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Abstract 
 
This dissertation reveals transformations in the conceptual and cultural understanding of 
labor during the socialist period of the People’s Republic of China. This era witnessed radical 
transformations in expert cultures (bai) that were marked through their redefinition in proximity 
to the proletariat (hong) and the forms of labor with which they were associated. I argue that the 
introduction of the people’s commune (renmin gongshe) in 1958 precipitated the widespread 
reorganization of multiple sites of labor in the Chinese countryside, including those not 
traditionally recognized as productive in the Marxist account, such as medicine, amateur art, 
higher education, and the home. I explore new revolutionary epistemes of work through analysis 
of literature, film, fine art, and visual culture from the period.  
In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I examine the processes by which 
professional cultures of work were converted into revolutionary cultures of labor, focusing on the 
transformation of medical and artistic labor through the figures of the barefoot doctor (chijiao 
yisheng) and the amateur artist. I argue that amateurism functioned as a means of converting 
highly professionalized, even rarified occupations such as the doctor or the artist, into practices 
of the everyday. The barefoot doctor redefined healing through their labor relationship with their 
communes, while the amateur artist transformed the specialized labor of the professionally 
trained artist into a productive leisure activity accessible to the worker, peasant, and soldier alike 
(gongnongbing qunzhong).  
 xi 
In the third and fourth chapters, I examine attempts to disrupt the divisions of labor that 
reproduced social inequality through chapters analyzing the filmic depiction of the Jiangxi 
Communist Labor University (Gongda), and literature depicting rural women’s “liberation” from 
domestic labor. In Juelie, a fictional film from 1975 set at Gongda, college students combined 
intellectual and productive labor in a transformation of the student from the elite, bespectacled 
urban intellectual of the May Fourth era into a diffuse, pluralistic subject position embedded 
within the socialist project and its productive social relations. Short stories by the authors Ru 
Zhijuan and Li Zhun published during the late 1950s and early 1960s examined the social 
consequences of re-organizing domestic labor on rural communes, resulting in works of fiction 
haunted by the endless physical and metaphorical reproduction of women around the 
countryside.   
This dissertation describes how the work associated with each of these sites—medicine, 
fine art, education, and the home—was re-positioned through their relationship to agricultural or 
productive labor in a “laboring” of the cultures associated with each. Through the embrace of the 
rural female subject, I find that the structures of feeling sustaining these revolutionary attempts at 
reorganizing labor and society were ultimately produced through the gendering of revolution 
itself. 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
 
 In the January/February 1969 issue of the New Left Review, the British historian Ronald 
Fraser penned a closing note to a series called “Work,” begun four years earlier in the journal. 
“The widespread interest in this series points to the lack of occasion under monopoly capitalism 
for serious individual expression of the meaning and purpose of work,” wrote Fraser, a gap that 
the series intended to fill by inviting people from all walks of life to speak, in their own words, 
about what they did for a living.1 The series of interviews with British workers from all walks of 
life proved so popular it was memorialized in two edited volumes, Work: Twenty Personal 
Accounts and Work, Volume 2.2 By giving voice to the working lives of British during the late 
1960s in explicitly personal and deeply emotional terms, Fraser hoped that “[talking] about work 
other than instrumentally [would], however fragmentarily, question its basic capitalist nature.”3 
 The series also expanded concepts of what constituted work to general readerships 
through its inclusion of what, at the time, was considered a diversity of occupations and forms of 
labor. Workers interviewed in the volume include an auto body mechanic, solicitor, miner, 
scientist, police officer, surgeon, and bus driver, among others, who might broadly be 
categorized as engaged in blue-collar or white-collar labor. There are also contributions from an 
unemployed factory worker, a housewife, as well as women performing what was then 
 
1 Ronald Fraser, “Note on ‘Work’ Series,” New Left Review, Jan/Feb 1969, p. 68.  
2 Work: Twenty Personal Accounts, ed. Ronald Fraser (London: Pelican Original, 1968), and Work, Volume 2: 
Twenty Personal Accounts, ed. Ronald Fraser (London: Pelican Original, 1969).  
3 Fraser, “Note on ‘Work’ Series,” p. 68.  
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considered traditionally male work. These contributions expanded narrow definitions of work 
beyond the realm of waged labor performed exclusively by one gender.  
 In his introduction to the second volume, Fraser noted that over the course of soliciting 
forty personal accounts, each worker, regardless of the work they engaged in, “felt the need for 
more control, control not only of the work process but of the purpose of work.” Noting “the basic 
capitalist contradiction between work that is inherently social and that yet remains controlled for 
private and sectional ends,”4 Fraser believed the desire for greater agency in one’s work spoke to 
the central role work plays in defining who we are, not simply as economic creatures (“rational 
actors”), but as feeling, socially imbricated ones as well. Put simply, work has always been about 
much more than just work. “Work is not only the way each of us makes a living; it is one of the 
principal ways in which we ‘make’ the society we live in and which in turn ‘makes’ us work,” 
writes Fraser. Defining work as “the human activity of mastering and transforming the given,” 
Fraser concluded that work “is (or should be) one of the principal ways in which we make 
ourselves.”5 
 The same January 1969 issue of the New Left Review also included an essay on a social 
movement that was then unfolding in China: the Cultural Revolution. Written by the China 
scholar W.J.F. Jenner, Jenner strives valiantly in the essay to provide a sympathetic overview of 
recent revolutionary developments in the People’s Republic of China, explaining how the 
movement had left “government structure shaken and in places replaced in popular rebellions 
from below and from the left.”6 Jenner believed the Cultural Revolution was best explained as a 
response to the sclerotic, bureaucracy-led changes to Chinese society that had taken place in the 
 
4 Fraser, “Note on ‘Work’ Series,” p. 68.  
5 Ronald Fraser, ed., Work, Volume 2: Twenty Personal Accounts (Harmondsworth: Pelican Original, 1969).  
6 W.J.F. Jenner, “The New Chinese Revolution,” New Left Review, Jan/Feb 1969, p. 83.  
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seventeen years since the establishment of the P.R.C. A new government led by bureaucratic 
elites had implemented what Jenner described as disappointingly gradual reforms, squandering 
their opportunity to create a more just and equal world through sweeping structural change. As a 
result, tensions and inequality had built up, with preferential treatment given to newly 
bureaucratized and professionalized members of the old elite classes: “The new regime gave 
security and far better career prospects to the professionals and civil servants while providing a 
peaceful and expanding market for manufacturers and shopkeepers,” Jenner explained. These 
groups were once again “entrenched in the official structure,” which enabled them to imagine 
“that they had a near-monopoly of some of the knowledge needed to run the state, the economy, 
and the cultural and educational world.”7 
 For a revolutionary state, the situation was untenable, and the Cultural Revolution thus 
entailed nothing less than a sweeping critique of “all ideas about Chinese society and politics 
held before 1966.” A committed socialist himself, Jenner had recently returned to Europe from a 
two-year stint in Beijing as a translator for the Foreign Languages Press, and he wrote frequently 
on matters revolutionary and Chinese for New Left Review. Sympathetic to the cause, Jenner 
certainly interpreted the events and import of the Cultural Revolution through “rose-colored 
lenses.”8 While some of his insights into the period remain incisive, other areas of the essay have 
not aged well. Jenner claims, for example, that the revolutionary ousting of “rightist” officials 
was judicious and limited, eliminating “only the most outrageous criminals” from the state 
machinery.9 Mao Zedong is praised for his pacifist tendencies, in particular for “his techniques 
 
7 Jenner, “The New Chinese Revolution,” p. 87.  
8 See Sigrid Schmalzer, “On the Appropriate Use of Rose-colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist 
China,” Isis 98, No. 3 (2007): 571-83.  
9 Jenner, “The New Chinese Revolution,” p. 86.  
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for renovating the Party with rectification rather than executions,” and Jenner concludes that on 
the whole, “The Cultural Revolution has done China’s position in the world no serious harm.”10 
 Although they wrote on different topics, both Fraser and Jenner concluded their pieces 
with optimistic conviction in the alternatives offered by socialist praxis. For Fraser, the “hopes 
and partial demands expressed” in the series on work represent socialism’s potential for 
reclaiming the dignity of work. Fraser suggests that by “integrating [the desires] expressed” by 
workers in the series with “the vision of a socialist hegemony,” we might be able to “create a 
society in which the necessity of work [is shaped] in accord with human needs,”11 righting the 
wrongs of the capitalist system and delivering agency into the hands of the people. To free labor 
from the rigid demands of capitalist rationality is to imagine a more humane way of working, 
and thus living. 
Similarly, Jenner was excited by socialism’s potential to correct against exploitative 
social structures by restoring agency to those who suffer its consequences. Jenner was troubled 
by the re-emergence of old elites as professionals, technocrats, and bureaucrats within the 
institutions of the new state, and he took seriously the Chinese Communist Party’s charge that 
there were capitalist saboteurs hidden among them, as exemplified by the former president Liu 
Shaoqi. In contrast to today’s predominant understanding of the Cultural Revolution as factional 
conflict driven by sparring political elites, Jenner understood it as a people’s movement that 
restored revolutionary agency to the average Chinese. To Jenner, “the very chaos and open-
endedness of the situation” was proof “that ordinary people have learnt to take more control over 
their own destinies.” 12 
 
10 Jenner, “The New Chinese Revolution,” p. 86, 95.  
11 Fraser, “Note on the ‘Work’ Series,” p. 68.  
12 Jenner, “The New Chinese Revolution,” p. 95.  
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In many ways, my dissertation is driven by some of the same impulses that moved Fraser 
and Jenner to publish in the same 1969 issue of New Left Review: to make sense, on the one 
hand, of the way that we live and structure our lives through work; and on the other, to make 
sense of the P.R.C.’s “last revolution,” to modify the title of Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael 
Schoenhal’s famous study of the Cultural Revolution.13 But where Fraser and Jenner were 
convinced in 1969 that the socialist project could offer powerful new agencies to those who 
sought to escape the tyrannies of capitalism, whether they were revolutionaries in China or 
laborers in Britain, five decades of changed thinking on work and revolution have complicated 
the picture. Since the 1970s, it does not appear that socialism has remade the face of labor across 
the globe so much as the rise and penetration of neoliberalism, with its extractive, globalized 
processes of manufacturing and trade.14 In China, not only has evidence of violence committed 
during the Cultural Revolution come to light, the state’s own repudiation of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1981 provided the ideological basis for its embrace of the market reforms that 
have since allowed the country to play a crucial role in the global articulation of capitalist 
production.15  
 
13 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).  
14 Lin Chun’s The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006) provides a 
provocative counter-argument to the idea that China’s economic development today has occurred in spite of, and not 
because of, the experiments of its socialist period. Quinn Slobodian’s Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth 
of Empire is a penetrating study of the rise and entrenchment of neoliberalism (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard 
University Press, 2018).  
15 Influential early studies on the Cultural Revolution include Richard Baum and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., The 
Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Anita Chan, Richard 
Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao’s China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Shaoguang Wang, Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution 
in Wuhan (Hong Kong: Oxford University press, 1995). For a prescient early account of the 1981 repudiation of the 
Cultural Revolution, see Lowell Dittmer, “Chapter Eight: Beyond Continuous Revolution” in China’s Continuous 
Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 210-271.    
 6 
Taken separately, today the fate of each of these projects—of socialist labor, on the one 
hand, and of the Cultural Revolution, on the other—seems ripe for reappraisal. It is my conceit 
that they are also intrinsically linked. By insisting on locating revolution through work and work 
through revolution, I ask how it was that they ever came to be decoupled in the first place. 
Afterall, what was it that socialism offered if not the possibility of an emancipation through 
labor? Where capitalist production created societies defined by a dystopia of alienation, 
atomization, and subordination, socialism has first and most commonly been understood 
reflexively, or as an inverse of capitalism. In his landmark study 1985 study of factory labor, 
Michael Burawoy wrote that “If the capitalist labor process is defined by the separation of 
conception and execution, then the socialist labor process must be the obverse—the reunification 
of conception and execution.”16 Thus, where capitalism is defined by its deskilling, socialism 
“heralds the restoration of the craft worker; if the capitalist labor process is defined by hierarchy, 
then the socialist labor process is defined by the abolition of hierarchy; control by capital gives 
way to control by workers.” 
Yet Burawoy himself concluded that in fact, the lived experience of socialism had 
demonstrated that the same separation of conception and execution that defined capitalist 
societies was instead transformed into the “defining elements of class structure” under state-led 
socialism. This, in turn, led to the state’s oppressive presence as “appropriator of surplus and 
regulator of production.”17 What, then, is, or was, socialism? How exactly did it reimagine the 
relationship between work and labor to value? How did the attempts to transform this 
 
16 Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes Under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 
1985), p. 157.  
17 Burawoy, Politics of Production, p. 195.  
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relationship produce new epistemes of thought, and how, in turn, were those produced and 
reproduced in the defining narratives of the period?  
In this spirit, I begin my project from the premise that the transition to socialist and 
collective production methods in the P.R.C.—the process of producing the socialist economy—
itself produced value that went beyond the measurable and material value of commodities 
produced. By the socialist period, I mean the period stretching from the late 1940s to the early 
1970s. In order to better understand what that value was, I examine cultural texts from the 
Maoist period in China that explicitly depicted different forms of labor as embodied through 
narrative. I argue that the introduction of the people’s commune (renmin gongshe) in 1958 
facilitated the widespread reorganization of multiple sites of labor in China. These sites were 
centered principally but not exclusively around the countryside, and I focus on sites of labor not 
traditionally recognized as productive in the Marxist account, such as medicine, amateur 
artmaking, higher education, and the home. 
Each chapter focuses on representations of a specific form of labor, exploring 
transformations in the conceptual and cultural understanding of labor during the socialist period 
in the P.R.C. As such, each chapter is written as a micro-genealogy of sorts of a specific field, 
and how the work associated with it changed during the socialist period, resulting in micro-
histories of the “whole way of life” associated with that field and its work in the socialist 
period.18 Chapter 2 takes up the question of amateur art practice (yeyu meishu chuangzuo) and its 
attempt to convert the rarified practice of professional, academy-trained artists into an everyday 
praxis, while Chapter 3 examines filmic, visual, and literary representations of the barefoot 
 
18 My understanding of culture is indebted to Raymond Williams’s definition of culture as “a whole way of life,” 
and not just the genres and forms of art that have historically been recognized as Culture. Raymond Williams, 
Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).  
 8 
doctor (chijiao yisheng) to trace its rise as a discursive figure signifying an ambitious but 
ultimately failed attempt to reposition medical labor within society. Chapter 4 looks at the 
integration of intellectual and agricultural labor in the film Juelie, a fictional film depicting the 
founding of the real-life Jiangxi Community Labor University. Finally, Chapter 5 takes up 
representations of domestic labor on rural communes in literature by authors including Ru 
Zhijuan and Li Zhun, whose short stories explored the new social terrains engendered through 
the agricultural commune’s programs to collectivize women’s domestic labor.  
Where other forms of scholarship make claims to representational accuracy, narrative and 
its cultural texts help us to approach the substance of the relationship between cultural 
production and political economy. Adopting a Gramscian vocabulary, I approach my primary 
sources not as representations of a specific socio-historical reality, but rather as an “ethico-
political realm” where “a social order’s legitimacy and cohesion could be secured and 
reproduced, modified or even overthrown.”19 I am referring, of course, to the concept of 
ideology. Where an earlier generation of scholars may have read the fictions of the socialist 
period for insight into its lived experience, I prefer to read fiction as fantasy. A short story 
centered around the marriage between a couple living on a rural commune tells us less, for 
example, about the contemporary conditions for agricultural labor, and more about the emergent 
fantasies of fulfillment—of marriage, of métier—that were ascribed to them, and the conflict that 
the author imagined stood in their way.  
These stories give us insight into the narratives that cultural producers found most 
relevant and compelling, the structures of feeling that sustained sentiment during the socialist 
period. By embracing fictional narratives form the socialist period as fantasies, a space in which 
 
19 Geoff Eley, “Reading Gramsci in English: Observations on the Reception of Antonio Gramsci in the English-
speaking World, 1957-82,” European History Quarterly 14 (4) 1984: p. 443.  
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visions of the cultural frameworks structuring the production and reproduction of society are 
themselves produced, these narratives provide access to the autonomous processes through 
which the ideological hegemony of the socialist episteme was produced. I find Raymond 
William’s concept of the “structure of feeling” particularly useful as a means of discussing the 
social acceptability of particular narrative conventions, and of how they emerge at a given time 
in history as well as the relationship between these dramatic conventions and a given text. 
However intangible, these structures of feeling are essential scaffolding bridging the gulf 
between the aspirations projected upon socialism, and the complexities of its historical record as 
actionable programs of utopic vision.  
In this project, the year 1958 emerges as a definitive marker. While the broader 
epistemological shifts around cultures and concepts of labor extended well before 1958 and even 
1949, the year 1958 is significant for several reasons: most closely associated with the launch of 
the Great Leap Forward, the year itself has come to function as a shorthand for the catastrophic 
failures of the utopic Maoist project, including the people’s commune (renmin gongshe), the 
backyard furnace programs, large-scale irrigation and public works projects, and the famine that 
followed. Thus, scholarship on the Great Leap Forward has a strong tendency to understand the 
period as pre-determined by its failures. Yet as the historian Maurice Meisner emphasizes, when 
the Great Leap Forward was announced in January 1958, it was little more than a slogan that 
came with “no detailed blueprints. It was the project of a utopian social vision, not an economic 
plan on the order of a five-year plan.”20 Instead, the specific policy initiatives for which it is 
remembered were improvised, and produced as the revolutionary episteme the Leap embraced 
book hold.  
 
20 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1999), p. 192.   
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I endeavor to understand the Great Leap Forward first and foremost as a way of thinking 
that eventually produced the signature policies with which it is now conflated. If each historical 
action presupposes a cultural framework, then it becomes incumbent to examine the system of 
values in which these actions occur. Cast in this light, the year 1958 materializes as a moment of 
arrival for a new mass culture, later entrenched by the actionable programs of utopic vision that 
followed. Although this emphasis may seem like a minor issue of historiography, the 
conventional approach to the Great Leap Forward—through its failures first—can only ever 
result in a pre-determined analysis of the period that takes culture as sheer propaganda, and 
broad popular support as the brain-washing of a captive people.  
My dissertation is roughly divided into two thematic sections: in the first, I examine the 
processes by which professional cultures of work transformed into revolutionary cultures of 
labor, focusing on the transformation of medical and artistic labor through the figure of the 
barefoot doctor and the amateur artist. In the second section, I examine attempts to disrupt the 
divisions of labor that structured processes of social reproduction, with chapters on the filmic 
depiction of the integration of student intellectual labor with productive labor at the Jiangxi 
Communist Labor University, and literature depicting rural women’s “liberation” from domestic 
labor on rural communes. I argue that although implementation of the rural commune was 
ultimately short-lived as a political campaign, it triggered a deep and lasting transformation of 
contemporary Chinese mass culture. Borrowing Michael Denning’s concept of the “laboring” of 
culture, I observe a similar transformation of Chinese culture through a pervasive use of “labor” 
and its synonyms in the rhetoric of the period (a “laboring” of language), the increased influence 
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of and participation of rural, lower-class Chinese in the culture and arts, and the new visibility of 
the labor of cultural production.21 
Two sites were crucial to the laboring of contemporary Chinese culture. I use the term 
“site” in a dual sense, both in the material sense (spaces and bodies) as well as in the symbolic. 
These two sites were the countryside and the female gender. Narratives centering rural and 
female subjects participating in medical, artistic, intellectual, and agricultural labor disrupted the 
class structure of elite control that had previously defined these systems. Gail Hershatter 
synthesizes the “laboring” of culture with its “gendering,” arguing in her latest monograph that 
“women’s labor and Woman as a symbol were central to the Party-state vision of socialist 
modernization.”22 Nearly to a rule, these narratives appear on the heels of the Great Leap 
Forward campaign, suggesting that the implementation of the rural commune had far-reaching 
impacts not simply on the organization of productive labor, but also on the dramatic narrative 
conventions of the period in written, filmic, and visual texts.  
When the P.R.C. introduced the people’s commune (renmin gongshe) in the fall of 1958, 
the commune was the most developed and visible manifestation of programs seeking to 
reorganize land and rural labor that, by the late 1950s, had already been underway for decades. 
Beginning with land reform programs in the Jiangxi Soviet, the intended cumulative effect of 
these efforts was to transform private farming into a system of collectivized agricultural 
production, in effect a complete reorganization of the means of production that entailed not only 
radical reorganizations of labor, but widespread and pervasive social and cultural change—or, 
the emergence of new mass culture centered in the Chinese countryside. Rather than thinking 
 
21 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Verso, 2011).  
22 Gail Hershatter, Women and China’s Revolutions (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), p. 2. 
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about the people’s commune as an isolated program limited in historical scope to 1958 to 1983, 
the years in which it was implemented as a policy, the collectivization of land and agricultural 
labor in China should be thought of as a planned yet experimental process of radical social and 
structural change whose penetration and implementation was uneven, and contained significant 
regional variation in its expression.23 Furthermore, it bears emphasizing that the P.R.C.’s 
introduction of the people’s commune took place against a greater post-war trend in the global 
South toward agrarian reform, with organizations in diverse national contexts seeking to protect 
rural inhabitants from the usury of the landlord.24 
 In China, the people’s commune built upon pre-existing programs of land reform, mutual 
aid teams, and agricultural co-operatives to achieve what state planners hoped would be the full 
exploitation of agricultural labor power. Programs of land reform were the first step in this 
teleology of agricultural revolution in China: by appropriating land, which itself constituted the 
basis of the means of production in the countryside, the C.C.P. delivered land from private hands 
to the state. Attempts at land reform began in the Jiangxi Soviet, continued on a national scale in 
1950, and were estimated to be largely completed by the spring of 1953.25 The establishment of 
mutual aid teams followed closely on the heels of land reform, wherein several neighboring 
families were grouped together to share agricultural resources, including tools, draft animals, and 
field labor.26 The mutual aid team introduced the work point instead of wages as compensation, 
 
23 For scholarship examining the experimental aspects of P.R.C. agricultural reform, see Yiping Huang, Agricultural 
Reform in China: Getting Institutions Right (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Raphael Shen, 
China’s Economic Reform: An Experiment in Pragmatic Socialism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000); and 
Guoli Liu and Lowell Dittmer, eds., China’s Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).   
24 Zhun Xu, From Commune to Capitalism,: How China’s Peasants Lost Collective Farming and Gained Urban 
Poverty (Monthly Review: New York, 2018), pp. 19-20. Contemporaneous attempts at land reform around the globe 
include in Taiwan, Korea, Egypt, Peru, and Chile.  
25 For a fuller account of the land reform process, see Chapter 5.  
26 For more on mutual aid teams, see Chapter 5.  
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basing the recognition of value around agricultural productivity, and the agricultural co-operative 
further entrenched these hierarchical structures of compensation for productive labor by 
expanding the pooling of resources from a few households to hundreds, and establishing 
cooperative oversight of all agricultural resources, including land, labor, and equipment, such as 
tools and draught animals.  
 The people’s commune represented the final stage of this utopic transformation of society 
through labor, wherein the implementation of the people’s commune would transcend the mere 
organization of production to become “the organizers of the way of life.”27 As it happens, 
attempts at reorganizing the entirety of a society’s way of living entails attention to women’s 
labor, and thus the original plans for the people’s commune included programs intended to 
collectivize domestic labor, providing the social services necessary to “free” women for labor in 
the fields. Wu Zhipu, party secretary of Henan county, where the nation’s first commune was 
established, wrote that the people’s commune would fulfill “seven basic requirements: eating, 
clothing, housing, childbirth, education, medical treatment, marriage and funeral expenses.”28 
Those responsibilities that were traditionally considered the exclusive domain of women, such as 
childbirth, childcare, cooking, and clothing families, would be collectivized by the commune: 
commune-run maternity wards would facilitate the safe and hygienic delivery of children; 
commune-organized nurseries (tuo’er suo, or “place for leaving children”), kindergartens, 
primary and secondary school would substitute for home childcare; commune-organized sewing 
 
27 “Greet the Upsurge in Forming People’s Communes,” Hongqi, 7 (Sept. 1958): p. 13. Also included in People’s 
Communes in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 10. 
28 Wu Zhipu, “From Agricultural Producers’ Co-operatives to People’s Communes,” Hongqi 7 (Sept. 16, 1958): pp. 
5-11. Reprinted in People’s Communes in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 37. In the same 
article, Wu waffled between committing to seven versus ten basic requirements. The “ten basic requirements” 
included the first seven as well as fuel for winter, haircuts, and theater. 
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circles (fengren zu) would produce clothing; and public canteens (gonggong shitang) would 
eliminate the need to cook. 
 In practice, many of these initiatives to transform the entirety of the way of life in rural 
China were short-lived and underfunded. Eating at the commune canteen and utilizing its 
childcare services was voluntary, and staff at canteens, nurseries, and sewing teams were “paid 
in accordance with the principal of ‘no losses and no profits.’”29 Most public canteens did not 
last for more than two months, and many rural primary and secondary schools established from 
the late 1950s to the mid-1970s were dissolved following the re-organization of China’s 
education infrastructure in the years following the end of the Cultural Revolution.30 Still, the 
historical experience of agricultural collectivization profoundly impacted the organization of 
productive, social, and cultural life. Mutual aid teams and communes organized villagers into 
new rural communities, forming social structures and networks that rivaled, and even threatened 
to replace, existing kinship networks. Collectivization competed with private family economies 
for primacy of place in the organization of rural life, weakening the base of patrilineal authority 
as the commune oversaw the direction of agricultural and small-scale industrial production, 
supplied labor for infrastructure projects, and delivered rural healthcare, education, and 
security.31  
 
29 “Tentative regulations (draft) of the Weihsing (Sputnik) People’s Commune,” Aug. 7, 1985, Renmin ribao, 
republished in People’s Communes in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 73.  
30 See Li Chunfeng, “Historical Observations Regarding the Large-Scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in 
Hebei Province,” in Agricultural Reform and Rural Transformation in China Since 1949, eds. Thomas David 
DuBois and Li Huaiyin (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 115-132. For more on the dissolution of rural primary and 
secondary schools at the end of the Cultural Revolution, see Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 
20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal development Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 484-511; and Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Educational Reforms and Their Impact on 
China’s Rural Development (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), pp. 157-176. 
31 For more on militias established within communes, see Joshua Eisenman, Red China’s Green Revolution, pp. 150-
179; and Gordon Bennett, Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People’s Commune (Oxfordshire, U.K.: Taylor and 
Francis, 2019), pp. 63-70.  
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 Indeed, reorganizing the countryside as a site of productive labor necessarily involved 
reorganizing the multiple other sites of labor constellated around it, as party control over the 
means of production entailed a vast change to the character of existing social relations. Yet 
existing scholarship on the people’s commune has focused nearly to a rule on answering the 
question of how successful the commune was as a novel system for organizing productive 
agricultural labor. The mainstream scholarship on this question understands the commune as 
essentially an obstacle to economic growth that restrained the rural economy, prevented technical 
innovation, and resulted in a net decrease in agricultural output. Kenneth Lieberthal, for 
example, faults the commune with being “too large to link rewards closely with labor,” which he 
argues “[fit] poorly with the natural bases of identity among peasants,” or the patrilineal clan.32 
To John Fairbank and Merle Goldman, agricultural collectivization was a program of pure 
ideology, a violation of a supposed rural natural order that was completely divorced from reality 
and represented “the final penetration of the state into the farm household, [and] the 
politicization of peasant life in order to control it.”33 This scholarship draws direct links between 
the formation of the commune and the famine and poverty millions of Chinese experienced in 
from 1959 to 1961.34 Recently, scholars espousing what Joshua Eisenman calls a “minority 
 
32 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, second edition (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2003), p. 106.  
33 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap Press, 2006), p. 371.   
34 For scholarship on the Great Famine in particular, see Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 
1958-1962 (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2012); Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine 
(London: John Murray, 1996); Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating 
Catastrophe, 1958-1962 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), as well as Cormac Ó Gráda, Felix Wemheuer, and Anthony 
Garnaut’s reviews of Dikötter’s monograph, Cormac Ó Gráda, “Great Leap Into Famine: A Review Essay,” 
Population and Development Review 37 (1) 2011: pp. 191-202, Felix Wemheuer, “Sites of Horror: Mao’s Great 
Famine,” The China Journal 66 (2011): pp. 155-162, Anthony Garnaut, “Hard Facts and Half-Truths: The New 
Archival History of China’s Great Famine,” China Information 27 (2) 2013: pp. 223-246; Daniel Vukovich, 
“Accounting for the Great Leap Forward: Missing Millions, Excess Deaths, and a Crisis of Chinese Proportions” in 
China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C. (Oxfordshire, U.K.: Routledge, 2011); Ding 
Shu and Song Yongyi, eds., Dayuejin Da jihuang: Lishi he bijiao shiye xia de shishi he sibian, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: 
Tianyuan shushi chuban, 2009); Li Rui, Dayuejin qinli ji, 2 vols., (Haikou: Nanfang chubanshe, 1999); and 
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view” have argued that the agricultural commune was, in fact, a productive mechanism. “Simply 
put, the Chinese commune was not an economic failure remedied by decollectivization,” writes 
Eisenman. “During the 1970s, the commune was able to support a larger, longer-living 
population on a diminishing amount of arable land and to overcome high capital depreciation 
rates.” If previous scholars missed the institution’s economic contributions, Eisenman argues that 
“the explanation… hinges to a large extent on the lack of available data about the commune, and 
the success of the four-decades long official campaign to downplay its productivity to justify its 
abolition on economic rather than political grounds.”35  
 Answering the question of whether the commune was successful in its attempt to increase 
agricultural productivity is important, but ultimately one that is beyond the limits of this project. 
I am sympathetic to the argument that the dismantling of the commune was a politicized act that 
has been successfully framed as unpolitical, and even as I would like to see further engagement 
with the argument. Instead of pursuing the productivist bottom line, my dissertation aims to 
complement the existing scholarship on the rural commune by illustrating how the establishment 
of the rural commune engendered transformations in adjacent and overlapping sites of labor in 
the countryside, particularly those not traditionally recognized as productive in the Marxist 
account. I trace the impact to these sites of labor not through an empirical account of 
 
Kimberly Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer, eds., Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China’s Great Leap 
Forward and the Famine (Vancouver: University Press of British Columbia, 2011).  
35 Other scholars espousing a “minority view” of the communes as productive mechanisms include Barry Naughton, 
Sigrid Schmalzer, Benedict Stavis, and Lynn T. White. See Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and 
Growth (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2007); Sigrid Schmalzer, Red Revolution Green Revolution: Scientific 
Farming in Socialist China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Benedict Stavis, People’s Communes and 
Rural Development in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee of Cornell University, 1974); Benedict 
Stavis, Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural Development in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural 
Development Committee of Cornell University, 1974); and Lynn T. White, Unstately Power: Volume 1 Local 
Causes of China’s Economic Reforms (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 
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productivity, or technical and professional standards of success, but by examining narrative and 
conceptual shifts in the stories told about these types of labor.  
Examining forms of labor that are less privileged in the classic Marxist account of labor 
entails several consequential shifts. First, we must plumb the boundaries of what is considered 
work and what is not, a distinction that lies at the heart of how we measure and produce (or 
produce by measuring) the vitality of a society.36 Often, the most meaningful designation of 
work’s legitimacy is simply whether or not one is paid to perform it. Yet as Andrea Komlosy and 
others have demonstrated, in modern times this privileging of gainful employment outside the 
home over other forms of labor has narrowed our understanding of work to the point where we 
now understand it as largely restricted to the performance of waged labor,37 the “centerpiece of 
the late capitalist economic system,” as Kathi Weeks describes it.38 Fraser and others understood 
this phenomenon in the late 1960s and attempted to counter it by introducing greater diversity 
into the range of livelihoods that were recognized as meaningful forms of work.  
But where Fraser attempted to expand the boundaries of what was considered work, I am 
trying to ask how we arrived at such a narrow understanding of it. In responding to this question, 
I make several contentions. The first is that the experience of socialism played a key and under-
explored role in the consolidation of the concept of work around waged labor. Historical 
experience has amply illustrated the ways in which the pursuit of the bottom line defines 
capitalist societies; less appreciated, but not unknown, are the continuities between the processes 
 
36 The organizational behavioralist Stephen Fineman helpfully offers in his general primer on work that it can be 
“divided broadly into what is officially counted and what is not,” a distinction that is widely shared by social 
scientists of work and labor. Stephen Fineman, Work: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 13.  
37 Andrea Komlosy, Work: The Last 1,000 Years, trans. Loren Balhorn and Jacob K. Watson (New York: Verso, 
2018).  
38 Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 6.  
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of socialist and capitalist production.39 If capitalism renders labor-power into a commodity, and 
if, throughout the twentieth-century, socialism has held the promise of an alternative approach to 
the valuation of labor, then the socialist experience must also be relevant to any examination of a 
shifting consensus around what work is and how it is valued.  
My second contention is that what happened in socialist China did not happen in 
isolation, and that socialist Chinese expressions of the project and culture of work are necessarily 
imbricated in the global articulation of work as an epistemological regime. By examining the 
limits of the concept of work in socialist China, I ask which divisions of labor persisted even as 
the state sought a utopic erasure of the privilege between different forms of labor (for example, 
of the privilege associated with mental labor over manual labor, naoli laodong he tili laodong, 
between urban and rural labor, between industrial and agricultural labor). Further, because any 
division of labor is simultaneously classed, gendered, and racialized, probing the boundaries of 
the construction of work is also a way of asking how socialist actors attempted to transform the 
hierarchies of class, gender, and race that had previously structured work and life. Which 
hierarchies remained in spite of these attempts to transform them? 
Finally, by examining unconventional categories of labor, I emphasize process over 
product, attempting to make sense of the system that produces workers, and not just the symbolic 
final product of their labor. For example, in a chapter on the new cultures of medical labor 
specific to the socialist period in China, this entails focusing on the ideas that underwrote the 
need for medical workers who were differently positioned within society (the barefoot doctors), 
 
39 Important scholarship in this vein include Michael Burawoy’s The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes Under 
Capitalism and Socialism (New York: Verso, 1985), The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to 
Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), and Martha Lampland’s The Object of Labor: 
Commodification in Socialist Hungary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and The Value of Labor: The 
Science of Commodification in Hungary, 1920-1956 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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as opposed to the health outcomes of their patients. In a chapter on attempts to collectivize the 
domestic labor of women in rural communes, this entails examining the new narratives that were 
told about the type of work women could do, as opposed to measuring the historical success of 
initiatives like the communal canteen. In a chapter on amateur art practice, this entails examining 
the processes by which workers, peasants, and soldiers (gongnongbing) were encouraged to 
participate in artmaking, as opposed to the formal qualities of their final output. And in a chapter 
on new university cultures that prioritized the participation of the lower classes, this entails 
attention to new narratives of rural university culture as opposed to the educational outcomes 
(test scores, graduation rates, employment rates post-graduation, career placement, etc.) of that 
period.  
In my project, the professional emerges as a key problematic troubling the intervention 
into the structures of work and labor. Simultaneously the embodiment of the accumulation of 
work itself, as well as its isolation from productive social relations, the professional is 
ambiguously situated within society: is the professional handmaiden to capitalist interest, a 
“transitional” class like the petty bourgeois bridging the capitalist class with the proletarian labor 
it exploits? Or are professionals themselves a sort of mental proletariat, surviving off the sale of 
their labor power? After the establishment of the P.R.C., what was clear was that the “old 
experts” inherited from the former Republic of China were members of elite social classes, 
privileged through their distance from rural, agricultural, and manual forms of labor. The crisis 
around the countryside was thus doubly and triply amplified by rural poverty, which left its 
residents without access to the education and infrastructure necessary for cultivating 
professionalized forms of expertise. These professionals were often known pejoratively as “white 
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experts” (baise zhuanjia), in contrast to the virtue of being red (hong), where red was an index of 
both proletarian class and politics. 
But what was problematic about the white expert was not necessarily their expertise, but 
rather their person. Guo Moruo, who was by then heavily involved in questions of intellectual 
and creative policy as a party official, wrote that expertise and redness had been isolated under 
the governance of the previous state. But now that all educational institutions were under C.C.P. 
control, anyone participating in the construction of the new society was automatically a red 
expert (hongse zhuanjia). According to Guo, the arrival of socialism had changed the nature of 
expert knowledge itself, rendering it a neutral, modular possession whose pursuit did not itself 
produce distance from the experience of the everyday.40 That same year, Mao gave speeches in 
which he emphasized the need “to build strong ranks of proletarian intellectuals,” hoping to have 
a veritable corps of red experts and professionals in service within ten years, a vision shared by 
Liu Shaoqi, who similarly dreamt of a battalion of “professors, educators, scientists, journalists, 
artists, lawyers, and Marxist-Leninist theoreticians” who belonged both to the working class and 
the party.41  
The party’s programs to create new “red and expert (youhong youzhuan)” cadres was part 
of a conscious attempt to recognize and resolve the major social conflicts understood to be 
driving injustice in the “old society:” the privileging of urban labor over rural labor, mental labor 
over manual labor, and between industrial labor over agricultural labor. By locating privileged 
 
40 Guo Moruo, “Taolun hong yu zhuan—da qingnian tongxuemen de yi feng gongkaoxin [A discussion of redness 
and expertise: an open reply to young students],” from Lun you hong you zhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: 
Beijing qingnian chubanshe, 1958), pp. 108-11.  
41 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong sixiang wansui [Long live Mao Zedong Thought], vol. 1 (Wuhan: Neibu xuexi 
[Internally published materials], 1968), pp. 117. Liu Shaoqi, “Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai Beijing gejie qingzhu Shiyue 
shehuizhuyi geming sishi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua” [Remarks by Liu Shaoqi at the all-inclusive fortieth 
anniversary celebration of the socialist October revolution in Beijing], reprinted as the introduction to Lun youhong 
youzhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: Beijing qingnian chubanshe, 1958), p. 3. 
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forms of labor within the social relations of underprivileged forms of labor, programs such as the 
barefoot doctor, amateur art study groups, labor universities, and collectivized domestic labor on 
communes challenged the reification of professional work as well as its exclusion of women.  
In this dissertation, I often use the terms “work” and “labor” interchangeably in an 
attempt to trouble the distinction between the two. My use of the terms “work” (usually rendered 
as gongzuo) and “labor” (laodong) diverges in important ways from its usage in primary sources. 
I proceed under the assumption that intellectual labor, domestic labor, artistic labor, and medical 
labor are legitimate and existing forms of labor, yet my primary sources use the term 
“labor/laodong” to refer almost exclusively to productive labor in the classic political economic 
sense—of activity, such as factory or farm labor, that results in the production of goods for 
consumption. Thus, using the term “labor” to discuss the intellectual labor of the university 
student, the domestic labor of the rural housewife, the artistic labor of the amateur artist, or the 
medical labor of the barefoot doctor, is an anachronistic means of discussing the changes in the 
work outside of the productive labor that students, housewives, artists, and healers did. I share 
my approach to the interchangeability of the terms work and labor with Kathi Weeks, who 
rejects a distinction between the two in order to seek a critique of both, a theoretical beginning 
that makes it possible to imagine what she calls a “postwork future.”42  
Indeed, during the Maoist period, attempts to improve society were accomplished 
through precisely the transformation of the relationship between the student, the housewife, the 
artist, and the healer to productive labor. Thus, the barefoot doctor is distinguished not through 
their training and credentials but through their participation in productive labor; the rural 
housewife’s lot is improved not through her domestic labor but by her participation in the 
 
42 Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work, pp. 14-6.  
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agricultural labor of her commune; the fine arts are revitalized by the participation of amateurs 
from the laboring masses; and the university student is transformed through the integration of 
production and higher education. Narratives from the Maoist period reflect the belief that 
inviting the laboring masses to participate in the work of doctors, artists, and educators would 
create mass—as opposed to elite—cultures of healing, fine art, domesticity, and education. 
Inviting women to participate in productive labor would free them from the exploitation of their 
unwaged domestic labor.  
Weeks’s greater call to begin the work of articulating antiwork politics and a postwork 
imaginary draws attention to the productivist tendency that underscores both our late-stage 
capitalist present as well as its historical alternative. Productivism remains a profoundly 
unresolved legacy specific not just to capitalist logics, but to Marxist thought and the historical 
experience of socialism as well—no less so than in the P.R.C., where Engels’s assertion that 
“labor created humanity” (laodong chuangzao ren) was taken as a point of departure and labor 
itself seen as the very ether from which humanity had been born.43 As Jean Baudrillard points 
out, a “critical theory of the mode of production does not touch the principle of production,” 
resulting in an inability to break from the values of work for production and allowing for the 
sanctification of labor to be reproduced in Marxist political economy.44 To Moishe Postone, this 
is the difference between Marxism as a “critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor” as 
 
43 Sigrid Schmalzer, “Labor created humanity: Cultural Revolution Science on Its Own Terms,” in The Chinese 
Revolution as History, eds. Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 185-210. 
44 Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, trans. Mark Poster (Candor, NY: Telos Press, 1975), pp. 17-8.  
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opposed to a “critique of labor in capitalism.”45 Fantasies of a limitless productivity haunt the 
capitalist and revolutionary imagination alike.46  
Indeed, the first step of Lenin’s teleology of communist development begins with the 
overthrow of capitalism, and is followed by a socialist phase in which “factory discipline” 
spreads from the proletariat to the entirety of society. The revolutionary dismantling of capital is 
meanwhile paused in order to implement the progressive development of the nation’s productive 
forces. In Lenin’s account, socialism therefore entails a provisional escalation of capitalist 
development, a contradiction that will be redeemed when communism is eventually achieved and 
the proletariat inherits the capitalist’s command over production. In the P.R.C., in spite of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s guerilla roots, the country’s first priorities were to lay the 
bureaucratic and institutional foundations for a strong, centralized state and to foster the growth 
of modern industry. The entwinement of the socialist project with productivist ethics, then, raises 
the question of whether or not socialism simply amounts to new ways of overseeing the same 
modes of production perfected in the pursuit of capitalist extraction.  
Labor thus becomes a fraught praxis lying at the heart of the Chinese socialist project. 
Yet as a field, labor studies of modern China has largely chosen to focus on industrial labor 
relations after the death of Mao, particularly under the modern enterprise system that defines the 
economy of China from the 1990s on. As Mary Gallagher argues, during this period continuing 
economic deregulation, increased domestic competition, and China’s integration within the 
 
45 Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
46 Branko Milanovic argues for a similar account of the historical experience of communism as “a social system that 
enabled backward and colonized societies to abolish feudalism, regain economic and political independence, and 
build indigenous capitalism,” ultimately leading to the formation of what Milanovic calls a system of  “political 
capitalism” that defines the experiences of countries such as China, Vietnam, and Russia. See Branko Milanovic, 
Chapter 3, “Political Capitalism” in Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System that Rules the World (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Belknap Press, 2019).  
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global economy has meant that “public ownership as a core characteristic of socialism is 
increasingly irrelevant for the determination of labor relations.”47 Landmark studies in the field, 
such as Dorothy Solinger’s Contesting Citizenship in China, Anita Chan’s China’s Workers 
Under Assault, and Ching Kwan Lee’s investigation into Chinese factory oversight, emphasize 
the declining status of urban state-sector workers and the abysmal working conditions of migrant 
workers.48 This approach is based around an assumption of worker’s rights that is itself 
contingent upon the legal articulation of either citizenship-based rights, or of universal human 
rights. Indeed, while labor scholars around the globe are divided on whether workers’ struggles 
should be linked to human rights, within Chinese studies scholars have explicitly linked 
scholarship of labor rights with human rights,49 an approach that privileges individual autonomy 
and legal and commercial forms of intervention over collective mobilization.  
Perhaps owing to the immediate legibility of the labor of exploited waged workers under 
capitalist work regimes, the labor studies of modern China have concentrated on the working 
conditions of industrial workers in the era of the P.R.C’s integration into the global market 
economy. This bias reflects the origins of labor history as a field, which grew out of European 
efforts in the twentieth-century to educate and organize urban workers. The field is thus typically 
delimited as a sub-discipline of social history specializing in the history of the urban working 
class and its political mobilization. This approach has the effect of rendering China’s rural and 
socialist pasts rather illegible as a labor history. Where the field does address the legacies of the 
 
47 Mary Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 203.  
48 Dorothy Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Anita Chan, China’s Workers Under Assault: The Exploitation of 
Labor in a Globalizing Economy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Ching Kwan Lee, “From Organized Dependence 
to Disorganized Despotism: Changing Labour Regimes in Chinese Factories,” China Quarterly 157 (1999): pp. 44-
71.  
49 See, for example, Anita Chan, “Labor Standards and Human Rights: The Case of Chinese Workers Under Market 
Socialism,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 20, No. 4 (1998): pp. 886-904.  
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socialist period, the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s are often treated as an aberrational if 
still essential historical set-piece in the narrative of multi-national capital’s inevitable arrival in 
the P.R.C.50 Labor historians dispute the extent to which the socialist history of the P.R.C. does 
or does not matter to the development of industry in contemporary China, but few scholars 
foreground socialist experiences in their narrative of the arrival of the present, essentially 
forming a consensus on the underlying assumption that what was socialist about the economic 
system of the P.R.C. has deteriorated to the extent that it is now nearly unrecognizable as such.51  
I dwell on the labor studies of modern China in part because this project is explicitly in 
conversation with the concept of labor, its definition, disciplinary boundaries, and the 
consequences of the manner in which these understands are mobilized. I assert that for labor 
histories of the P.R.C. not to engage squarely with the complicated legacies of the socialist 
period is only a partial record of change. Any labor history of the P.R.C. that focuses on the 
urban to the exclusion of the rural has similarly misunderstood the nature of the revolutionary re-
organizations of labor that laid at the heart of the Maoist project to disrupt and improve the 
prevailing organizing structures of society. At the same time, it seems clear that many critical 
insights from the study of work and labor within the humanities have not yet been brought to 
bear on the full record of the P.R.C’s history. For example, scholarship that explicitly utilizes 
concepts of domestic labor in the Chinese context is nearly to a rule focused on the last four 
 
50 Studies of the socialist period that constitute exceptions to this rule include Mark Frazier’s The Making of the 
Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution, and Labor Management (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986).  
51 A notable exception to this approach is Joel Andreas’s new study, which goes a long way toward offering a 
coherent narrative on the changing political status of Chinese factory workers from the founding of the P.R.C. to the 
present. Andreas uses the lens of the changing terms of industrial workers’ “industrial citizenship” in a narrative of 
urban industry that places equal, if not greater weight on the historical experience of the Maoist period. See Joel 
Andreas, Disenfranchized: The Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2019).  
 26 
decades.52 The same is true to an even greater extent for scholarship examining affective labor,53 
immaterial labor, or cognitive capital in the Chinese context.54 And while the influence of leftist, 
specifically Marxist feminist traditions of thought on social reproduction theory is widely and 
explicitly acknowledged, scholars who identify as working within the frameworks of social 
reproduction theory rarely bring their analytical framework to bear on the socialist and/or 
Chinese contexts, leaving the Chinese socialist historical record underexplored as a relevant 
praxis of social reproduction theory.  
Consequently, the commune’s impact on the Chinese imaginary has been difficult to 
measure.55 To that effect, the discourses of amateurism and of social reproduction allow me to 
explore how understandings of labor changed. In my project, I apply insights from the study of 
amateurism in both fine art and medicine in order to examine the transformation of artistic and 
 
52 For a few examples, see: Yan Hairong, New Masters, New Servants: Migration, Development, and Women 
Workers (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Tamara Jacka, Women’s Work in Rural China: Change and 
Continuity in an Era of Reform (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Luo Mengsha, Gender 
Division of Labor in China: Changes in Domestic Work and Market Work in the Early 21st Century (Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong Libraries, 2019).  
53 For example, see Xia Zhang, “One Life for Sale: Youth Culture, Labor Politics, and New Idealism in China,” 
positions: east asia critique (2015) 23 (3): pp. 515-543; Xiao Liu, “Information Fantasies: Culture and Media in the 
Post-Mao ‘New Era,’” (Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 2013); and Carlos Rojas and Ralph A. 
Litzinger, eds., Ghost Protocol: Development and Displacement in Global China (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2016).  
54 For example, see Jack Linchuan Qiu, “China’s Digital Working Class and Circuits of Labor,” Communication and 
the Public Vol. 3, Issue 1 (2018): pp. 5-18; Daniel Vukovich, “The China-Reference and Orientalism in the Global 
Economy” in China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C. (London: Routledge, 2011); 
Silvia Lindtner, “Hackerspaces and the Internet of Things in China: How Makers are Reinventing Industrial 
Production, Innovation, and the Self,” China Information Vol. 28 (2014): pp. 145-67.  
55 Literature examining cultural depictions of the commune, particularly during the Great Leap Forward period, 
include Richard King’s Heroes of China’s Great Leap Forward: Two Stories (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2010); Krista Van Fleit, Literature the People Love: Reading Chinese Texts from the Early Maoist Period, 
1949-1966 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Peter Button, Configurations of the Real in Chinese Literary 
and Aesthetic Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Cai Xiang, trans. and eds. Rebecca E. Karl and Xueping Zhong, 
Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949-1966 (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 2016); Ban Wang, ed., Words and Their Stories: Essays on the Language of the Chinese 
Revolution (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Brian DeMare, Mao’s Cultural Army: Drama Troupes in China’s Rural Revolution 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Maggie Greene, Resisting Spirits: Drama Reform and 
Cultural Transformation in the People’s Republic of China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019); 
Bonnie McDougall, ed., Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the P.R.C., 1949-1979 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984); and Rosemary Roberts and Li Li, eds., The Making and Remaking of China’s 
‘Red Classics’: Politics, Aesthetics, and Mass Culture (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017). 
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medical labor during the P.R.C.’s socialist period. I draw insight from the fields of medical 
history and art history, where the discourses around amateurism are particularly developed. In 
fine art, the antinomy of modern amateurism is typically understood as “the professional 
[conducting] activities for work, [while] the amateur labors away from work in free or leisure 
time.”56 Amateurism thus marks the dynamic juncture of the social and cultural boundaries 
separating leisure from labor, and the private from the public. Amateurism is often understood as 
a “social rather than artistic process,”57 or even as the distinction between pre-modern and 
modern society.58 But rather than accept a naturalized distinction between remunerated and 
unremunerated artistic pursuits, scholars such as Patricia Zimmerman draw our attention to the 
power structures in place that marginalize amateur art as an insignificant discourse and practice, 
favoring instead a history of the relationship between art practice and the art market (think, for 
example, of the seriousness with which commercial film is studied compared with home video.) 
Amateur art practice, therefore, is not simply an inert designation of inferior or unrecognized 
artistic talent, but rather a historical process of social control over representation.  
By contrast, scholarship on health, medicine, and science and technology studies 
understands amateurism less as a matter of compensation and more as a problematic of expertise. 
Scholars critical of the construction of science as a “natural” phenomena identify expertise as a 
thorny possession that “privileges its possessors with powers that the people cannot successfully 
 
56 Patricia Zimmerman, Reel Families: A Social History of Amateur Film (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995), p.7.  
57 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 2001). 
58 See Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1958), pp. 16-9. Levenson argued that pre-modern society in China hinged around 
the “amateur ideal” of the scholar-official. When the nation-state arrived, the “bureaucratic Confucian ‘princely 
man’” gave way to Weber’s “puritan—and capitalist—‘vocation,” elevating the competence of the professional over 
the pejorative sense of the amateur as unserious dilettante.  
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control, and cannot acquire or share in.”59 Medical sociology has responded to the anti-
democratic potential of expert domination over health systems through increased interest in the 
potential of the lay person, arguing that lay knowledge and participation in the medical system 
may be as important as expert knowledge.60 Amateurism in medicine is thus accessed through 
the figure of the lay expert, whose participation reconciles expertise’s long-standing conflict with 
public epistemologies valuing democratic governance and participation.  
In chapters on barefoot doctors and amateur art practice, I argue that amateurism 
functions as a means of converting the cultures of the highly professionalized, even rarified 
occupations—the doctor and the artist—into practices of the everyday. Barefoot doctors created 
a culture of medical practice socialized around their identities as regular working members of 
their communes, while the recognition of amateur artists challenged the professional, academy-
trained artist's monopoly over fine arts practice. The historian Xu Xiaoqun understands this 
period as a history of “forced de-professionalization,”61 while the sociologist Joel Andreas 
understands the Maoist initiatives to purge Communist officials with advanced technical 
credentials as an attack on the bureaucratic class.62 By examining the Maoist rejection of 
professional cultures and embrace of amateur ones, I choose to understand the trend toward 
amateurism not as an exclusively top-down political process, but rather a broad and pervasive 
 
59 Turner, Stephen, “What is the Problem with Experts?,” Social Studies of Science Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb. 2001): p. 
123. 
60 For a few important works critiquing overreliance on expertise, see Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, 
Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); D. Willems, “Susan’s 
Breathlessness: The Construction of Professionals and Laypersons,” in J. Lachmund and G. Stollberg, ed., The 
Social Construction of Illness: Illness and Medical Knowledge in Past and Present (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1992), pp. 105-14; Srikant Sarangi, “On Demarcating the Space Between ‘Lay Expertise’ and ‘Expert Laity,’” Text 
21, Vol. 1-2 (2001): pp. 3-11.  
61 Xu Xiaoqun, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 
1912-1937 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 278-9.  
62 Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).  
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cultural shift supported by shifting social consensuses around the entrenched cultural 
expectations around knowledge and authority. 
In the first chapter, I trace the rise of the barefoot doctor as a discursive figure of the 
socialist period. I argue that the barefoot doctor’s emergence signified the undertaking of an 
ambitious, epoch-defining, but ultimately failed attempt to reposition medical labor within 
society. The barefoot doctor was a rural healthcare worker who provided low-cost medical and 
public health services to the members of their commune. By embedding barefoot doctors within 
their own rural communities, the barefoot doctor sought to remake medicine as a social relation 
through labor. Barefoot doctors remade the medical field as a culture of lay expertise, replacing 
the distant and elite professional doctor with grassroots, everyday healers. In filmic depictions, 
such as the 1975 films Chunmiao [Spring Shoots], Hongyu [Red Rain], and Yanming hupan [By 
the Side of Goose Crying Lake], the barefoot doctor’s gender functioned as a site of 
revolutionary articulation, allowing women barefoot doctors to challenge the patriarchal 
structures of authority in the interests of serving their communities. 
 In the second chapter, I examine amateur art practice during the socialist period, the 
most famous of which were the peasant artists from Hu Xian, a rural county in Shaanxi Province. 
During the 1970s, Hu Xian peasant art (Hu Xian nongmin hua) exhibited widely both in China 
and abroad, feted from Paris to Washington D.C. as an “exhilarating”63 artistic development in 
the culture of the P.R.C. Yet the celebrity of the Hu Xian peasant painters obscured an amateur 
art practice that was pervasive and widespread during the socialist period, not just among 
peasants but also industrial workers and the military. In this chapter, I argue that amateur art 
practice constituted an ambitious re-orientation of fine art practice, transforming it from the 
 
63 William Feaver, “China at the Double: Art,” The Observer, November 21, 1976. 
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highly specialized labor of the professional and credentialed artist to a leisure activity accessible 
to worker, peasant, and soldier alike (gongnongbing qunzhong). Amateur art practice (yeyu 
meishu chuangzuo) had its roots in pre-1949 political organizing and production practices, 
beginning with the encouragement of C.C.P.-organized workers to draw sketches and cartoons 
criticizing counterproductive work habits or to depict more ideal ones. As more amateurs became 
involved in creating art, the practice shifted from a critique of production methods into a broader 
socialist cultural praxis in which the artist’s subjectivity was transformed through the act of 
making art, allowing the disenfranchised to assert and represent the “reality” of their lived 
experiences. This new artist’s subjectivity was exemplified through the celebration of Li 
Fenglan, a farmer and mother of four from Hu Xian whose paintings were amongst the most 
high-profile works in Hu Xian peasant art exhibitions. The embrace of amateurism weakened the 
art academy as a legitimizing site of training. Concepts such as creative genius and high levels of 
technical accomplishment, previously linked closely with the recognition of an artist, were 
evacuated in order to accommodate the contributions of untrained art producers. The legacy of 
amateur art practice is an essential and under-appreciated element in the development of 
“contemporary Chinese art.” 
In the second section of my dissertation, I explore the changing subject position of 
students and women with particular attention to the role they play in the social reproduction of 
their communities. Education and domestic labor were themselves understood explicitly as 
system of social reproduction at the time. Attempts to integrate productive labor with intellectual 
labor, or to replace women’s domestic labor with productive labor, were intended to disrupt elite 
monopolization of the university and male dominion over women. I conceptualize social 
reproduction not as the unity of two separate processes (commodity production and the 
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reproduction of labor power), but rather as the encapsulation of production and reproduction 
within the same systematic framework.64 Where production is usually theorized as public and 
reproduction as private, these filmic and literary narratives from the socialist period are unique 
for the manner in which they present the university and the commune as institutions that make 
public the work of social reproduction. Furthermore, exploring the figure of the student and the 
woman through narratives of their labor allows me to illuminate not only the labor that produces 
commodities, but the labor that through which the student and the woman are themselves 
produced. 
In the third chapter, I examine the integration of education and labor in the film Juelie. 
The film was released in 1975 to celebrate the success of the Jiangxi Community Labor 
University (Gongda), a university that was unique for its “part-work, part-study” (bangong, 
banxue) model for students, integrating the theoretical lessons of the classroom with the practical 
lessons of labor. Gongda was both a productive commune as well as a university. The film 
extolled the new national educational culture that it exemplified, a culture that was practical, 
cultivating useful skills such as animal husbandry and crop fertilization, as well as egalitarian, 
striving to offer rural students as much entry to college as their wealthier urban peers.  
Juelie questioned the episteme of the university student: What should students learn, and 
whom does that knowledge serve—the professor or the cowherd, the school or society? Who is 
in control of the classroom, and what is the student’s agency? Where does their future lie? In this 
 
64 Here, I follow the contributions of Isabella Bakker, Tithi Bhattacharya, Johanna Brenner, Sylvia Federici, Johanna 
Brenner, Lise Vogel, and others on social reproduction theory. See Tithi Bhattacharya, ed., Social Reproduction 
Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression (London: Pluto Books, 2017); Sylvia Federici, “Notes on 
Gender in Marx’s Capital,” Continental Thought and Theory 1 (4) 2017: pp. 19-37; Lise Vogel, Marxism and the 
Oppression of Women (2013); Isabella Bakker, “Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political 
Economy,” New Political Economy Vol. 12 (4); Barbara Laslett and Johanna Brenner, “Gender and Social 
Reproduction: Historical Perspectives,” Annual Review of Sociology 15, 1989; Susan Ferguson, “Intersectionality 
and Social-Reproduction Feminisms: Toward an Integrative Ontology,” Historical Materialism 24 (2): pp. 38-60.  
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chapter, I examine the figure of the student during the socialist period in the P.R.C. My reading 
is grounded in the film Juelie, the most extensive narrative from that period to explore the 
relationship between the student and the university. I approach the student through a 
consideration of their labor, asking what was the work of the student, and what did it produce? I 
argue that the student’s labor was a key site through which the student was reconsidered, 
transformed from the bespectacled urban intellectual of the May Fourth era into a diffuse, 
pluralistic subject position embedded within the socialist project and its productive social 
relations. The student stands as synecdoche for the entire apparatus of the educational system as 
a mechanism of social reproduction. By integrating the student's intellectual labor with 
productive labor, Juelie disrupts the university as a site of elite social reproduction and 
transforms it into an integrated and productive site of unalienated labor. 
In the fourth chapter, I examine the representation of domestic labor in literature from the 
late 1950s to mid-1960s. During the Great Leap Forward, the advent of people’s communes 
sought to bring new agricultural workers—women—out of the home and into the fields.65 With 
unpaid family work theorized as unproductive, initiatives such as the “Five Changes” policy 
sought to collectivize women’s domestic labor by introducing communal meal preparation, 
clothing production, midwife services, child care, and flour milling. By thus “freeing” women 
from household labor, women could be counted upon to serve as a core labor force for 
agricultural production.  
Authors such as Ru Zhijuan and Li Zhun examined the social consequences of re-
organizing domestic labor on rural communes in short stories and novellas published from the 
 
65 Women’s participation in rural labor during the socialist period was not extraordinary; women have long 
participated in productive rural labor, especially in the Chinese countryside. The Great Leap Forward, however, may 
have been unusual in the extent to which women were mobilized as farmers.  
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late 1950s to mid-1960s. One the one hand, works such as Ru Zhijuan‘s “The Warmth of Spring” 
and Li Zhun’s “Mother and Daughter” reframed cultural narratives of what constituted 
“women‘s work,” denaturalizing the association between women and domestic labor by 
rendering the private household a public site for the production and reproduction of the laboring 
community. These works drew attention to the division between what Gail Hershatter calls the 
“visible and invisible” labor occurring in public and domestic spaces, respectively.66 On the 
other hand, the agrarian commune in the literary imagination simultaneously upheld productive 
labor as the privileged form of women’s labor, erasing the continuity between the waged labor of 
the commune with the unwaged labor of the home. While the authors gave language to the 
demands on women for socially reproductive labor, the home was conceptualized as an ancillary 
enterprise to socialist construction, and these fictional works are haunted by the endless physical 
and metaphorical reproduction of women around the countryside. 
Ultimately, I find profound shifts in the ways that the labor of women, educators, artists, 
and doctors were understood during the socialist period. The cultural texts that I examine 
represent deliberate and complex attempts to shift the perception of the social relations that had 
previously separated the educated and the poor, the professional and the amateur, the urban and 
the rural, the revolutionary woman from the hegemony of men. In all sites of labor that I 
examine, gender was the essential site through which revolutionary narratives were articulated. 
Narratives of women’s participation in new forms of medical, artistic, and intellectual work 
powerfully instantiated the labor transformations that were possible under the new conditions of 
the P.R.C. Women characters offered the ability to transform and sublimate the oppressive labor 
relations of the old society, a narrative trend that began in the late 1950s and reached its fullest 
 
66 Gail Hershatter, “Women and China’s Socialist Construction, 1949-78,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 17, Issue 
12, No. 2 (2019): pp. 1-27.  
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expression in cultural production during the final years of the Cultural Revolution. Within a few 
short years after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the cultural imaginary that had given rise to 
these narratives quickly collapsed, rendering the works of literature, film, art, and journalism 
from the period “orphans” of the socialist period. But rather than narrating these ambitious 
attempts to transform the cultural imaginary through their failures, in this project I seek to 
illuminate why new revolutionary narratives of work seemed possible and necessary in the first 
place. 
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Chapter 2 | The Laboring of Medicine: Barefoot Doctors and the Gendering of Revolution 
 
“Those with mud-covered legs are not to be underestimated.”1  
 
Introduction: Deng Walks Out 
Sometime in early 1976, the senior Chinese statesman Deng Xiaoping attended the 
screening of a new film in Beijing. Deng’s path to his seat in the audience that night had been 
rocky, especially over the course of the previous ten years. He was still not in the clear. After 
decades of high-profile leadership in the Chinese Community Party, he had been accused of 
pursuing the capitalist road in the late 1960s for siding against signature Maoist policies such as 
the Great Leap Forward, and was subsequently stripped of his titles and responsibilities. For four 
years, he worked at the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi, an ignoble demotion 
meant to humiliate in spite of praise elsewhere for the dignity of the proletariat laborer.2 But as 
the years went by, the party’s internal consensus on the success of revolutionary Maoist 
programs shifted, and so did Deng’s fate. In 1973, he was called back to Beijing as part of a 
 
1 Chu Lan, “Yi Bu Gesong Wenhua Dageming de Hao Yingpian: Ping ‘Chunmiao’ [A Great Film in Praise of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: A Review of ’Chunmiao’],” Hongqi, 1976. Chu Lan is a penname for 
opinions that were believed to represent the views of the State Council Cultural Creation Leadership Small Group 
(Guowuyuan wenhua zu wenyi chuangzuo lingdao xiaozu). “Chu Lan” wrote high-profile commentary on film, and 
was active from 1973 to late 1976. See Qi Zhi, Wenge dianying, 1966-1976: Yi ge zhidu yu guannian de lishi, di er 
ji [A History of Institutions and Ideas: Cultural Revolution films, vol. 2] (Austin, TX: Meiguo huayi chubanshe 
[Remembering Publishing], 2020), pp. 66-71; and Wu Qiwen, “Wo zai ‘Chu Lan’ xie wenzhang [I wrote as ‘Chu 
Lan’],” Yanhuang chunqiu 7 (2011).  
2 Ezra E. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2011), pp. 49-53.  
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broader effort to reinstate disgraced senior officials who were now seen as critical to the state’s 
rebuilding efforts.  
By the time Deng sat in the movie theater, the film industry was also in the midst of a slow 
recovery: after three years of no film production,3 the country’s most prominent studios slowly 
resumed making moves in the early 1970s, beginning with a few model operas. The film Deng 
was watching that evening, titled Chunmiao (“Spring Shoots”), was part of an initiative to 
release more films and a greater diversity of films, in particular narrative feature films 
(gushipian).4 Like many ambitious film projects, Chunmiao had been in development for several 
years, beginning in 1970 when a script-writing team was sent to a village outside Shanghai to 
meet Wang Guizhen, the young woman who was the real-life inspiration for the movie project.5  
Wang was a barefoot doctor (chijiao yisheng), a rural healthcare worker who provided 
low-cost medical and public health services to the members of her commune. Wang had risen to 
prominence when her village’s medical team was featured in a report on barefoot doctors that 
was syndicated across national newspapers in 1968.6 Although barefoot doctors rose out of pilot 
programs to train “semi-agricultural, semi-medical” (bannong, banyi) rural health workers that 
pre-dated the Cultural Revolution by almost a decade, they were closely associated with the 
Cultural Revolution, launched as a nationwide medical program in 1968 and described in press 
 
3 See the Appendix to Paul Clark, Chinese Cinema: Culture and Politics Since 1949 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 185-6. 
4 The number of feature films produced increased dramatically beginning in 1974. Film historian Zhai Jianning 
attributes this to a push led by Jiang Qing and Gang of Four to increase the number of films representing the struggle 
against capitalist roaders, while Li Wenhua recounts in an oral history of the film that Zhou Enlai had ordered the 
production of an increased number of feature films (gushipian). Zhai Jiannong, Hongse wangshi: 1966-1976 nian de 
Zhongguo dianying (Taipei: Taihai chubanshe, 2001), p. 62; Lin Shu, ed., Ru ying sui xing: Li Wenhua de dianying 
shijie [Like the shape of shadows: the film world of Li Wenhua] (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 2012), p. 
146.   
5 Zhang Haiyun, “Dianying Chunmiao de yuanxing Wang Guizhen [Wang Guizhen, the original model for 
Chunmiao],” Wenshi jinghua 1995 (3): pp. 27-9.   
6 See “Cong ‘chijiao yisheng’ de chengzhang kan yixue jiaoyu geming de fangxiang,” Renmin ribao, Sept. 14, 1968; 
see also “Zai Mao zhuxi de wuchan jieji geming weisheng luxian zhiyin xia Shanghai jiaoqu ‘chijiao yisheng’ duiwu 
jinyibu chengzhang zhuangda,” Renmin ribao, Sept. 25, 1969.  
 37 
as a “socialist new thing” (shehui zhuyi xinsheng shiwu) that had grown organically from the 
Revolution’s successes. After meeting Wang, the script-writing team finished their first draft for 
a spoken drama titled Chijiao yisheng (“The Barefoot Doctor”). The manuscript would be 
revised at least eight times more and its title changed before it was adapted into the fictional 
narrative that Deng watched that night in early 1976. The final product was filmed on location in 
Jiangxi, directed by an award-winning team and featuring the newcomer Li Xiuming in her 
screen debut as the irrepressible Tian Chunmiao.7 
In the film, the plucky eponymous heroine (whose name means “spring shoots”) decides 
to become a barefoot doctor after a baby with acute pneumonia dies because a physician refuses 
to treat it. Chunmiao studies medicine at the county health clinic, returning to her home 
commune to care for its underserved members. Chunmiao repeatedly butts heads with the film’s 
villains, the corrupt Dr. Qian (surnamed “money”) and the malicious health clinic director Du 
Wenjie (his surname is a homophone for “poison”), and she eventually wrests control of the 
commune health clinic from the two men. Chunmiao’s rebellion was especially notable since it 
constituted an act of Cultural Revolution, overthrowing the clinic’s ruling class in order to return 
it to proletarian control. Chunmiao was thus the first film since the Cultural Revolution had 
begun in 1966 to depict the movement on screen.8 
But Deng likely did not watch this part of the film. He apparently disliked the film so 
much that he walked out of the theater in full view of its audience, which included other 
 
7 Chunmiao was co-directed by Xie Jin, Yan Bili, and Liang Tianduo. Xie Jin was the most prominent of the three 
co-directors, making his directorial debut with Nü lan wu hao (“Woman Basketball Player No. 5” in 1957 and going 
on to direct the screen adaptation of Hongse niangzi jun (“The Red Detachment of Women”), for which he won the 
Hundred Flowers Award for Best Director.  
8 See “Shanghaiwei lingdao dui Chunmiao ba gao de yijian,” collected in Wu Di, ed., Zhongguo dianying ziliao, 
1948-1979 [Collected research materials of Chinese film, 1949-1979], xia juan [Vol. 2] (Beijing: Wenhua yishu 
chubanshe, 2006) pp. 288-90.  
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powerful and high-ranking party members.9 With this gesture, Deng made his feelings about the 
film and its vision of empowered grassroots medical providers clear, and he allegedly called the 
movie a work of “ultra-leftist” (jizuo) trash as he left. The Cultural Revolution had left its scars 
on Deng and his family, experiences that made him skeptical of its most radical projects, and he 
had come to disagree inherently with policies that favored grassroots mobilization over the 
cultivation of specialized expertise. Ergo, Deng believed barefoot doctors to be ineffective 
practitioners with grossly overrated healing abilities derived from medical training that was 
rudimentary at best.  
Deng’s outburst at the movie theater fanned a controversy that was already well 
underway. Once again, the validity of a radical Maoist social movement and political project—
the Cultural Revolution—was in dispute. When Deng refused to issue self-criticisms that 
sufficiently affirmed the Cultural Revolution or disavowed the rightist tendencies that was 
accused of harboring, national press laid the groundwork for his dismissal.10 “How could a film 
celebrating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution make the party’s most recidivous capitalist, 
Deng Xiaoping, so uncomfortable that he couldn’t sit through the end?” asked two officials from 
the China Film Company (Zhongguo dianying gongsi) in a film review for the People’s Daily. 
“In fact, that’s exactly the point of the film’s critique, …to serve as a mirror revealing the true 
shape of this chief representative of the capitalist class. That’s why he threw such a fit (bao tiao 
 
9 Deng’s departure from the movie theater was widely reported in national press. For a representative article, see 
Shanxisheng Xiyang xian Dazhai gongshe Nannao dadui pinxiazhongnong [Lower-middle peasants of the Southern 
Mound Brigade, Dazhai Commune, Xiyang County, Shanxi Province], “Anmen ye yao he Deng Xiaoping 
suansuanzhang” [We too need to settle accounts with Deng Xiaoping], Renmin ribao, May 19, 1976,  
10 See Ezra Vogel, Chapters 3 to 5 from Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2011) for an account.  
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ru lei).”11 By April, Deng had been ousted once more, removed from power and replaced as 
successor to the premier by the colorless official Hua Guofeng. 
Deng’s antipathy to the film Chunmiao testified to the extent to which the barefoot doctor 
had emerged as a powerful discursive figure in the P.R.C.’s cultural imaginary during the mid-
1970s. Provoking powerful praise and dissent, in 1975 the barefoot doctor was at peak saturation 
both within the medical system as well as the cultural consciousness: over 1.7 million were at 
work in communes across the countryside, with an estimated ninety percent of the country’s 
rural residents served by a barefoot doctor in their community.12 A spate of cultural products 
produced during from the 1960s to 1970s, from newspaper profiles to novels, short stories, 
paintings, poster, and songs, as well as merchandise such as notebooks and decorative vases, 
memorialized their achievements. In fact, representations of barefoot doctors were so popular 
during the mid-1970s that Chunmiao was one of three films released from late 1975 to early 
1976 featuring a barefoot doctor as the central protagonist.13 
Deng’s conniption at the movie theater raises several questions: How had the barefoot 
doctor become at once so prevalent and controversial? What about the barefoot doctor’s 
reconfiguring of medical treatment and social relations made the institution so contentious, even 
within the explicitly revolutionary context of their own time period? And, on a metatexual level, 
how should a barefoot doctor film, as a narrative and cultural text of its period, be understood in 
relation to the policies and social phenomena they reflect? Can a work of propaganda tell us 
anything about a culture beyond the interpretive demands of its associated agenda?  
 
11 Li Wenbin and Zeng Xiangtian, “Pi zai Du Wenjie de shen shang, teng zai Deng Xiaoping xin shang: ping caise 
gushipian Chunmiao,” Renmin ribao, Apr. 27, 1976.   
12 Chunjuan Nancy Wei, “Barefoot Doctors: The Legacy of Chairman Mao’s Healthcare” in Mr. Science and 
Chairman Mao’s Revolution, eds. Chunjuan Nancy Wei and Darryl E. Brock (New York: Lexington Books, 2012), 
p. 270.  
13 The other two films are Hongyu (“Red Rain,” or “The New Doctor”) and Yanming hupan (“Geese Cries by the 
Lakeshore.”) I discuss these films in greater detail in this chapter.  
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In this chapter, I seek to answer these questions by tracing the rise of the barefoot doctor 
as a discursive figure of the socialist period. I argue that the barefoot doctor’s emergence 
signified the undertaking of an ambitious, epoch-defining, but ultimately failed attempt to 
reposition medical labor within society. By embedding barefoot doctors within their own rural 
communities, barefoot doctors sought to transform medicine as a social relation through labor. 
Barefoot doctors remade the medical field as a culture of lay expertise, replacing the aloof and 
elite professional doctor with grassroots, everyday healers. Filmic depictions of barefoot doctors 
represented complex narrative shifts from external to internal antagonists, external to internal 
medical cultures, and external to internal medical practices. This shift inward allowed for a 
critique of socialist bureaucracy and corruption that upended the narrative conventions of the 
nation’s previous film output. Im this chapter, I show that production documents from the 
barefoot doctor films Hongyu, Chunmiao, and Yanming hu pan reveal the importance attached to 
Chunmiao’s depiction of Cultural Revolution on screen. Moreover, through comparative analysis 
of the films, I find that gender itself functioned as a site of revolutionary articulation, allowing 
women barefoot doctors to challenge authority in a critique of the medical establishment’s 
separation from labor.  
Expert Problems 
Barefoot doctors emerged from trends in thought in the late 1950s that interrogated the 
relationship between knowledge and class, particularly as it was embodied in the figure of the 
expert. Simply put, after a first five-year plan that drew heavily from Soviet precedent and the 
advice of Soviet experts, reliance on the expert had become problematic. As Western socialist 
theorists critical of the expert would later argue, a central issue with the notion of an expert 
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culture was that it was anti-egalitarian in and of itself.14 Thus, barefoot doctors were a feature 
component of policies and programs that hoped to resolve the challenges of expertise by creating 
new socialist experts who remained embedded within their organic social relations.  
Because the knowledge and experiences that accrue to specialized work are diverted from 
the realm of the everyday, the greater the degree of professionalization, the greater the distance 
to the public. This dynamic, which Jürgen Habermas calls a “dialectic of systemically induced 
reification and cultural impoverishment,” was illustrated in 1958 in a collection of essays on the 
nature of expertise.1516 A historian at Fujian Normal College17 warned against the perils of 
pursuing expertise to the exclusion of all else, for example. After meeting an advisor who 
specialized in ancient world history (shijie shanggu shi) in his first year of college, the scholar, 
Lin Jinghua, writes that he “became intensely interested in acquiring expert knowledge, and 
spent all my time in the library, reading room, and my mentor’s home. I became obsessed, and 
even thought eating and sleeping were a waste of time.”18 But without the moral tether of the 
proper politics, the researcher became further and further isolated, unable and uninterested in 
participating in contemporary society. Insulated from the masses and on track to become a full-
fledged member of the anti-revolutionary elite, the researcher is redeemed when he joins party 
 
14 For Western criticism of expert cultures, see Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of 
Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Vol. 2, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985); Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: 
A Study of People, Expertise, and Sustainable Development (Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, 1995); 
Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005); and Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
15 Lun you hong you zhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: Beijing qingnian chubanshe, 1958). The “red and 
expert” campaign is discussed in further detail on the next page.  
16 Jurgen Habermas, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses [Notes Toward an Investigation],” in Mapping 
Ideology, Slavoj Zizek, ed., (New York: Verso, 1994), pp. 100–140. 
17 Known from 1972 on as Fujian Normal University.  
18 Lin Jinghua, “Wo cengjing tiaoshang ‘xian zhuan hou hong’ de weixian xianjing [I once fell into the dangerous 
trap of being ‘expert first, then red’]”, in Lun you hong you zhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: Beijing 
qingnian chubanshe, 1958), pp. 175-8.  
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organizations following the establishment of the P.R.C. Through political activities sponsored by 
the party, he reintegrates with society. Realizing the selfishness of his actions, and ultimately the 
moral paucity of an apolitically cultivated expertise, Lin Jinghua concludes that “there is no soul 
without the political” as he reaches a final understanding of expert-driven culture as anti-
democratic, and antithetical to the social forces that brought the C.C.P. to power.  
Yet even as it was critiqued, expert knowledge was still understood as indispensable to 
the state-building enterprise and to the competitiveness of the socialist project. Expert power was 
essential to state power, no more so than to Liu Shaoqi, who was then chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress. Ever the “engineer”19 in his approach to 
revolution, Liu Shaoqi believed that expert knowledge was the essential bridge to achieving 
simultaneous intellectual and material development. He spoke of his desire to see a “regiment of 
sci-tech (kexue jishu) cadres” who belonged to the working class, a battalion of politically-loyal 
“professors, educators, scientists, journalists, artists, lawyers, and Marxist-Leninist 
theoreticians”: essentially, a corps of proletarian professional workers.20 Liu believed that after 
sufficient training, all proletarians could transform into proletarian intellectuals, thus closing the 
gap between mental and manual labor. This imaginary cadre would be both “red and expert” 
(you hong you zhuan).  
 
19 Lowell Dittmer describes two approaches to revolution within the Chinese Communist Party, an “engineering” 
approach that relies upon planned, sequential tactics with directions issued from an elite command center atop a 
vertical hierarchy, versus the “storming” approach of spontaneous action emanating from the bottom of an 
egalitarian hierarchy with an indiscriminate division of labor. Mao Zedong exemplified the minority “storming” 
approach, while Liu Shaoqi not only symbolized the majority “engineering” approach, but lent the approach its 
name through his metaphor of revolutionary processes as an engineered raising or lowering of water levels. See 
Lowell Dittmer, China’s Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), pp. 1-11.  
20 Liu Shaoqi, “Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai Beijing gejie qingzhu Shiyue shehuizhuyi geming sishi zhounian dahui shang 
de jianghua” [Remarks by Liu Shaoqi at the all-inclusive fortieth anniversary celebration of the socialist October 
revolution in Beijing], reprinted as the introduction to Lun youhong youzhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: 
Beijing qingnian chubanshe, 1958), p. 3. Translations all my own, except where noted otherwise.  
 43 
The “red and expert” phrase was popularized by Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong in inner-
party debates during late 1957, and spread into popular usage the following year as work units, 
particularly universities, were asked to hold discussions over the phrase and what its embrace 
would entail.21 As a historical campaign, “The initial impulse behind the Red and expert drive 
was class warfare,” writes the sociologist Joel Andreas, who analyzes the “red and expert” 
campaign as the realpolitik cultivation of new political elites by allowing them to accrue the 
cultural capital typically reserved for old elites.22 The historian Sigrid Schmalzer, however, 
highlights the red and expert’s theoretical challenge to the supposed neutrality or objectivity of 
scientific knowledge itself,23 while Maurice Meisner describes the “red and expert” as an 
inherently contradictory ideal indebted to utopian Marxist notions of an all-round communist 
man who combines “brain work with brawn work,” “civilian and military work.”24 Although the 
red expert emerged as an ideal specific to the historical conditions of the late 1950s, the phrase 
quickly came to be seen as a distinctive and symbolic feature of a broader Maoist episteme.  
But during the late 1950s, the red expert was presented not as a contradiction, but as a 
solution. By resolving the historical opposition between intellectual elites and common laborers, 
the red expert integrated theory with practice, an innovation that the scholar-official Guo Moruo 
credited to the new epoch ushered in by the establishment of the P.R.C. Theoretically, the arrival 
of the socialist state meant that there were no longer any significant barriers to becoming a red 
expert. “Before Liberation, a person could be expert first and then red, or red first and then 
 
21 See Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 61-86 for a detailed discussion of red experts, particularly at 
Tsinghua University.  
22 See Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, pp. 61-70.  
23 See Sigrid Schmalzer, “Red and Expert” entry in Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao 
to Xi (Canberra and New York: Australian National University and Verso Books, 2019), pp. 215-220. 
24 See Maurice Meisner, “Utopian Goals and Ascetic Values in Maoist Ideology,” from Marxism, Maoism, and 
Utopianism (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), pp. 118-131.  
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expert,” wrote Guo, a poet and president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in a letter 
addressed to young students. Because the educational apparatuses of the previous state had not 
been red, expertise and redness had to be acquired in isolation from one another. Worse yet, 
“there were even some who were expert but not red, or red but not expert,” he wrote. But now, 
not only were all educational institutions under CCP control, those who had participated in 
constructing the new society were now automatically a red expert (hongse zhuanjia), Guo 
explained.25 In Guo’s opinion, the arrival of socialism had changed the nature of expert 
knowledge itself, rendering expertise acquired under socialism unproblematic, a neutral, modular 
possession in which the process of acquiring specialized knowledge did not itself produce elitism 
or distance from the everyday. 
In fact, the adoption of a socialist project by the state had instigated a legitimation crisis 
in all forms of professional activity, no less so than in medicine. The popularization of the “red 
and expert” ideal thus represented a serious attempt at democratizing the acquisition of education 
and technical expertise. By imagining the red expert as a common member of the masses, the red 
expert would simultaneously be accountable to the masses from which she had emerged. Thus, 
through lay participation in expert decision-making, experts would be accountable to the masses. 
The red expert was thus an embrace of lay expertise, imagining a new type of cadre who would 
be distinguished not only by her acquisition of expert knowledge, but also the authority of her 
experiential knowledge as a member of the lay. By embracing the lay expert, the party created a 
path toward greater lay (read: mass, proletarian, grassroots, minjian, gongnongbing) participation 
in determining the politics and policies that were previously controlled by the professional 
classes.  
 
25 Guo Moruo, “Taolun hong yu zhuan—da qingnian tongxuemen de yi feng gongkaixin [A discussion of redness 
and expertise: an open reply to young students],” from Lun you hong you zhuan, pp. 108-11. 
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The public commentary on red experts was matched by a slew of policy initiatives meant 
to cultivate a new class of technically skilled and politically reliable professionals. During a 
period of party rectification during 1957, technical staff in work units across the country 
complained that the party leadership they answered to had no right to lead their units because 
they lacked the technical expertise to make for competent administrators.26 Their demand that 
“non-specialists cannot lead specialists” (wai hang buneng lingdao neihang) threatened the 
legitimacy of party authority, the subsequent Anti-Rightist Campaign is generally understood as 
a backlash to the challenge of the intellectual class’s dissent.27 The red and expert formulation 
emerged in the early months of the Anti-Rightist as the ideal rebuttal, and the campaign 
highlighted the need to replace the old, “white” experts with new, red ones. Soon, the slogan was 
instantiated through programs to educate and train party faithful. Worker-peasant cadres could 
attend crash education courses, while factories provided literacy and technical-training programs. 
New schools were established in villages and poor urban areas to educate the proletariat, while 
organizations implemented class line policies that discriminated against the children of old elites 
in favor of the children of workers, peasants, and revolutionary cadres.28 In medicine, pilot 
programs began to train rural health workers for work in the countryside. These rural health 
workers are the direct predecessor to barefoot doctor. 
 
26 See Joel Andreas, Disenfranchised: The Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2019), pp. 47-9 for further discussion of the roots of the Anti-Rightist campaign.  
27 Classic scholarship on the Anti-Rightist campaign includes Roderick MacFarquhar’s The Hundred Flowers 
Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960); Ding Shu’s Yangmou: “Fanyou” qianhou 
[Open conspiracy: The Complete Story of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Rightist Campaign], (Hong Kong: 
Jiushi niandai zashi she, 1991); and Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the 
Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65 (New York: Routledge, 1993). See also Zhongguo fanyou yundong shukuju 1957- 
[Database of China’s Anti-Rightist Movement] (Hong Kong: Universities Service Center for Chinese Studies, 
2010), edited by Song Yongyi for an essential collection of primary source documents. For recent scholarship, see 
Sebastian Veg, “Testimony, History, and Ethics: From the Memory of Jiabiangou Prison Camp to a Reappraisal of 
the Anti-Rightist Movement in Present-Day China,” The China Quarterly No. 218, pp. 515-539.  
28 See Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 61-2.  
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The systems that gave rise to the rural health worker subsequently shaped and defined the 
scope and substance of the barefoot doctor’s responsibilities. At its most basic, this entailed an 
ambitious re-organization of the existing medical system, transforming it from privatized service 
to public good. The state began this process in the 1950s by mobilizing individual medical 
practitioners into voluntary union clinics, where doctors’ collectives (yisheng jiti suoyouzhi)29 
and county hospitals together constituted a two-tier state medical system making up the basic 
structure of the P.R.C.’s medical system during the socialist period.30 But union clinics, despite 
falling under the explicit auspices of party and government organs, were self-organized and self-
funded. Clinics kept their own books and did not receive substantial financial support from the 
state. Unsurprisingly, the medical needs of the country’s rural residents, who constituted over 
sixty percent31 of the population at the time, were left unmet. Policies implemented in 1952 that 
granted free medical service (gongfei yiliao) to all civil servants, party members, and disabled 
revolutionary veterans did not include peasants, while workers in state-owned enterprises 
enjoyed medical coverage through the Labor Health Insurance system (laobao yiliao).  
The lack of medical care available in the countryside did not go unnoticed, however. In 
the late 1950s, a group of physicians from Shanghai initiated a pilot program to train rural health 
workers (nongcun weishengyuan) in the countryside. Traveling to the city’s countryside, doctors 
began training local personnel who would be engaged in both medical and agricultural work. 
Working through the rural communes to train these rural health workers, the doctors held short-
term classes and provided opportunities for supervised practice. By June of 1960, over 3,900 
 
29 For more details on the founding of union clinics, see Xiaoping Fang, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in 
China (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012), especially “Regulations for Organizing Union Clinics” 
published by the Ministry of Health in 1956, quote on p. 24.  
30 The two-tier medical system’s structure resembled policy recommendations promoted by the Nationalist 
government during the Rural Construction Movement of the 1930s 
31 The World Bank, 2018, World Bank Open Data (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS.  
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individuals in the greater Shanghai municipality had received rural health worker training, 
representing ten counties in the area.  
These programs to train rural health workers were the direct predecessor of the barefoot 
doctor program, and in the summer of 1960, the program seemed off to a good start: with proof 
of concept delivered, supporters hoped to expand the model to other provinces.32 But nationally, 
opportunities for leftist social experiments dwindled as complications with the implementation of 
the Great Leap Forward and new revelations of the “three years of famine” came to light. By the 
early 1960s, conservative voices dominated policy, and a critical report of the rural health worker 
program was released in 1961. Finding the medical training of the health workers lacking, the 
report recommended that the program be abandoned and rural health workers reassigned 
exclusively back to agricultural labor. From 1961 to 1965, the rural health worker program 
shrank significantly, with the number of rural health workers in the Shanghai region dropping to 
just over three hundred.33 Rural health workers were described as “semi-agricultural, semi-
medical (bannong banyi),” a pejorative label meant to imply they were insufficient for either 
task.  
Yet by the mid-1960s, the phrase bannong banyi would be proudly embraced in official 
discourse, mobilized in support of the redistribution of state resources to address the urban/rural 
divide. When the Socialist Education Campaign was launched in the mid-1960s, it explicitly 
targeted urban/rural disparities in the distribution of resources, including healthcare. Policies and 
attitudes swung again back toward sympathy for rural social interests, and the report criticizing 
rural health workers was now considered revisionist and counter-revolutionary.34 The term 
 
32 Victor Sidel, “The Barefoot Doctors of the People’s Republic of China,” New England Journal of Medicine 286 
(June 15, 1972): p. 1,294. 
33 Sidel, “The Barefoot Doctors of the People’s Republic of China,” p. 1,295.  
34 Sidel, “The Barefoot Doctors of the People’s Republic of China,” p. 1,295.  
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“semi-agricultural, semi-medical (bannong banyi),” was now embraced in official discourse, and 
a January 1965 plan from the Ministry of Health included programs to train more rural health 
workers, and required that each production brigade have at least two “semi-agricultural, semi-
medical” workers, one of whom would be a woman responsible for delivering babies.35 By the 
time Mao issued the “June 26 Directive,” a scathing critique of the Ministry of Health that 
fundamentally re-shaped the direction of the country’s healthcare system toward the countryside, 
there was already considerable interest in providing better healthcare to the country’s rural 
residents.36  
The barefoot doctor is typically recognized in historical scholarship as a separate entity 
from the rural health worker. For example, the historians Li Haihong and Xiaoping Fang, both of 
whom have published monographs on the barefoot doctor, define the barefoot doctor as existing 
from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, a period that neatly overlaps with the officially 
recognized dates of the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976). But I believe that the barefoot doctor 
and rural health worker are better understood as belonging to the same trajectory of thought, 
policy, and culture that developed in distinct phases across the entirety of the socialist period. In 
a chapter on barefoot doctors, Xiaoping Fang describes the policies and practices that distinguish 
rural health workers from barefoot doctors, and the difference largely boils down to the scale on 
which barefoot doctors operated, as well as the barefoot doctor’s engagement in direct medical 
care in their own commune clinics, as opposed to the public health work that rural health 
workers performed in brigade clinics.  
 
35 Xiaoping Fang, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in China, p. 30.  
36 Mao Zedong, “Directive on Public Health” (June 26, 1965), from Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought in Selected 
Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 9, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). Also available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_41.htm. 
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Furthermore, the vintage of the name “barefoot doctor,” which was popularized in 
national press in 1968, has allowed many to attribute the barefoot doctors specifically to the 
Cultural Revolution. The barefoot doctor is thus closely entwined with the Cultural Revolution, 
and the negation of the barefoot doctor seems to follow as naturally as the negation of the 
Cultural Revolution itself. I prefer to understand them as a product of socialist culture and the 
socialist healthcare system writ large. Recognizing that the cultural lineage of the barefoot doctor 
includes that of the rural health worker, with its roots in the red and expert debates, allows us to 
recognize that the intellectual project of the barefoot doctor is, in fact, much more closely 
entwined with the entirety of the intellectual project of the P.R.C., and not just the “ten years of 
disaster (shinian dongluan).” This easy—but I believe ultimately mistaken—attribution of the 
barefoot doctor contains significant repercussions for the post-Reform appraisal of the socialist 
period, and has guided the Reform period’s negation of socialist ideology and culture. 
Repudiating the barefoot doctor should not be as easy as denying the legitimacy of the Cultural 
Revolution, as the denial of barefoot doctors actually implies the denial of a much more 
extensive intellectual project and cultural history. 
The Barefoot Doctor as Discursive Figure 
Within China, barefoot doctors first came to prominence in September of 1968, when a 
front-page report on their contributions to the revolution in medical education was carried across 
multiple flagship newspapers with national distribution, including the Renmin ribao, Hongqi, 
Guangming ribao, and Jiefangjun bao. Titled “Cong ‘chijiao yisheng’ de chengzhang kan yixue 
jiaoyu geming de fangxiang [Examining the direction of the revolution in medical education 
from the development of ‘barefoot doctors’],” the article traces the history of the barefoot doctor 
back to Mao Zedong’s June 26, 1965 “Directive on Public Health,” in which Mao, recognizing 
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the unequal distribution of healthcare resources in the cities and countryside, advised the nation 
to “put the emphasis on the countryside” in medical work.  
In the report, barefoot doctors are described as “participating in labor about half of the 
time,” with their income largely derived from subsidies contributed by the peasants of their 
respective communes, and compensated at a rate commensurate with other laborers in the 
commune.37 The report emphasizes the barefoot doctor’s identity as a full-fledged member of the 
local community, their active interest in the well-being of their neighbors, and their fair and 
affordable rates. “When the child of a poor peasant fell ill, it used to be that some itinerant 
scoundrel would come to consult (‘kan’ bing), cheating you out of ten kuai or more just for a few 
tablets of Analgin, and your child’s fever wouldn’t break. ‘Barefoot doctors’ take the initiative to 
come to your home, treat you with careful attention, and your illness will be healed at the cost of 
only around three kuai.”  
After the September 1968 front-page report on barefoot doctors was published, a 
steady stream of profiles of exemplary barefoot doctors from different provinces 
followed.38 Soon, the barefoot doctor was soon ready for foreign consumption, too: by 
the early 1970s, outward-facing publications such as China Reconstructs and Peking 
Review, which were written in non-Chinese languages and widely distributed abroad, 
contained primers on China’s new initiatives in rural health. In a 1971 China 
Reconstructs article, barefoot doctors were defined as “commune members who have 
taken courses in medical treatment,” and “a peasant who has had basic medical training 
 
37 Shanghai shi diaocha baogao. “Cong ‘chijiao yisheng’ de chengzhang kan yixue Jiaoyu Geming de Fangxiang 
[Examining the Direction of the Revolution in Medical Education from the Development Of ‘barefoot Doctors’].” 
Renmin Ribao, September 14, 1968. 
38 The compendium Chijiao yisheng xianjin shi ji hui bian collects seventeen such profiles, variously published in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Editors of the Renmin weisheng chubanshe, Chijiao yisheng xianjin shi ji hui bian 
(Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1974).   
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and gives treatment without leaving productive work.”39 Meanwhile, publications 
dedicated to the on-going education of barefoot doctors were published in every 
province. A theatrical play, “The Barefoot Doctor,” was written in 1971, while a full-
length novel, Hongyu, featuring a young boy as a barefoot doctor protagonist was 
published in 1973, with another barefoot doctor novel, Yanming hu pan, following in 
1974. And by 1976, the full-length feature films based on these novels and play were 
screened across the nation. By the 1970s, the barefoot doctor had become a defining 
feature of both the P.R.C.’s socialist healthcare system, as well as a prominent discursive 
figure in the cultural imaginary of the nation.  
In both English and Chinese, as a concept and as an occupation, the barefoot 
doctor is distinguished by its curious name, which China Reconstructs explains derives 
from peasants who work bare foot in the muddy rice paddies. 40 Yet in spite of serving as 
the defining indicator of the rural health workers embedded in local communities, bare 
feet in and of themselves function as a highly unstable indicator of the barefoot doctor. 
Films, art, and photographs featuring barefoot doctors do not always depict them with 
bare feet; in fact, barefoot doctors are more reliably indicated by the wooden medical box 
slung over their shoulders than they are by a lack of footwear.  
The instability of the bare foot as an indicator of a specific type of socialist 
Chinese medical worker is a complex phenomenon, and deconstructing the iconography 
of the barefoot doctor involves unpacking several intersecting modes of thought and 
cultural production. Shoes, for example, have long been imbued with notions of gender, 
 
39 “Health and Medical Care for the People,” China Reconstructs, Vol. XX No. 6, June 1971, p. 20; and “Everybody 
works for Good Health,” China Reconstructs, Vol. XX No. 10, November 1971, p. 20.  
40 “Everybody works for good health,” China Reconstructs, p. 20.  
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class, and sexuality, and scholars such as Pang Laikwan prefer to read images of the 
barefoot doctor through the lens of gender, seeing a veiled eroticism in the depiction of 
naked feet.41 To others, such as social scientist Ruth Sidel, the barefoot doctor is so 
intellectually and culturally challenging to understand in the highly professionalized 
Western context that the name makes no sense, and might be untranslatable. On this 
basis, Sidel concludes that the appellation is oxymoronic, for “barefoot doctors are 
neither barefoot nor doctors.”42  
The first appearance of the term “barefoot doctor” in nationally circulated press 
occurred in a June 1968 issue of the magazine Hongqi, just three months before the 
September 1968 report on barefoot doctors that solidified their national profile. The June 
1968 issue of Hongqi was largely devoted to rural health initiatives, and a first-person 
account of a health worker tending to the poor in rural Jiangxi mentions the phrase 
toward the end of the piece. The author, Xiong Haiyi, is a bannong, banyi rural health 
worker, and he describes receiving a year and a half of medical training in the early 
1960s before being placed as a worker in a rice-growing rural commune, where he 
notices the suffering of the impoverished peasants around him who fall ill without access 
to medical care. “Following Chairman Mao’s guidance, and with great class feeling, I 
decided to treat the poor and lower middle peasants (pinxia zhong nong). When I first 
started treating them, I had no medicine, so I saved up ten kuai to purchase a few 
 
41 Pang Laikwan, The Art of Cloning: Creative Production During China’s Cultural Revolution (London: Verso, 
2017), pp. 107-35. 
42 Ruth Sidel, “New Roles for Women in Health Care Delivery: Conditions in the People’s Republic of China,” from 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Women in Health, June 16-18, 1975, Washington D.C. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1976), p. 106. 
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commonly-used medications that I could use to treat common illnesses,” describes 
Xiong.43  
Xiong’s unofficial practice grows, and he eventually receives permission from the local 
party branch and production brigade to create a rural clinic. The bulk of the article describes 
Xiong’s efforts to treat his most dramatic cases. Xiong’s willingness to discard with decorum in 
order to offer the most effective treatment—including hospitalizing patients with contagious 
illnesses in his own home, using his mouth to suck the kidney stones out from the production 
brigade chief’s urethra, and stumbling through rain and mud at midnight to treat a miscarriage—
wins him the favor of the local community.  
At the very end of the article, Xiong describes the playful nicknames his rural peers 
bestow upon him:  
Because I am always working alongside the poor and lower middle peasants [in the rice paddies], I 
wear shorts on hot days and my two naked feet become completely covered in mud. The commune 
members affectionately call me the ‘barefoot doctor’ (chijiao yisheng) and ‘muddy man doctor’ 
(niba lao yisheng), and I’ve realized that this is how the masses express their confidence in me. So 
long as it benefits the lower middle peasants, I’m willing to be a ‘muddy man doctor’ for the rest 
of my life.44 
 
The first mention of the term “barefoot doctor” is thus one of two nicknames used by 
local villagers to describe Xiong’s humble practice, and perhaps because “muddy man 
doctor” is both less specific in its description and less memorable in its construction than 
“barefoot doctor,” the term “barefoot doctor” caught on. Xiong’s bare feet immediately 
 
43 Xiong Haiyi, “Wuxian zhongyu Mao zhuxi, yongyuan zhagen zai nongcun” [Limitless loyalty to Chairman Mao 
forever takes root in the countryside], Guangming ribao, June 28, 1968.  
44 Xiong Haiyi, June 28, 1968.  
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identify him as a participant in communal labor who works in solidarity with his peasant 
peers, emphasizing the health worker’s kinship within the peasant community.  
Because the rural health worker programs that served as the model for barefoot 
doctor programs grew out of experimental policies based around Shanghai, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the nationwide program would ultimately take its name after the local 
labor culture of the region—an instance of a local signifier mobilized in the creation of a 
new, universalist national culture.45 Yet a surprising reluctance to depict barefoot doctors 
with bare feet followed the proliferation of visual culture depicting the rural health 
workers. For example, widely reproduced posters depicting barefoot doctors often feature 
compositions that cut the barefoot doctor figure off at the waist. Two posters depicting 
barefoot doctors are examples.46 In both posters, a woman explicitly identified as a 
barefoot doctor by the poster’s slogan is depicted interacting with local peasants, with all 
major figures depicted from the waist up. Such framing makes the figures more easily 
legible by focusing attention on the central figures and their features, but the artistic 
choice also effectively avoids having to depict any sort of shoes or feet. 
 
45 See later discussion of Cai Xiang. 
46 See “Chijiao yisheng bian shancun hezuo yiliao qixiang xin [Barefoot doctors are all over the mountain villages, 
cooperation creates a new atmosphere of medical treatment]” (Figure 3-1) and “Chijiao yisheng fangzhi hao, hezuo 
yiliao gonggu lao [Barefoot doctors do good prevention, cooperative medicine is strong and reliable].” 
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Figure 2-1 “Barefoot doctors are all over the mountain villages; cooperation creates a new atmosphere of medical treatment,” 
Wang Linkun collective work, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 53 x 77 c.m., Stefan Landsberger collection of the International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. 
 
Figure 2-2 “Barefoot doctors do good prevention, cooperative medicine is strong and reliable,” artists and publisher 
unspecified, dimensions unspecified, private collection. 
Other representations of barefoot doctors show them with decidedly covered feet, 
such as the cover of the 1969 Shanghai Science and Technology Press edition of the 
‘Chijiao yisheng’ shouce [Barefoot Doctor Manual], a textbook for barefoot doctors 
printed at low cost in order to facilitate wide dissemination. While the woman barefoot 
doctor depicted on the front cover has her pant legs rolled up, her feet are covered in 
cloth shoes. The political scientist Chunjuan Nancy Wei believes the Chijiao yisheng 
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shouce was the most widely circulated work in print in the P.R.C. after Mao Zedong yulu 
[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung], itself believed to be bested in circulation 
only by the Bible.47 Although the Chijiao yisheng shouce was printed in different 
provinces in different versions with varying cover designs (most of which feature simply 
the title in bold font), that the flagship edition of the manual published by the locality in 
which the program originated chose to depict a barefoot doctor with covered feet speaks 
to deep ambivalence over depicting the barefoot doctor’s titular trait.  
The cultural studies scholar Pang Laikwan has noted the same reluctance to depict 
barefoot doctors with bare feet, which she traces to the femininity and sexuality with 
which she believes images of women barefoot doctors were infused. Noting that more 
women than men tend to be depicted as barefoot doctors, Pang argues that “These 
beautiful barefoot doctors [were] one of the most accessible feminine images for the 
youth at a time when sexual differences were carefully contained.” Barefoot doctors were 
depicted as an “idealized pure young woman” who “[melded] domesticity and 
femininity” through her entrée into rural homes to treat patients and her embodiment of 
modern medicine—or, as Pang sees it, the “simultaneous [embodiment] of two kinds of 
femininity—the traditional domestic version and the modern professional version.”48 
Pang’s discussion of visual culture depicting barefoot doctors focuses largely on 
two images, Wang Yujue’s 1963 painting Village Doctor, and Chen Yanning’s 1974 
painting Yugang xin yi [New Doctor in the Fishing Village]. In Wang Yujue’s painting of 
 
47 For the circulation of the Chijiao yisheng shouce, see Chunjuan Nancy Wei, “Barefoot Doctors,” p. 267. For the 
circulation of Mao Zedong yulu, see Daniel Leese, “A Single Spark: The Origins and Spread of the Little Red Book 
in China,” in Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History, ed. Alexander Cook (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 23 
48 Pang Laikwan, p. 120-33.  
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a sent-down woman serving as village doctor, Pang sees a figure “invested with a 
femininity that has subtle sexual connotations,” highlighting the figure’s “red lips and 
fragile profile suggest[ing] a traditional Chinese beauty.”49 In Chen Yanning’s Yugang 
xin yi, a beaming young woman on the docks carries a heavy pail as workers on the docks 
toil behind her. Her pant legs are rolled up, and Pang suggests in her reading of the 
painting that the woman’s bare feet are imbued with “heavy sexual connotations” owing 
to China’s long history of bound feet. Pang concludes that while the barefoot doctor 
seems to function as vessel for “domesticity and femininity,” depictions of women with 
bare feet were tinged with a lingering sexual charge, and the erotic overtones of bare feet 
help explain the overall reluctance to depict barefoot doctors without their shoes on.  
 
49 Pang Laikwan, p. 120.  
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Figure 2-3 “A New Doctor in the Fishing Harbor," Chen Yanning, Renmin meishu chubanshe, 38 x 26 cm., Stefan Landsberger 
collection at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. 
But as a symbolic trope, bare feet cannot be understood exclusively as a signifier 
of gender. Rather, bare feet equally symbolized belonging within specific communities of 
laborers. Neither was the depiction of bare feet specific to women. Instead, bare feet 
should be understood as a symbol of both gender and class, and insisting on an erotic 
reading of their significance risks combining separate registers of cultural discourse into 
an imaginary construction of an essentialized and immutable ‘traditional’ Chinese 
culture.50 For example, taking a closer look at Yugang xin yi, aside from the central 
figure, a male worker directly behind the doctor has rolled his pants up similarly to reveal 
bare feet. The local labor context of the docks serves as the essential context for bare feet, 
 
50 Class, however, is not separate from gender, a dimension I will explore in further detail as this chapter progresses.  
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and not the practice of foot binding, which had been thoroughly condemned by the 
socialist period.  
Here, I draw from the contemporary Chinese literature scholar Cai Xiang, who 
understands the local as “a spatial concept [counterposed] to the centralized power of the 
national state” encompassing “systems, mores and customs, social groupings, the 
disposition of the population and its languages (or dialects), as well as those deep 
accumulated cultural modes that are hidden in the heart of these spaces.”51 The process of 
nation-building incorporates local knowledge in the service of articulating new cultures 
and political visions, a relationship that Cai characterizes as “complex and interactive,” or 
mutually constitutive. Rather than expurgating itself of all remnants of the traditional, the 
socialist imaginary “recalled tradition by occasionally treating the local (tradition) as a 
source for its own imaginary” and thus transforming the local into “a certain form of 
modernity.”52 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the barefoot doctor, whose 
defining characteristic (bare feet) derives from local labor practices specific to the 
southern rice-growing regions of the country. Furthermore, the depiction of bare feet as a 
symbol of class went beyond the medical context. One example comes from the 1975 
film Juelie [Breaking with Old Ideas].53 The film includes a scene in which rural identity 
is explicitly attached to the practice of forgoing shoes while working in muddy fields. In 
the scene, two university students from rural backgrounds enter the office of a university 
 
51 Cai Xiang, “The National/The Local: Conflict Negotiation, and Capitulation in the Revolutionary Imagination” in 
Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949-1966, edited and 
translated by Rebecca E. Karl and Xueping Zhong, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 27-84. Originally 
published as Geming/Xushu: Zhongguo shehuizhuyi wenxue-wenhua xiangxiang (Beijing: Peking University Press, 
2010). 
52 Cai Xiang, Revolution and Its Narratives, p. 79-81.  
53 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation for further discussion of Juelie.  
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administrator, Cao Zhonghe. They have just come from work in the field, and their pant 
legs are rolled up, their feet muddied and bare. The administrator, who comes from a 
bourgeois urban background, scolds their appearance: “Look at you! You don’t even look 
like college students. From now on, you’re not allowed to go barefoot.” Behind him, the 
university’s principal, Long Guozheng, enters the office, and observes the interaction to 
comedic effect. The principal, himself from a humble cattle-herding family, is barefooted 
with his pant legs rolled up at the calf, and after he sees Cao scold the students, Long 
chides Cao, teasing that with rules like these, soon even principals will be barred from 
entering Cao’s office. Cao looks down at Long’s feet and scoffs.54As the central 
protagonist of the film, Principal Long is clearly held in higher moral regard than Cao, a 
trouser-and-shoe-wearing recidivist bourgeois intellectual. The scene is an explicit 
attempt to transform a formerly scorned marker of poverty and manual labor into a 
metonym of the heroic proletarian, and Long’s bare feet mark his class sympathies, as 
well as his alliance with the peasant students.  
 
54 Chun Chao, Zhou Jie (screenplay), Jue lie [Breaking with Old Ideas], VHS, dir. Li Wenhua (Los Angeles: 
Voyager Press, 1986). 
 61 
 
Figure 2-4 Principal Long enters Cao Zhonghe's office, still from "Breaking with Old Ideas." 
Bare feet are similarly mobilized in pivotal scenes from the films Chunmiao and 
Yanming hu pan, two of the three films released in 1975 that took barefoot doctors as 
their protagonists. The heroines of Chunmiao and Yanming hu pan are two women, Tian 
Chunmiao and Lan Haiying, respectively, and both characters are selectively depicted 
with bare feet at pivotal points in the films. When Tian Chunmiao is first introduced, she 
is shown walking scattering seeds in rice paddies, wading through the water with bare 
feet. The camera zooms to a close up of her muddied feet before panning to her face, 
gazing determinedly ahead. Commune members behind Chunmiao are also planting 
seeds in the paddies, and a boy runs up to Chunmiao, asking that she come attend to a 
sick child. The scene embodies Chunmiao’s dual nature as a barefoot doctor, tending to 
the young sprouts of her community through equal engagement in healing and in 
agricultural commune labor.  
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Figure 2-5 Chunmiao walking barefoot in paddies, still from "Chunmiao." 
Bare feet also appear during climactic scenes in which both Chunmiao and 
Haiying confront the antagonists of their respective narratives. In Chunmiao, the 
antagonist is Dr. Qian Jiren, a doctor trained under the Nationalist medical system who 
acts against the interests of the rural community due to lingering capitalist and revisionist 
sympathies. In Yanming hu pan, the central antagonist is party secretary Chen Tu, a 
hidden capitalist roader who provides political support for the corrupt Dr. Lin Daquan. 
The central conflicts of each film center over the operation of the cooperative health 
clinic, and in scenes of tense confrontation, both Chunmiao and Haiying’s feet not only 
certify their participation in labor, but interpolate them within communities defined by 
their labor.  
For example, in Yanming hu pan, things come to a head when Uncle Lin falls into 
a well, where he is sickened by noxious fumes. Lan Haiying had championed the digging 
of the new well as a preventative measure against local diseases (difang bing) contracted 
through the consumption of impure drinking water, while the party secretary Chen Tu 
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and commune doctor Lin Daquan fought to divert funding and labor to the construction 
of a surgery theater that would operate for profit. After Uncle Lin is revived, Granny 
Jiang, an elderly peasant who has been crippled by local diseases, defends Haiying to the 
crowd that has gathered. “Look at our (zan’men) Haiying! Have a good look at her!” says 
Granny Jiang as the camera cuts first to Haiying’s resolute face, and then to her muddied 
feet. “Uncle Lin and Dr. Lan, who was the one who saved them? Haiying did. Who 
wanted to prevent the lower-middle peasants of Huanshui from getting local diseases, 
working day and night to dig the well and correct the water (gai shui)? It was also 
Haiying! And yet you accuse her of getting up to no good (tiao laohu shi),” says Granny 
Jiang.  
As the conflict unfolds, the crowd’s presence serves to place the conflict on a 
public stage, and members of the crowd echo their support for Granny Jiang and Haiying. 
Haiying’s muddied feet serve as evidence in the court of public opinion. Despite her 
privileged city origins as a sent down youth, Haiying comes by her class feeling honestly, 
and the depiction of her bare feet constitutes irrefutable physical proof of the sincerity of 
her identification with the lower-middle peasants of the Huanshui commune. Here, class 
is no abstract concept: it is physically manifest, written on the body.55 
 
55 Elsewhere, the pale, soft hands of the intellectual similarly testify to the cosseted lifestyle of elites. 
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Figure 2-6 Close up of Haiying’s feet during confrontation, still from “Yanming hu pan” 
The Enemy Within 
Certainly, depictions of bare feet were not without their gendered dimensions. Yet 
I find that in barefoot doctor films, women’s bare feet served less as a marker of 
submerged eroticism, and more as an indicator of revolutionary agency. Indeed, 
revolutionary agency itself is gendered: in Chunmiao, Yanming hu pan, and Hongyu, 
women protagonists bear the responsibility for rebelling on behalf of their community, 
compared to the male protagonist of Hongyu, who needs only to physically defeat the 
socially destructive antagonist of his narrative. In order to better understand how barefoot 
doctor films—Chunmiao in particular—innovated upon the existing storytelling 
techniques for depicting revolution, it is necessary to examine more closely the film’s 
production. Chunmiao was adapted from a 1971 script titled Chijiao yisheng [The 
barefoot doctor], and as an intended marquee film event, the development of the film was 
supervised by Shanghai’s highest political leadership. In minutes from a meeting of the 
city’s Standing Committee convened to discuss the new draft of the script, Xu Jingxian, 
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then deputy director of the city’s Revolutionary Committee (Geming weiyuanhui) as well 
as a party secretary to the city,56 discussed the attention that had gone into the depiction 
of revolution in his introductory remarks:  
As previously discussed, the biggest issue we are concerned about in the film is the depiction of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The third section of the film has been re-written 
entirely, and is much stronger now. This section was difficult to write, as no script yet has 
depicted the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.57  
 
By this point, the film’s script had gone through eight different drafts, each draft 
attempting to refine the depiction of revolution on screen. In the film’s third act, 
Chunmiao leads a coup (duo quan) at the health station, taking away control from Du 
Wenjie, the revisionist leader there. Xu complains in the meeting of writers who “don’t 
dare to depict the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [in their scripts.] Their thinking 
is severely hampered by ‘no conflict theory (wu chongtu lun),’ and they’re always writing 
scripts that end before the start of the Cultural Revolution, with a weak sense of realism 
(xianshi yiyi).”58 
To the Cultural Revolution film scholar Mu Ting,59 the depiction of revolution 
itself in films from the late Cultural Revolution constitutes a fundamental narrative shift 
in P.R.C. filmmaking. The protagonists of late Cultural Revolution films no longer face 
“Kuomintang reactionaries, Japanese invaders, or hidden members of the Five Black 
 
56 At the time, Shanghai had several party secretaries and not one, as is the custom in the present.  
57 Wu Di, ed., Zhongguo dianying yanjiu ziliao, 1949-1979 [Research materials on Chinese film, 1949-1979], xia 
juan (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 2006), p. 288-90. 
58 Ibid.  
59 This is likely a penname.  
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Elements [landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, or Rightists].”60 
Instead, external antagonists have transformed into internal ones, capitalist roaders, and 
Rightists hidden within the body politic itself. Referring to Chunmiao as one of several 
“conspiracy films (yinmou dianying),” a label retroactively used by Deng Xiaoping-led 
reformers to criticize leftist films produced during the late Cultural Revolution, Mu Ting 
describes the change as an innovative shift in socialist story-telling:  
 
The depiction of rebellion and the seizure of power (zaofan duoquan) is an innovation of 
‘conspiracy films,’ a development that built upon the model opera… What really struck people is 
that in the history of Chinese cinema, most heroes were characters that received orders (mingling 
de jieshouzhe) and executed them. High-level leaders always played the role of the giver of orders 
(shoumingzhe), and in a few situations, the giver of orders could be absent or combined into 
another role. But to take the giver of orders and turn that character into the antagonist of the 
narrative, that was unprecedented, a narrative change that relied upon the logic of class struggle 
and two-line struggle that Mao Zedong became ensnared with in his late years, perhaps best 
expressed by the phrase ‘Capitalist roaders are still out there, and capitalist roaders are within the 
party itself [Zouzipai hai zai zou, zouzipai jiu zai dang nei].’61 
 
Mu Ting points to a fundamental shift in the emplotment of late Cultural Revolution 
films in which the agency traditionally reserved for characters embodying virtuous 
authority has been given to the film’s antagonist, complicating the depiction of power and 
its relation to moral virtue and political authority. Giving the agency to propel the film’s 
narrative forward to the central antagonist—what Mu Ting calls “giving orders (shou 
 
60 Mu Ting, “‘Yinmou dianying’ qianxi [A rough analysis of ‘conspiracy films’],” Jiyi [Remembrance] 65, Dec. 30, 
2010. http://www.xujuneberlein.com/rem65.html#C  
61 Mu Ting, “‘Yinmou dianying’ qianxi.” 
 67 
ming)—implies that the antagonist has become uncomfortably similar to, even mistakable 
for, those characters who traditionally embodied the film’s overarching legitimizing 
moral and political order. If narrative is, at its core, an organizing structure for the 
reproduction and interpretation of human experience vis a vis the logic of the temporal, 
then such a shift in revolutionary narrative signifies an increasingly complex 
contemporary critique of the relationship between power, morality, and realpolitik in the 
P.R.C.  
The shift from externalized to internalized antagonists is mirrored in other aspects 
of storytelling during the socialist period as well. During the same period, film depictions 
of medical work shift in an arc that begins with medical expertise embodied in external 
characters such as the famed Canadian surgeon Dr. Norman Bethune. As a foreign expert 
with superior training and experience in surgery, Bethune disseminates knowledge to the  
grateful Chinese staff of his army medical unit. Although the director of the film was 
careful to avoid portraying Bethune as a “capitalist intellectual in the making,”62 Bethune 
is openly critical of what he sees as the incompetent medical work of his subordinates as 
well as the country’s lack of medical infrastructure, but as the film progresses, Bethune 
transforms into “both a teacher and student of the Eighth Route Army.”63 The film 
centers on Bethune’s heroic transformation from arrogant foreign surgeon to humble 
contributor to the revolutionary cause, and he is aided in his spiritual growth, his 
familiarity with China, and his understanding of the socialist cause by the Chinese cast 
around him. The film’s heroes are antagonized by the encroaching Japanese army, whose 
 
62 “‘Bai Qiuen Daifu’ he shezhi zu jiao di,” Zhang Junxiang (director and scriptwriter), Dai chanshu [Director’s 
commentary], July 1, 1963, China Film Archive, Bai Qiuen Daifu box. 
63 Zhang Junxiang, “‘Baiqiuen daifu’ he shezhizu jiaodi [A true account of how Dr. Norman Bethune was 
produced], July 1963, Dr. Norman Bethune ephemera box, China Film Archives, Beijing, P.R.China.  
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encroachment on Bethune’s mobile surgery theater ultimately cause him to contract 
blood poisoning and die, as he did in real life.  
The literature scholar Cai Xiang argues in Revolution and Its Narratives that the 
local is inextricably involved in the articulation of new national cultures, an interaction he 
sees as inherently contradictory yet necessary in the creation of a new national culture (as 
in the rejection of dialects in favor of a standardization of language that ultimately relies 
on one particular regionalized manner of speaking.)64 So, too, in depictions of medical 
practice do local practices come to define national medical culture. Dr. Norman 
Bethune’s portrayal of foreign-led medical work gave way to the 1974 short film 
Wuyingdeng xia song yinzhen (the official English title rendered as A Song of 
Acupuncture), whose protagonists are a team of cardiac surgeons at a hospital in 
Shanghai. When the conservative surgeon Dr. Luo refuses to operate on Master Yang, a 
worker whose heart condition has derailed his ability to continue smelting steel at the 
nearby plant, the intrepid young anesthesiologist Li Zhihua eventually succeeds in 
convincing the team to conduct Yang’s open heart surgery with a radical new technique, 
acupuncture anesthesia. Here, the lionhearted foreign surgeon is replaced by more 
localized and internalized cinematic heroes: no foreign experts appear in the film, and the 
primary antagonist is not Japanese, but a conservative and bourgeois-trained senior 
surgeon on the team, Dr. Luo (although he is ultimately redeemed after witnessing the 
success of the surgery and admitting the error of his conservatism.) 
As medical heroes internalize, medical knowledge itself is increasingly localized: 
where Bethune’s foreign surgery skills took center stage in Dr. Norman Bethune, 
 
64 Cai Xiang, Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949-1966, trans. 
Rebecca Karl and Xueping Zhong (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 27-9.  
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Wuyingdeng xia song yinzhen celebrates the development of acupuncture anesthesia, an 
anesthetic technique distinctive to the socialist period and developed from within Chinese 
medical tradition. When Li Zhihua confronts Dr. Luo over his refusal to sanction 
operating on Master Yang, she asks him why they can’t use acupuncture anesthesia:  
 
Li Zhihua: It’s true that Master Yang’s illness makes it impossible to administer 
anesthesia, but why can’t we use acupuncture anesthesia to do the surgery?  
Dr. Luo: Acupuncture? You want to use acupuncture such an acute condition? It’s never 
been done before.  
Li Zhihua: It’s true that it’s never been done before because acupuncture anesthesia is a 
new socialist thing (xinsheng shiwu)…  
Dr. Luo: The technology is most developed abroad. Without anesthesia, the rate of failure 
for this operation is too high for us to consider it. You should accept that this is a fact. 
Li Zhihua: That is in capitalist countries! (She turns away, but then turns back to face Dr. 
Luo.) I’m confident that so long as we have deep proletarian class feeling in our hearts, 
so long as we keep developing the treasures of knowledge that we have in this country, 
we’ll be able to achieve things that Western capitalists cannot!  
 
The success of anesthesia acupuncture, then, owes explicitly to its wholly Chinese provenance, 
and distinctively indigenous knowledge—in this case, acupuncture—speak not only to a 
culturally specific context, but can also be weaponized as an anti-capitalist resource. The 
development of acupuncture anesthesia, then, constitutes a singular and defining achievement of 
the national medical system.  
Yet Wuyingdeng xia song yinzhen represents a medical culture that remains at arm’s 
distance from the workers they serve. The cardiac team at the Shanghai hospital sport white coats 
and glasses, ready identifiers of their high level of training and professionalization. Although the 
 70 
team treats and is deeply involved in the welfare of a local factory worker (referred to as 
“master” (shifu), out of respect for his skill and service as a worker), the hospital stands apart 
from the greater community. With the exception of the film’s opening and closing scenes, which 
depict Master Yang at work smelting iron at the factory, the entire film takes place within the 
confines of the Shanghai hospital, a rarified community of highly trained medical experts. Gated 
walls metaphorically and visually isolate the hospital and its medical team, and as much as the 
hospital team’s white lab coats and scrubs distinguish them, they also separate the characters 
from the masses. Only two characters move between the hospital and the factory: Master Yang, 
the factory worker, is borne by disease from the foundry to the hospital, and back again. He is 
accompanied on this journey between worlds by Li Zhihua, who is inexplicably present at 
Yang’s worksite when he first falls ill, and accompanies him in an ambulance to the hospital. 
Although she works for the workers’ health and appears at the factory again at the film’s end to 
welcome Yang back to work, she is not of the factory, and belongs at the hospital.  
In contrast, the barefoot doctors of Hongyu, Chunmiao, and Yanming hu pan fully belong 
amongst the laborers they treat, and represent a fully localized medical tradition. Gone are the 
foreign surgeons and white-coat wearing city doctors, replaced by Tian Chunmiao, Yan Haiying, 
and Hongyu. Tian Chunmiao and Yan Haiying are sent-down youth who have been fully adopted 
by their local communes, while Hongyu is a native son of his Qingshan commune, born and 
raised for generations in the village. Their medical practice as barefoot doctors relies on the use 
of acupuncture and herbal medicine, low cost and locally available treatments celebrated in the 
theme song to Hongyu:  
 
A single silver needle cures a hundred illnesses, 
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A bit of red heart, a bit of red heart 
Warms a thousand homes, warms a thousand homes. 
Scaling a thousand peaks to make a house call,  
Scaling a thousand cliffs to gather medicinal herbs,  
Welcoming the trials and tribulations of struggle,  
The revolutionary road, oh, the revolutionary road 
Is lined with rosy clouds, with rosy clouds.65  
 
The song describes an image of the barefoot doctor scaling mountains to obtain medicinal 
herbs, a defining image of the medical worker. Photographs of barefoot doctors 
ascending sheer cliffs were published widely in photojournalism from the period,66 and 
each of the three films features scenes of their respective protagonists setting out on 
physically arduous excursions to collect local herbs from nearby mountains. Although 
older forms of medical practice challenge the barefoot doctor—such as Hongyu’s 
bourgeois pharmacist Sun Tianfu, Chunmiao’s witch-doctor Jia Yuexian, and Yanming 
hu pan’s capitalist Dr. Lin Daquan—ultimately the heroes of each film triumph over their 
competitors, convincing the members of their commune not only that they provide 
medical care with the best of intentions, but that their treatments are cheapest and most 
effective. Filmic barefoot doctor thus produce doubly, producing locally sourced 
medicine as well as their productivity as full working members of their communes. That 
the new, localized medical practice of the barefoot doctor is heralded as a defining 
 
65 Su Min, Wang Jixiao (score), Hongyu [The New Doctor], streaming video, dir. Cui Wei (Los Angeles: YiMovi, 
2017).  
66 See, for example, Medical Workers Serving the People Wholeheartedly (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), 
p. 71 
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feature of socialist China’s new healthcare system exemplifies Cai Xiang’s assertion that 
the local is inextricably involved in the articulation of new national cultures.67  
The Revolutionary Doctor 
That Chunmiao was heralded as “the first feature film that directly reflects the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,”68 replete with its strong, daringly realistic 
(xianshi yiyi qianglie) plot,69 speaks to the extent that the film exemplified these narrative 
shifts from external to internal enemies, external to internal medical practices, and 
external to internal cultures. Specifically, the film’s claim to depicting the Cultural 
Revolution on screen lies in a final scene in which Chunmaio confronts Du Wenjie, the 
director of the commune’s health clinic and himself a member of the party. Successfully 
overthrowing Du Wenjie, Chunmiao seizes control of the health station on behalf of the 
people, effectively staging revolution within her commune. In an echo of Mu Ting’s 
anaylsis, the film historian Wu Zhala70 argues that Chunmiao’s critique of both the state 
of rural healthcare as well as a political leadership run amok was extraordinary at the 
time, going against the narrative conventions of the Seventeen-year Period when “the 
suffering of the masses, the wickedness of officials, and the darkness of society” were 
attributable only to the vilified Nationalist party.71 The social critique that had previously 
been staged in an externalized past was now transposed into the present, staged not only 
within the new state, but within the party itself—a development Wu Zhala says could not 
 
67 Cai Xiang, Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949-1966, trans. 
Rebecca Karl and Xueping Zhong (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 27-9.  
68 “Spring Shoot—A Film,” Peking Review, 24 (June 11, 1976), pp. 17-8.  
69 “Shanghai wei lingdao dui ‘Chunmiao’ ba gao de yijian,” Zhongguo dianying yanjiu ziliao (1949-1979), pp. 288-
90. 
70 Penname for the retired Beijing Film Academy professor Wu Di.  
71 Wu Zhala, “‘Chunmiao’ du jie [A reading of Chunmiao],” Jiyi [Remembrance] 65, Dec. 30, 2010. 
http://www.xujuneberlein.com/rem65.html#D. 
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have failed to astonish audiences accustomed to narratives of socialist righteousness and 
abundance. 
Wu Zhala’s analysis is distinguished by his choice to take seriously the 
contemporaneous description of Chunmiao as “realistic,” a commitment that implicitly 
rejects the Reform-era critique of Chunmiao as an exemplar “conspiracy film”—or, a 
politically weaponized work of propaganda authored by the Gang of Four meant to attack 
their political enemies.72 Instead, Wu sees the film’s attempt to depict the structural 
challenges faced by the poor as sincere. Citing the sociologist Li Qiang, Wu points out 
that during the 1970s, China’s urban residents “enjoyed socialist benefits including better 
education, public medical insurance (gongfei yiliao), and retirement benefits” that the 
rural peasantry did not receive.73 The irony of a film depicting “lower-middle peasants 
(pinxia zhongnong),” a vaunted group of distinguished political status in the P.R.C., 
being “overlooked, discriminated against, and exploited” by party members, would not 
have been lost on audiences. Instead, the film suggested that “China’s industrialization 
was built upon the exploitation of the peasants, and that the culture of the cities was 
predicated upon the ignorance and backwardness of the countryside.” In turn, the 
predicament of the lower-middle peasants of Chunmiao “was predicated upon the system 
that had been built after 1949.”74  
This trenchant and provocative social critique is explicitly articulated, of course, 
by Chunmiao’s titular character. The heroine’s gender is no accident. Woman characters 
voice the most daring critiques of political power and social injustice in late Cultural 
 
72 Wu Zhala, “‘Chunmiao’ du jie.” 
73 Wu Zhala, “‘Chunmiao’ du jie,” citing Li Qiang, Dangdai Zhongguo shehui fengceng yu jiaoliu (Beijing: China 
Economic Publishing House, 1993), p. 77.  
74 Wu Zhala, “‘Chunmiao’ du jie.”  
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Revolution films, a trend thrown into high relief in the three late Cultural Revolution-era 
films that constitute the bulk of this chapter’s focus. Scholars of gender and its depiction 
in socialist China have tended to argue that the period promoted a vision of gender 
equality based upon cultures of men’s labor, celebrating the “iron” women who 
performed work traditionally associated with men—often depicted as agricultural or 
industrial labor including welding, driving tractors, or operating machinery. Male 
privilege (zhongnan qingnü) was associated with the old, feudal cultures of the past, and 
the portrayal of women performing traditionally male labor articulated a new culture of 
equality.75 In this vein of scholarship, the militaristic culture of the Cultural Revolution 
carried the message of gender and equality and proletarian solidarity into an “erasure of 
gender and sexuality (xingbie mosha)” that rendered women into “genderless 
revolutionaries.”76 To the cultural studies scholar Meng Yue, socialist literature and film 
“use the female image to signify either a certain class or sociopolitical group or the 
authority of the Communist Party itself.”77 Film scholar Cui Shuqin argues that Maoist 
heroines are “erased of anything that is feminine,”78 and Mayfair Mei-hui Yang that 
“gender, especially female gender, was invisible.”79 
 
75 See Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People’s Republic, 
especially chapters 6 and 8, for an insightful account of the representation of women performing work during the 
socialist period.  
76 Huang Yufu, “Chinese Women’s Status as Seen Through Peking Opera,” in Holding up Half the Sky, ed. Tao Jie, 
Zheng Bijun, and Shirley L. Mow (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2004), p. 34.  
77 Meng Yue, “Female Images and National Myth,” in Gender Politics in Modern China, ed. Tani E. Barlow 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 118, originally published as “Nüxing xingxiang yu guojia shenhua,” 
Ershiyi shiji, no. 4 (1991), pp. 103-12. 
78 Cui Shuqin, Women Through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema, (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), p. 87.  
79 Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, “From Gender Erasure to Gender Difference: State Feminism, Consumer Sexuality, and 
Women’s Public Sphere in China,” in A Space of Their Own: Women’s Public Sphere in Transnational China, ed. 
Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 41.  
 75 
In her study of model opera during the Cultural Revolution, Rosemary Roberts 
critiques what Meng Yue, Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, and Cui Shuqin call the 
“masculinization of Maoist heroines” at the cost of women’s reproductive gender roles, 
pointing out that such a view is possible if one assumes a heteronormative cis-male 
subject position.80 Such a view believes that the heroines of Maoist narratives were 
forced to choose between either “agency in the public sphere” or an “authentic gender 
identity,” resulting in women characters who occupied an “inauthentic” masculinity that 
denied their roles as daughters, lovers, mothers, or wives. I echo Roberts’s argument that 
the culture of the Cultural Revolution is better understood as a “shifting of gender 
parameters along political lines,” and in my analysis of Yanming hu pan, Chunmiao, and 
Hongyu, I find that rather than insisting upon the ways characters are or are not allowed 
to express assumed gender roles, the revolutionary narrative itself appears to be gendered.  
In Yanming hu pan and Chunmiao, for instance, Lan Haiying and Tian Chunmiao take 
direct political action to oppose or overthrow the authority of corrupt male superiors. 
Chunmiao’s climactic final confrontation is staged in front of the village’s health clinic, 
where Chunmiao clashes with Dr. Qian Jiren over the treatment of a local villager 
suffering from lumbago. Chunmiao insists that Uncle Shui Changbo’s lumbago be treated 
with a medicinal soup made from plant matter harvested in the region, while Qian Jiren 
believes that the village clinic cannot heal Shui Changbo, and that he should be sent to 
the regional hospital for treatment. Tian Chunmiao overthrows the leadership of the 
health clinic, seizing control of the health station in a revolution led from the grassroots. 
Not only is her insurgence celebrated, production materials from the filmmaking process 
 
80 Rosemary Roberts, Maoist Model Theater: The Semiotics of Gender and Sexuality in the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, 1966-1976, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 19.  
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indicate that a central motivation for making the film was to depict a rural uprising 
around access to healthcare.81  
Meanwhile, in the film Yanming hu pan, the barefoot doctor Lan Haiying acts in 
direct opposition to the figures of political leadership in the film, opposing the party 
secretary Chen Tu, a hidden capitalist roader, and the corrupt doctor Lin Daquan when 
they conspire to bankrupt the commune’s rural health clinic into closure. (Chen Tu and 
Lin Daquan’s Chinese names further reinforce their defining character traits: Daquan, or 
“great power,” thirsts after power, while Tu, or “path,” follows the capitalist road.) 
Tearing down the “clinic closed” sign Lin Daquan nails to the front of the door, Lan 
Haiying forces the clinic to remain in operation with the support of the local commune 
members. While Lan Haiying does not seize control of the clinic herself, her accusations 
against Lin Daquan result in his dismissal from the clinic, and when he is rehabilitated in 
the film’s second act, she must again defy local leadership to prevent him from 
implementing destructive capitalist healthcare policies and protect the wellbeing of the 
rural peasants.  
Yet in spite of their aligned interests as barefoot doctors, Tian Chunmiao and Lan 
Haiying’s male counterpart, the young Hongyu, is never placed in a position of having to 
defy the film’s figures of authority. Throughout the course of the film, Hongyu acts 
within the given political boundaries, making no direct challenge to his superiors: 
Hongyu never rebels. Like Chunmiao and Haiying, Hongyu is vexed by the machinations 
of a nefarious and mettlesome bourgeois medical figure—in this case, the pharmacist Sun 
 
81 “Wenhua bu lingdao shenkan ‘Chunmiao’ shuangpian de yijian,” from Zhongguo dianying yanjiu ziliao (1949-
1979) [Research materials on Chinese film, 1949-1979], ed. Wu Di (Beijing: Culture and Art Publishing House, 
2006), pp. 304-7, also “Shanghai shi wei shenkan ‘Chunmiao’ shuangpian de yijian,” in the same volume, pp. 303-4. 
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Tianfu. Trained during the Republican period, Sun Tianfu previously operated a 
pharmacy known for extorting villagers in need of medicine, and smarts under the 
healthcare system of the new society, where his opportunities for extortion are few. The 
film never questions the validity of Sun’s medical expertise—and in fact, in several 
scenes characters openly question Hongyu’s level of training, preferring to consult Sun—
only the purity of his intentions, and Sun has no corrupt party secretary with whom to 
collude.  
The film culminates not in Hongyu’s direct challenge to authority, but in a 
physical confrontation between Hongyu and the reprobate pharmacist, who attacks 
Hongyu with a knife in the dark. Tumbling into a stream below, Hongyu shouts “Had 
enough to drink, have you?” as he dunks Sun Tianfu’s head under the river. Hongyu 
extracts a confession from Sun, who reveals that he had attempted to poison another 
villager and lay the blame on Hongyu. Although Hongyu fiercely defends the interests of 
the rural peasantry, at no point in the film does he defy the orders of a superior or seize 
control of the health clinic—here, the depiction of the revolution in healthcare requires no 
actual revolution, only the physical defeat of a marginalized and disgraced traditional 
healthcare provider.  
In this trio of films, the most powerful revolutionary potential is carried by 
characters who are women, resulting narratives of revolutionary agency that are 
themselves inherently gendered. All three films were developed contemporaneously, and 
while the narratives share many common features—young villagers chose to complete 
barefoot doctor training, medical authority figures with baleful intentions, an uncle or 
aunty in the village suffering from a local disease, suspenseful forays into the mountains 
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to retrieve medicinal herbs, and babies that are sick, dead, or delivered in scenes of 
difficult labor—the power to wage revolution and challenge authority characteristically 
belongs to characters who are women, not men. Other plot elements are gendered as well: 
bourgeoisie, elitism, and traditional knowledge are always embodied by a middle-aged 
man whose refusal to adapt to the culture of the new society has metastasized into naked 
greed and animosity, marking traditional authority and knowledge systems as male.  
Yet by the end, the revolutionary agency that is celebrated through heroines such 
as Lan Haiying and Tian Chunmiao operates within the limits of a socialist system that 
ultimately remains patriarchal. At the end of Yanming hu pan, the county party secretary, 
Lao Dao, places a phone call to Lan Haiying’s health clinic. Ranking above Chen Tu, 
Lao Dao congratulates the members of the clinic for the good work they’ve done in an 
explicit validation of Lan Haiying’s actions. Further, the party secretary orders that Chen 
Tu must be dealt with. Lao Dao remains off screen, his disembodied voice heard through 
the telephone as he tells the clinic members sitting around a table overlooked by Mao’s 
portrait that they must continue Mao’s work. Lan Haiying’s agitation is validated from 
above by a man, the county party secretary, who represents the approval of the system as 
a whole, circumscribing her direct challenge to the leadership of the health clinic and the 
authority of her village party secretary within the integrity of the overall system.  
As a mark of labor practice and of class identity, bare feet, then, qualify 
Chunmiao and Haiying not only to train as barefoot doctors and treat the members of 
their commune, but also to challenge authority and, in Chunmiao’s case, to lead the 
revolution. Hongyu, by contrast, does not lead rebellion in his rural health clinic, and 
perhaps because direct revolutionary agency is gendered female, this might explain why 
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the depiction of Hongyu’s bare feet is minimized in the film. While both Chunmiao and 
Yanming hu pan include close-ups of both Lan Haiying and Tian Chunmiao’s bare feet, 
Hongyu never receives such treatment. Instead, when Hongyu shares with his 
grandmother the news that he has been selected to receive barefoot doctor training, he 
explains to her that the barefoot doctor’s biggest identifying trait is their continued 
engagement with commune labor. “They are amongst the poor, half-peasant and half-
doctor,” Hongyu explains, and his grandmother laughs with approval, revealing that she 
had guilelessly believed barefoot doctors were actually prohibited from wearing shoes.  
Conclusion: Deng’s Theory of Development by Footwear 
After Deng Xiaoping left the screening of Chunmiao in 1975, he followed up with 
explicit criticism of the barefoot doctor program in remarks to foreign visitors to the 
country.  “The barefoot doctors have only just begun; their knowledge is slight,” he 
began. Minimizing the importance of their preventative and public health work, he 
complained that “they can only treat a few common illnesses.” Deng wanted the barefoot 
doctor to develop their expertise in the “normal” way, building a base of knowledge upon 
which they could further specialize. Comparing their skill at healing to footwear, Deng 
remarked that with time, the barefoot doctor could “put on straw shoes; that is, their 
knowledge will have grown. A few years more, and they will wear cloth shoes.”82 
Ostensibly, the barefoot doctor would eventually possess so much specialized medical 
knowledge and training that they could eventually graduate from cloth shoes to luxurious 
leather shoes.  
 
82 Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China After Mao (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 71.  
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Deng’s remarks were a rejection of the Maoist model of spontaneous and 
egalitarian empowerment at the grassroots which barefoot doctors had followed, and a 
harbinger of what would come: by the start of 1977, the consensus on barefoot doctors 
would change radically, so much so that the teleological vison of the medical 
establishment’s linear development for which Deng had been excoriated would come to 
be embraced. The headline of a 1980 special report in the Peking Review proudly 
proclaimed that after receiving systemic retraining in “basic knowledge and technique,” 
“Barefoot Doctors Now ‘Wear Shoes.’”83 Where the barefoot doctor’s participation in 
agricultural labor had once been their defining feature, after Mao’s death their 
participation in commune labor was gradually de-emphasized,84 and policies requiring 
increased testing and training from barefoot doctors underscored the specialization of 
their medical expertise over their socialization as workers.85 
Meanwhile, the consensus on barefoot doctor films began to reverse as well. 
Chunmiao, which had been both the most popular of the barefoot doctor films as well as 
the most closely associated with Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, was especially singled 
out for attention. Following their sensational arrest in October 1976, any organization that 
had been associated with Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, or Wang 
Hongwen published denouncements of their influence in order to distance themselves 
 
83 Lin Yang, “Countryside: Barefoot Doctors Now ‘Wear Shoes,’” Peking Review Vol. 23, No. 25 (June 1980): pp. 
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85 In October 1979, the State Council proposed requiring barefoot doctors to sit for exams certifying their medical 
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“Barefoot Doctors and the Provision of Rural Health Care” in Medical Transitions in Twentieth Century China, ed. 
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from their agenda, thereby attempting to ensure the organization’s continued institutional 
viability under a new set of political leaders and a value system in flux.  
By spring 1977, criticism of the Gang of Four had reached the film industry, and 
film studios formed criticism groups to investigate and condemn any malfeasance the 
institution had committed under the Gang’s influence. A criticism group at the Shanghai 
Film Studio published an editorial in the Renmin ribao calling Chunmiao an anti-party 
film that revealed the Gang of Four’s evil conspiracy to usurp control of the party.86 
Criticism of Chunmiao accused the Gang of forcing the studio’s hand, perverting the 
content of the film through revisions, and of suppressing dissent against the film through 
control of the media.87 Dazibao written in 1975 by a man identified as a poor commune 
member who had been brought to Beijing to see Chunmiao were published in June 1977 
as evidence of an attempt to silence the mass’s distaste for the film.88 Where Tian 
Chunmiao had once been praised for having a “political consciousness”89 so advanced 
she knew when it was just to rebel against corrupt leaders, she was now denounced for 
criticizing the party, defaming medical workers, and inciting spontaneous mass 
movement.90 “After all, our arts and culture (wenxue yishu) should celebrate the party’s 
leadership, not oppose it,” wrote one critic. The consolidation of cultural organs around 
the new leadership foreclosed the possibility of a cultural critique of the internal enemy. 
 
86 Shanghai dianying zhipianchang da pipanzu [Great criticism group of the Shanghai Film Studio], “Zhe bi zhang 
yiding yao qingsuan: Cong fandang yingpian ‘Chunmiao’ de chulong kan ‘Sirenbang’ suandang duoquan de zui’e 
yinmou [The account must be cleared: The Gang of Four’s evil conspiracy to usurp Party control as seen in the anti-
party film ‘Chunmiao’], Renmin ribao, June 25, 1977.  
87 Zhang Zuoguang, “Dianying ‘Chunmiao’ bixu pipan [The film Chunmiao must be criticized],” Renmin dianying 
No. 2-3 (1977): pp. 32-5. 
88 Zhao Anting, “‘Chunmiao’ shi yike daducao [Chunmiao’ is a poisonous weed],” Renmin ribao, June 25, 1997. 
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And by denying the presence of internal enemies, criticism of Chunmiao abrogated the 
revolutionary agency of the film’s heroine.  
So great was the stigma of being associated with Chunmiao that one of its three 
directors, Xie Jin, attempted to expunge it from his oeuvre. Pang Laikwan notes that 
although Xie went on to a career as one of China’s most distinguished directors, 
Chunmiao “is seldom mentioned in studies of Xie Jin, and is usually not included in the 
director’s oeuvre.” The film is not officially distributed, and any copies now available are 
contraband.91 The passage of time has only slightly modified the Dengist consensus on 
Chunmiao: a compendium of films produced in Shanghai remembers Chunmiao as an 
early reflection of the “struggle against capitalist roaders” with heavy Gang interference 
in its production, but allows that the film was made with exemplary technical mastery of 
the camera.92 
The barefoot doctor represented a failed attempt to remake medicine as a social 
relation through embeddedness in labor. The barefoot doctor was sustained by a Maoist 
attempt to level the structures of elitism and bureaucratic hierarchy that had prevented the 
poor from receiving adequate medical training and care, but ambiguity over the barefoot 
doctor’s rejection of traditional professional qualifications and embrace of lay expertise 
weakened their intervention in the medical system. As an institution, the barefoot doctor 
was weakened by the implementation of a medical examination system that made 
expertise, not labor relation, the main criterion for status as a barefoot doctor.93 Rural 
 
91 Laikwan Pang, The Art of Cloning, p. 128. 
92 See Chen Wenping and Cai Jifu, eds., Shanghai dianying 100 nian [One hundred years of Shanghai films] 
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economic reforms progressively weakened (and eventually dismantled) the commune 
system that supported them, and when cooperative medical service collapsed, it was 
quickly replaced with a user-pays system that again exacerbated the urban rural divide in 
healthcare.  
Ultimately, the barefoot doctor’s novelty as a new socialist thing was too great to 
overcome. When Minister of Health Chen Minzhang announced in 1985 the ministry’s 
decision to abolish the title, effectively ending the program, he cited confusion over their 
name as a prime motivation. “The implications of this term are not clear,” said Chen 
before announcing that barefoot doctors with secondary technical school education (yishi) 
and above would be called village doctors (xiangcun yisheng), and those without yishi 
qualifications would be called health workers (weishengyuan).94 As market reforms and 
the emergence of a post-socialist society transformed the countryside, memories of the 
barefoot doctor live on as a curiosity. 
 
94 Chen Minzhang cited in Xiaoping Fang, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine, p. 175.  
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Chapter 3 | The Laboring of Art: Amateur Art Practice and the Everyday 
 
 
Introduction: Hu Xian Peasant Art and the Arrival of the Contemporary 
In November 1976, an exhibition of artwork by peasant artists from Hu Xian, a rural 
county in Shaanxi Province, arrived in London. Consisting of around eighty works by peasants 
from “red” China, the show had just shown to great acclaim at the 9th Paris Biennale. After 
making its way through several small venues across Great Britain, the show finally arrived in the 
United Kingdom’s capital city. London was intended to be the final leg of the tour, but the 
exhibition was so well received that the Chinese officials who had organized the exhibition 
agreed to extend it. Numerous art institutions across the United Kingdom placed additional 
requests to host the show in their exhibition spaces,1 and the critical response was 
overwhelmingly positive. Prominent mainstream art critics such as William Feaver, chief art 
critic for The Observer, stated that “Only the bleakest Scrooge could avoid being exhilarated by 
the crop of Chinese peasant paintings at the Warehouse Gallery.” Feaver described the art as “a 
mass display of confidence” that “bring[s] a sense of sunshine, a vivid, affirmative outburst,”2 
while The Guardian’s art critic, Caroline Tisdall, found the works so affective that they could 
“make even the most hard-bitten Western cynic feel a pang of longing for the collective.”3 
Adrian Rifkin, writing more explicitly from the left in the trendy new contemporary art magazine 
 
1 Emily Williams, “Exporting the Communist Image: The 1976 Chinese Peasant Painting Exhibition in Britain,” 
New Global Studies 8, no. 3 (January 1, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2014-0030. 
2 William Feaver, “China at the Double: Art,” The Observer, November 21, 1976. 
3 Caroline Tisdall, “Record of Achievement,” The Guardian, November 17, 1976. 
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Artscribe, said it was simply “an honor to have had the exhibition here and to have seen for 
ourselves one of the fruits, the ‘socialist new things,’ of the Cultural Revolution.”4 
To its organizers in Beijing, the exhibition was an astounding success by every possible 
metric. Not only had the exhibition succeeded in sharing with the capitalist West what the 
organizers saw as a flourishing new contemporary culture in China, but that culture had 
resonated beyond their wildest expectations. Large crowds in the capitalist world were gathering 
to see contemporary art from “communist” China, and the most discriminating of the 
bourgeoisie’s art critics had been won over with a peasant art celebrating socialist values and 
collective labor. According to a People’s Daily report, “During the exhibition, many visitors 
expressed their passion and approval for Hu Xian peasant art, saying that the art vividly reflected 
the new socialist villages of China, and that they helped visitors understand the enormous change 
that China’s revolution had brought to the countryside.”5 As a proxy for the socialist culture and 
values articulated by the Chinese state, the success of the Hu Xian peasant art exhibition was a 
symbolic triumph that signaled both the viability and the persuasive power of contemporary 
socialist culture outside its own national context.  
From London, the show went on to venues in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, New 
York City, Washington D.C., Houston, Toronto, and Christchurch, New Zealand, where it was 
seen by “several hundred thousand people”6 across the world. The shows attracted large crowds, 
and even critics more skeptical of the P.R.C.’s political programs had something nice to say: 
“This sort of propaganda is, as propaganda goes, minimally bothersome. It is not virulent; it does 
 
4 Adrian Rifkin, “The Chinese Exhibition at the Warehouse Gallery,” Artscribe, February 1977. 
5 “Hu Xian Nongmin Hua Zai Yingguo Shoudao Guanzhong Huanying [Hu Xian Peasant Art Welcomed by 
Audiences of England],” Renmin Ribao, November 24, 1976. 
6 Paul Richard, “The Happy Peasant Paintings of Huhsien,” The Washington Post, October 9, 1978. 
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not urge the mind to hatred. It is entertaining, colorful, informative and cheery,” wrote one art 
critic for The Washington Post.7 
By the late 1970s, peasant art from Hu Xian constituted one of the most visible cultural 
representations of contemporary Chinese culture in the non-socialist world. China and other 
socialist countries had been conducting exchanges of art and culture since the P.R.C.’s founding 
in 1949. But because the country had limited exchanges of trade, diplomacy, culture, etc. with 
non-socialist countries, in the capitalist world cultural products from China were thought of as 
largely inaccessible.8 In the early 1970s this status quo famously began to change: Richard 
Nixon’s historic 1972 visit ended decades of diplomatic freeze between the United States and the 
P.R.C., and the path to his trip had been paved by the highly visible exchanges of “ping pong 
diplomacy” the year before.9 The robust media attention paid to Nixon’s trip and the athletic 
events had given the American public glimpses of the contemporary P.R.C. culture, from state 
banquets to model operas and panda husbandry. But with a handful of notable exceptions,10 few 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Emily Wilcox demonstrates in her history of concert dance in China that the P.R.C.’s programs of cultural 
exchange were not limited exclusively to the socialist bloc. See Revolutionary Bodies: Chinese Dance and the 
Socialist Legacy (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018 ), especially Chapter 3, “Performing a Socialist 
Nation.” For a discussion of global film exchange between 1949 to 1957, see Tina Mai Chen, “International Film 
Circuits and Global Imaginaries in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–57,” Journal of Chinese Cinemas 3, no. 2 
(January 2009): 149–61, https://doi.org/10.1386/jcc.3.2.149_1. For literary exchanges, see Nicolai Volland, 
“Translating the Socialist State: Cultural Exchange, National Identity, and the Socialist World in the Early PRC,” 
Twentieth-Century China 33, no. 2 (April 2008): 51–72, https://doi.org/10.1179/tcc.2008.33.2.51; and Volland, 
Socialist Cosmopolitanism: The Chinese Literary Universe, 1945-1965, Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian 
Institute, Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). For Soviet influence in China, see 
Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li, eds., China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present, The Harvard Cold 
War Studies Book Series (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010). 
9 See Chapter 9, “The Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1972” in Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 
The New Cold War History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Qian Jiang, 'Ping Pang' 
waijiao muhou [Behind Ping Pong Diplomacy] (Beijing: Dongfang, 1997); Nicolas Griffin, Ping-Pong Diplomacy: 
The Secret History Behind the Game That Changed the World (New York: Scribner, 2014). 
10 The most notable exception to this was “The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People’s Republic of 
China.” A partial list of the exhibition’s venues includes museums in Australia, Canada, France, Mexico, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom between 1973 and 1976. See the catalog The Exhibition of the Archaeological Finds 
of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: The National Gallery of Art, 1974); for an exploration of the 
exhibition's reception within the P.R.C., see Juliane Noth, “‘Make the Past Serve the Present:’ Reading Cultural 
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organized exhibitions of Chinese art and culture had been staged in the West with P.R.C. 
sponsorship, and Western audiences had limited opportunities to learn about trends in the 
country’s contemporary art and culture. In the United States, for example, critics noted that the 
Hu Xian show was the first exhibition of “contemporary art” from China to be displayed since 
the founding of the P.R.C.,11 and the first exhibition of peasant painting from China ever to be 
shown.12 Thus, the exhibition had succeeded in a tricky task, leaving foreign audiences in the 
ideologically hostile West with a positive impression of “New China” and its culture.  
In spite of the primacy of place historically seized by Hu Xian peasant art in the Western 
cultural imaginary of the P.R.C., since the 1970s Hu Xian peasant art has decidedly left the 
cultural spotlight. It has been supplanted by a narrative of “contemporary Chinese art” that 
begins not in the socialist period but in the first moments of the post-socialist experience in 
China, when Mao’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms marked the passing of the avant-garde 
mantle from the revolutionary vanguard in the peasantry and proletariat to political and cultural 
dissidents. Today’s narrative of “contemporary Chinese art” traces its origins to art groups and 
movements that were only nascent at the time, such as the Stars Group (xingxing huahui), who 
later exhibited conceptual art in defiance of the institution in spaces symbolically outside of the 
establishment, the No Name Painting Society (wuming huahui), whose refusal of any moniker is 
now understood as an act of avant-garde nonconformity, and the April Photographic Society 
(siyue yinghui), whose unofficial photography practice is credited with taking the first steps in 
“claiming” photographic image-making for the private space.13 As the field of “contemporary 
 
Relicis Excavated During the Cultural Revolution,” in Cultural Heritage as Civilising Mission: From Decay to 
Recovery, ed. Michael Falser (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 181–99. 
11 Richard, “The Happy Peasant Paintings of Huhsien.” 
12 Diana Loercher, “China’s Peasant Art: Political, but More,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 9, 1978. 
13 For literature on the “origins” of contemporary Chinese art, see Karen Smith, Nine Lives: The Birth of Avant-
Garde Art in New China (Beijing and Hong Kong: Timezone 8, 2008); Paul Gladston, Chapter 2, “Modern 
(Contemporary) Chinese Art” in Contemporary Chinese Art: A Critical History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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Chinese art” becomes increasingly codified,14 political dissidence is woven deeply into the fabric 
of its narrative of emergent art.15 As a consequence, cultural practices that developed under state 
sponsorship during the socialist period are excluded from what is considered “contemporary” 
P.R.C. culture.  
Yet the Hu Xian peasant art phenomenon—or, speaking more broadly, the phenomenon 
of a nationwide amateur (yeyu) art practice—occurred contemporaneously to the development of 
the Stars Group (active 1979 to 1980), the No Name Painting Society (active 1974 to 1981), the 
April Photographic Society (active 1979 to 1981), and other art groups and practices seen as 
originators of contemporary Chinese art. While the latter genre of contemporary art practice has 
traveled with far-reaching global currency since the first Chinese artists were included in the 
watershed 1989 Centre Pompidou exhibition “Magiciens de la Terre,”16 the former type of art 
has disappeared from discussion. We should recall, however, that amateur art practice has its 
roots in cultural developments taking place beginning in the mid-1950s, and that it spread 
nationally throughout the 1960s; by the early 1970s locales such as Hu Xian were seen as 
 
Press, 2014); Wu Hung, Contemporary Chinese Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 2014); Lü Peng and Yi Dan, 
Zhongguo xiandai yishushi: 1979-1989 [A history of modern Chinese art, 1979-1989] (Changsha: Hunan meishu 
chubanshe, 1992); Lü Peng, A History of Art in 20th Century China (Milan: Charta, 2010), esp. chapters 16-25; Feng 
Boyi and Qiu Zhijie, The Monk and the Demon: Contemporary Chinese Art (Milan: 5Continents, 2008); Julia F. 
Andrews and Kuiyi Shen, “Art After Mao” in The Art of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012); Gao Minglu, Total Modernity and the Avant-Garde in Twentieth-Century Chinese Art (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2011), and Jennifer Dorothy Lee, “The Aesthetics of Anxiety: Post-Mao Experimentalisms, 1976-1982” 
(PhD diss., New York University, 2014), and Katherine Grube, “State of Exchange: Contemporary Art and China’s 
Postsocialist Image Economy,” (PhD diss., New York University, 2018). 
14 For recent discussion of the term and its limits, see Philip Tinari, “Between Palimpsest and Teleology: the 
Problem of ‘Chinese Contemporary Art’” in Art and China After 1989: Theater of the World (New York: 
Guggenheim Museum Publications, 2017), pp. 51-67.   
15 Xiaobing Tang calls this the “dissident hypothesis.” See Visual Culture in Contemporary China: Paradigms and 
Shifts (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2015), especially Chapter 5, “How (not) to watch a Chinese 
blockbuster.”  
16 See the exhibition catalog Magiciens de la Terre (Paris: Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1989). The selection of the 
Centre Pompidou exhibition is somewhat arbitrary, as any number of other exhibitions of Chinese artists abroad 
could have equally served as a symbolic moment of arrival for contemporary Chinese artists, including the inclusion 
of twenty Chinese artists in the Venice Biennale in 1999, Johnson Chang’s 1993 exhibition “China’s New Art Post-
1989,” or the establishment of the Shanghai Biennale in 2000. 
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flourishing centers of amateur art as a new rural cultural practice.17 Hu Xian artists continued to 
paint, sell, and exhibit art in an undiminished capacity after Mao’s death in 1976 and well into 
the 1980s, while the international exhibition of their art was coordinated simultaneously with the 
first implementations of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms (beginning in late 1978.) 
Temporally, there is no question that amateur art practice belongs as much to the 
contemporary moment in China as do early figures of what is variously known as “contemporary 
Chinese art (Zhongguo dangdai yishu),”18 the Chinese “avant-garde,”19 or “experimental art” 
(shiyan meishu).20 Indeed, in the late 1970s amateur art was a highly visible cultural practice, 
while the groups, individuals, and activities that would later be identified as comprising the 
vanguard of contemporary Chinese art would have been invisible to all but a limited circle of 
domestic art students and educators.21 The cultural narratives of the contemporary in China 
fracture in the face of juggernaut of historical transitions during the late 1970s, from the death of 
Mao Zedong to the arrest of the Gang of Four, the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the 
beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s Opening and Reform policies of 1978-9. When these narratives 
 
17 Although this chapter will present its own, more nuanced narrative of amateur art practice in the P.R.C., for a 
condensed version focusing specifically on Hu Xian, see Ralph Croizier “Hu Xian Peasant Painting: From 
Revolutionary Icon to Market Commodity,” in Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), pp. 136-142. 
18 For more on the term “contemporary Chinese art” and its limits, see Philip Tinari, “Between Palimpsest and 
Teleology: The Problem of ‘Chinese Contemporary Art’” in Art and China After 1989: Theater of the World, 
Alexandra Munroe, Hou Hanru, and Philip Tinari, eds. (New York: Guggenheim Museum Publications, 2017).  
19 This is the preferred term of the curator Fei Dawei, who suggested the term “avant-garde” be used in the title of 
the exhibition. See Fei Dawei, ed., ’85 xinchao: Zhongguo deyici dangdai yundong [Archives of the ’85 New 
Wave], 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2007).  
20 See Wu Hung, “Introduction” in Exhibiting Experimental Art in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000) for his defense of “experimental art (shiyan meishu)” as his preferred term.  
21 Foreign tourists were often taken to Hu Xian in the 1970s and 1980s. Ralph Croizier reports that from 1972 to 
1983, over thirteen thousand foreigners visited Hu Xian. See Croizier, “Hu Xian Peasant Painting: From 
Revolutionary Icon to Market Commodity” in Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, Richard 
King, ed., (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 144-5. For accounts of outside visits to the artist community of Hu 
Xian, see Marcelin Pleynet, Le Voyage en Chine (Paris: Hachette, 1980), p. 86; Julia Kristeva, Des Chinoises (Paris: 
Éditions des Femmes, 1974); and Chiang Yee, China Revisited: After Forty-Two Years (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1977), pp. 116-8.  
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were regrouped in the 1980s, they no longer significantly included the experiences and cultural 
practices of the socialist period.  
How, then, did amateur art practice get left out of the narrative of the cultural 
contemporary in the P.R.C., and why does the socialist experience seem to be excluded from our 
understanding of the constitution of contemporary present? In this chapter, I will argue that 
leaving amateur art practice—and, more broadly speaking, the cultural legacies of the socialist 
period—outside of the contemporary is a willfully partial history that impoverishes our 
understanding of the contemporary, preventing us from making a full account of the legacies of 
the socialist period and diminishing our capacity to appreciate the complexity of the origins of 
the present. I will present a case for the inclusion of the socialist experience within the concept of 
the contemporary, through the defining characteristic of socialist art practice, its embrace of 
amateurism. The celebrity of the Hu Xian peasant artists served to obscure a widespread 
nationwide amateur art practice in the socialist period, as those identified as workers, peasants, 
and soldiers were encouraged to take up paint brushes to depict and critique the world around 
them.22 By excluding such artists and their practices from the purview of “contemporary Chinese 
 
22 Furthermore, although I will refer to China’s rural inhabitants as “peasants,” I wish to draw attention to the 
meaning of the term. I use the term “peasant” because that is how the term nongmin has been translated into English 
by the artists and the state-employed translators of materials related to their practice. However, I agree with the 
argument advanced by Joshua Eisenman and others that the P.R.C.’s rural residents do not fit the definition of the 
peasant as landless rural residents who make their living from the land through partial integration in broader markets 
and partial reliance on subsistence level farming. Eisenman chooses to refer to commune members during the 
socialist period as either “team members,” “rural residents,” and “farmers” in order to avoid the inaccurate and 
pejorative connotations of the term “peasant.” For the purposes of this chapter, I have not eschewed the word 
“peasant” because that is the term that was embraced by rural artists themselves; I do wish to signal critical attention 
to the reasons the term was used. For more, see Joshua Eisenman, Red China’s Green Revolution: Technological 
Innovation, Institutional Change, and Economic Development Under the Commune (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2018) p. xxx. For a working definition of the peasant, see Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A 
Critical Introduction (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 59; and Andrejs Plakans, “Seigneurial Authority and 
Peasant Family Life: The Baltic Area in the Eighteenth Century,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 5, 
No. 4 (Spring 1975): pp. 629-652.  
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art,” the discourse erases the contributions of poor and rural artists, and re-asserts urban, elite, 
and professional dominance over the fine arts.  
The embrace of the amateur constituted an ambitious re-orientation of fine art practice 
within the P.R.C., transforming it from the specialized labor of highly credentialed cultural elite 
to an everyday practice that encouraged the historically disenfranchised to articulate and 
illustrate a new subjectivity.23 Amateur art practice was not only meant to be more inclusive, but 
to make art immediate and relevant to wider audiences as an essential part of a socialist cultural 
praxis in which subjectivity was transformed through the act of making art. My examination of 
primary source materials from the socialist period shows how amateur art practice in the P.R.C. 
challenged the assumptions of gender and class privilege that had previously been coded into the 
figure of the (urban male) artist, facilitating broad participation in art practice that destabilized 
the cultural precepts previously defining the figure of the artist. In particular, as amateur art 
practice spread, the concept of creative and artistic genius came under increasing scrutiny. As 
academy-trained art educators embraced the need to create art that was compelling to audiences 
outside the professional realm, the concept of genius as an innate characteristic of a creative 
individual fell under suspicion for justifying an elite monopoly on fine art practice. Instead, art 
educators increasingly argued that genius could and should be cultivated through broad public 
exposure to art instruction. The countryside and its inhabitants were seen as a critical source of 
realism, and immersion in the countryside an important process for enriching and legitimating 
the output of the professional artist. The art academy’s position as a legitimizing site of training 
was weakened, and the countryside emerged as a dominant site of creative activity.  
 
23 It bears emphasizing that this transformation was roughly contemporaneous with a similar politicization of art 
practice in the West during the 1960s and 1970s. See Julia Bryan-Wilson, Art Workers: Radical Practice in the 
Vietnam War Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and Caroline Jones, Machine in the Studio: 
Constructing the Postwar American Artist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
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As academy-trained artists began creating a more publicly focused art, the public was 
increasingly provided with opportunities to create its own art. Instruction from professionals 
(zhuanjia) to untrained amateur artists in factories, the military, and the countryside were an 
early focus of late 1950s art policy, and technique emerged as a crucial junction at which trained 
and untrained artist could meet and conduct exchange. The possession of the technical skills 
considered necessary to create art—such as line drawing, enlargement, shading, creating volume, 
the use of color, and the realistic depiction of anatomy, expression, and likeness—were not seen 
as a dividing force between expert and amateur artists. Rather, lack of access to adequate 
opportunities for training in fine art technique was blamed. Contrary to the popular scholarly 
consensus, amateur artists worked collaboratively with academy-trained artists to acquire the 
technical skills seen as necessary to create good art. At the same time, the range of styles and 
subject matter that constituted exemplary and compelling art broadened, as everyday themes 
from industrial labor practices to military leisure time and rural recreation were embraced as 
worthy of depiction in fine art. Folk styles previously seen as gaudy or unrefined were adopted to 
reflect the interests of more diverse audiences, and established genres of fine art practice with 
imperial (“feudal”) histories, such as bird-and-flower or scroll paintings, receded from the 
spotlight. Amateurism facilitated a wide-ranging transformation of art practice in the P.R.C., 
redefining not only the identity of the artist but also the role played by art in transforming the 
individual and society. Amateur art practice ultimately changed what it meant to be an artist, 
what art itself was, and what role it could play in a socialist society. These legacies linger in the 
present even as the dominant cultural logics of the contemporary obfuscate their presence. 
Legacies of the Amateur 
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The legacy of amateur art practice in the P.R.C. is intimately linked to the historiography 
of the contemporary, a historiography which, since 1981, has been defined by a repudiation both 
within and without the P.R.C. of the Cultural Revolution.24 Where leftists in the West were once 
excited by the alternatives presented by countries such as China, the P.R.C.’s shift embrace of 
market economy, as well as revelations about violence committed in the name of the Cultural 
Revolution in the period following Mao’s death, wiped away enthusiasm for both the political 
and cultural programs of the times. Instead, the 1970s are now condemned by association with 
the Cultural Revolution, a period that has been officially declared an aberration in the historical 
record: as an “era of madness” (fengkuang de niandai) in which terror and violence reigned.25  
And just as China specialists felt duped by the Cultural Revolution, so too has that view 
extended to the history of China’s visual arts. In 1984, the art historian Ellen Johnston Laing 
argued that a stylistic analysis of the most prominent works by Hu Xian peasant painters 
revealed that those works had, in fact, been largely executed by professional artists, whose 
contributions were minimized in the service of a pro-peasant political agenda. Laing concludes 
that the concept of an autonomous and authentic Hu Xian peasant art was—like so much of the 
socialist period—a fraud. Laing’s indictment of peasant art practice remains the defining work of 
English-language scholarship on the Hu Xian phenomenon, and today even those who visited Hu 
 
24 In 1981, the Cultural Revolution was condemned in a statement adopted by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China as “the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state, and 
the people since the founding of the People’s Republic. See “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our 
party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China,” 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm, accessed May 18, 2018.  
25 For secondary scholarship exploring the significance of the 1981 repudiation of the Cultural Revolution and its 
legacy, see Anita Chen, “Dispelling Misconceptions about the Red Guard Movement: The Necessity to Re-examine 
Cultural Revolution Factionalism and Periodization,” The Journal of Contemporary China 1, No. 1 (Sept. 1992): pp. 
61-85; Tony Saich, “Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on History” in Tony 
Saich and Hans van de Ven, eds., New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995), pp. 299-338; Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Party Historiography” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Using 
the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1993); and Joshua Zhang and James D. Wright, Violence, Periodization, and Definition of the Cultural Revolution 
(Leiden: Brill, 2017).  
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Xian at the time question the accuracy of their memories. For example, as a student of the 
Chinese language at the Beijing Languages Institute in the summer of 1975, the art historian 
Craig Clunas had the chance to visit Hu Xian, meeting and observing its peasant artists. He 
memorialized the trip in his diary, writing “This stuff is just the antidote to most Chinese art. 
When you see what the peasants are actually painting, your faith revives.”26 Views of the period 
and the art it produced have changed so much that Clunas now cringes at his earlier assessment: 
“My enthusiasm for this work… was fulsome to the point of embarrassment.”27 
Rather than proceeding from an assumption of fraudulent or aberrational art production, 
the peasant art that Laing and Clunas describe is better understood within the context of longer 
cultural trends that achieved their final manifestation during the period now known as the 
Cultural Revolution. Despite the association between Hu Xian’s peasant artists as thriving during 
the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, amateur art practice emerged out of trends in thought and 
art practice that can be traced back into the early Republican period, when leading cultural 
figures made amateur and non-elite involvement in cultural production a focal point of their 
agendas for cultural reform. Conversely, probing the relationship between the amateur the 
professional during the revolutionary period sheds new light upon their relationship during the 
Reform period, when amateurism was devalued and expertise prized. 
The Art Ecosystems of the P.R.C. 
The first anniversary of the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China (Kaiguo 
dadian) fell on October 1, 1950, the first National day observed in the young country. A festive 
 
26 Craig Clunas, “Souvenirs of Beijing” from Picturing Power in the People’s Republic of China: Posters of the 
Cultural Revolution, eds. Harriet Evans and Stephanie Donald (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 
pp. 47-61. Clunas also mentions that it was popular in leftist circles at the time to hang Dong Shengyi’s “Commune 
Fishpond” on the walls.  
27 Clunas, “Souvenirs of Beijing,” p. 53. 
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parade following the same path as the inaugural military parade held on Oct. 1, 1949 was held to 
mark the occasion, proceeding down Chang’an Avenue and past Mao Zedong ensconced atop 
Tiananmen, the gate in the heart of Beijing. The P.R.C’s new leaders attached great importance 
to the National Day ceremony and parade, and representatives from every organization, class, 
and institution of note participated: the military, followed by the Young Pioneers (Zhongguo 
shaonian xianfeng dui), who symbolized the future of the nation and led groups of workers, 
peasants, government workers, students, and cultural (wenyi) groups. As marchers from the 
Central Academy of Fine Art (Zhongyang meishu xueyuan) in Beijing filed past Mao, he waved 
as he read their banner, shouting “Long live the Central Academy of Fine Arts!”28 
The People’s Liberation Army had arrived in Beiping (which would imminently be 
renamed Beijing) on January 31, 1949, and in the year that followed, one of its many tasks was 
to bring the city’s non-Communist artists into the socialist fold. The administrative and 
institutional re-organization that followed entailed a significant re-organization of the country’s 
art academies, which played a defining role in supporting and structuring the Chinese fine art 
industry, as well as a significant transformation of the role that the fine arts would play in 
shaping and reflecting the culture of the new nation. Moreover, the Communist Party’s 
reorganization of the arts was not limited to the administration of the art academies, but 
constituted a reorganization of the arts accomplished “not in a single act, but in a series of only 
partially coordinated economic and administrative measures implemented between 1949 and 
1957.”29 A decade after the founding of the P.R.C., major long-term changes in the Chinese art 
world included the state as the major arts patron in the country, the development of a broad 
 
28 Julia Andrews, Painters and Politics in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), p. 36.  
29 Richard Kraus, The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics of Culture (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), p. 37.  
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foundation for party and state supervision of the arts, and the disappearance of the popular 
commercial cultures that had previously supported the arts.30 Although the transformations of the 
arts implemented in the 1950s were epoch-making changes whose consequences are still with us, 
their significance needs to be appreciated in historical context.  
Transformations in Chinese society and industry following end of the first Opium War 
led to rapid growth in the country’s modern industries, which in turn drove the founding and 
expansion of modern schools. These schools were meant to train workers to fill the needs of the 
emergent job market, and the fine arts were no exception to this rule in the late Qing and early 
Republican periods. In 1906, the Liangjiang Normal School (Liangjiang shifan xuetang) in 
Shanghai set up the country’s first program of art through its painting department, but the 
department at Liangjiang Normal School was far from the first integration of art into curriculum. 
As early as 1862, Western drawing techniques were taught as a component of Western science 
and technology at the Tongwenguan, a government-run institution for the instruction of Western 
languages and science during the Qing dynasty,31 while drawing and painting (tuhua) became a 
compulsory part of all levels of curriculum in 1902.32 In 1912, the Shanghai Academy of Fine 
Art (Shanghai meishuyuan) was founded, a private tutorial art school funded by tuition fees,33 
and in 1918, the National Art Academy of Beijing (Guoli Beijing meishu xuexiao) was founded, 
 
30 See Richard Kraus, The Party and the Arty in China, p. 37-41 for more details.  
31 Ellen Johnston Laing, Selling Happiness: Calendar Posters and Visual Culture in Early-Twentieth Century 
Shanghai (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004).  
32 Mayching Kao, “Reforms in Education and the Beginning of the Western-style Painting Movement in China,” in 
Julia F. Andrews and Kuiyi Shen, eds., A Century in Crisis: Modernity and Tradition in the Art of Twentieth-
Century China (New York: Guggenheim Museum Publications, 1998), p. 147. See Shu Xinching, Jindai Zhongguo 
jiaoyu shi ziliao [Source materials on the history of modern Chinese education] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1961), vol. 
2, pp. 408-515 for further details.  
33 See Jane Zheng, The Modernization of Chinese Art: The Shanghai Art College, 1913-1937 (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2016), for a study of the Shanghai Academy of Fine Art from its founding through the start of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. 
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funded through Republican government support.34 By the late 1920s, there were more than a half 
dozen major art academies or departments of fine art throughout the country, many of which 
remain in operation to this day.35 
As the art historian Mayching Kao notes, because Western drawing and painting 
techniques were introduced as a component of Western technology, “Western art… reached 
China’s educated class not as a curiosity but as something for practical application, contributing 
to the progress of China.”36 Skill in fine art was seen as much a matter of technique as 
acculturation. Indeed, during the Republican period aesthetics were embraced as a foundation 
principle of education, and this emphasis was reflected in the adoption of art instruction as a 
component of the national curriculum.37 Since 1902, some version of painting or art instruction 
was a compulsory subject in primary through high school education.38 The cultural historian Jane 
Zheng describes the demand for students with training in art practice stemming from two major 
sources, the first being the need to staff the country’s growing educational system with art 
 
34 For a comprehensive history of the development of fine arts education in China, see Chen Ruilin, 20 shiji 
Zhongguo meishu jiaoyu lishi yanjiu [Fine art education in 20th century China: a historical perspective] (Beijing: 
Tsinghua University Press, 2006). 
35 See the index “Name changes of principal art academies” in Michael Sullivan’s Modern Chinese Artists: A 
Biographical Dictionary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pp. xvii—xx, for a full list of the major 
art academies and their major name changes and administrative re-organizations in China from the late Qing to the 
present.  
36 Mayching Kao, “China’s Response to the Western in Art: 1898-1937,” (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 
1972), p. 63.  
37 The educator Cai Yuanpei played a large role in establishing a modern educational system that that emphasized 
aesthetics. For more, see Xiaobing Tang, “The Beautiful Object of Art” in Origins of the Chinese Avant-Garde: The 
Modern Woodcut Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 9-42; Vera Schwarcz, The 
Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986), pp. 45-50; and Cai Yuanpei, “Replacing Religion with Aesthetic Education,” trans. Julia F. 
Andrews, in Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893-1945, ed. Kirk A. Denton (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).  
38 See Jane Zheng, “Private Tutorial Art Schools in the Shanghai Market Economy: The Shanghai Art School, 1913-
1919,” Modern China 35, no. 3 (May 2009): p. 316-7 for a detailed description of how painting and art courses were 
integrated into national curriculum.  
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teachers, and the second being urban China’s growing commercial market for art, particularly in 
Shanghai.39  
To the aspiring artist, art schools were important sites of accreditation, and a degree 
conferred upon the graduate the necessary credentials to seek work as either an art teacher 
making a modest but steady monthly salary, or as a commercial artist. Records of oil paintings 
for sale from at least 1840 indicate the presence of a strong commercial art market,40 and the 
availability of artworks produced at French Catholic missionary-run Tushanwan Painting Studio 
(in operation c. 1864-1914) in Shanghai, as well as commercial painting studios producing large 
volumes of paintings for export in the southern Chinese port city of Guangzhou attests to the 
growing market for fine art.41 By the 1910s, the Shanghai region supported a commercial market 
for art, and according to Jane Zheng, students hoping to be employed in the commercial art 
industry upon graduation could expect to work primarily in three lines of work. First, the 
adoption of lithographic printing in the late nineteenth century made high quality illustrations 
increasingly common in print media. Artists were needed to create, for example, watercolors for 
book illustrations or cartoons for newspapers and magazines. Second, commercial clients needed 
artists to create images for advertisements and calendar posters, the latter of which were usually 
painted in what was considered a Western style.42 Last, a growing theater industry meant an 
 
39 Jane Zheng, “Private Tutorial Art Schools in the Shanghai Market Economy,” pp. 315-8.  
40 Ge Yuanxi, “Huyou zaiji [Notes on traveling in Shanghai],” in Zhang Zhi, ed., Zhongguo fengtuzhi congkan 
[Chinese local customs], no. 44 (Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 1876), cited in Jane Zheng, “Private Tutorial Art 
Schools in the Shanghai Market Economy,” p. 318. 
41 For more about the Tushanwan workshops, see William Hsingyo Ma, “Pedagogy, Display, and Sympathy at the 
French Jesuit Orphanage Workshops of Tushanwan in Early-Twentieth Century Shanghai,” (PhD Dissertation, UC 
Berkeley, 2016). For more about the commercial export painting studios of Guangzhou during the Qing, see Paul A. 
Van Dyke, Maria Kar-wing Mok, eds., Images of the Canton Factories 1760-1822: Reading History in Art (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015).  
42 For more on advertising in Shanghai during the late Qing and Republican periods, see Jonathan Hay, “Notes on 
Chinese Photography and Advertising in Late Nineteenth Century Shanghai” in Visual Culture in Shanghai, 1850s 
to 1930s, ed. Jason Chi-sheng Kuo (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Press, 2007), pp. 95-119. On calendar 
posters, see Ellen Johnston Laing, Selling Happiness: Calendar Posters and Visual Culture in Early Twentieth-
Century China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004).  
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increased demand for stage designers, who painted scenic backdrops for productions in 
watercolor.  
Accordingly, early curricula at art schools emphasized the technical skills necessary for 
art production, but as time progressed, art schools added new faculty and departments as the 
scope of the field broadened. Eventually, some schools possessed not only a wealth of 
departments to prepare students to participate in a wide variety of art practices (such as Western 
painting, guohua painting, sculpture, architecture, crafts, and design), but also provided 
instruction in English language, art history and theory, pedagogy, music, and other such 
supplementary courses considered helpful for success as an art professional or art teacher. The 
education offered in art schools stood apart from the selective master/pupil model of the dynastic 
past, and the art historian Michael Sullivan describes Republican art academies as “art schools in 
the European sense,” by which he means art schools teaching a curriculum of what was 
considered “modern” art (which often meant art in European mediums such as oil painting).43 
Jane Zheng notes the parallels between private tutorial art schools and early modern educational 
institutions in Japan, shijuku, which attracted a wide national enrollment from varying social 
classes due to reduced class barriers to entry.44 In art schools administered by the Republican 
government, the curriculum stressed national salvation through the invigoration of culture, while 
the curriculum at for-profit art schools was more closely oriented around meeting market 
demand.  
It should be noted that the Republican market had its limits, especially in times of strife 
and transition. Most positions teaching art were poorly paid, and many artists supplemented their 
teaching with editorial work or other employment. Private art schools were particularly sensitive 
 
43 Michael Sullivan, Chinese Art in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 47.  
44 Jane Zheng, “Private Tutorial Art Schools,” pp. 317-8.  
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to changes in the market, and at the Shanghai Academy of Fine Art, enrollment varied widely 
from year to year. Financial instability caused the school to relocate frequently.45 Yet more so 
than private patrons, gallery networks, or museum support, art academies were the defining 
institution supporting the fine art industry in twentieth-century China. The art school was not 
only the single most important site of legitimization for aspiring artists, it was a major employer 
of artists, supporting top graduates through salaried faculty positions. The fine art industry was 
driven more by the growth of higher education in Republican China than it was by any other 
institution or constituency. Thus, to call oneself a professional artist during the Republican era 
indicated not only that one created artwork for financial reward, but that one had also received 
academy training in art practice.  
The concept of amateurism, on the other hand, re-emerged during the late Qing and 
Republican period under guise of the term “yeyu,” meaning afterwork, or the surplus time 
outside of work or industry. The term yeyu began appearing in print publications in treaty-port 
cities as a prefix indicating amateur activity, including amateur athletics, amateur theater, 
amateur choir, and amateur art.46 The term appears to a transcultural one: in the English poet and 
art scholar Laurence Binyon’s Painting in the Far East, Binyon appears to use the term 
“amateur” for the Chinese 文人 wenren, or literati, as does the British diplomat and sinologist 
Herbert Giles in his Introduction to the History of Chinese Pictorial Art.47 Binyon and Giles 
were struck by literati painter’s casual engagement, lack of formal or institutional structure, 
 
45 Jane Zheng, “Private Tutorial Art Schools in the Shanghai Market Economy: The Shanghai Art School, 1913-
1919,” Modern China Vol. 35 No. 3 (2009), p. 325.  
46 The term “yeyu” begins to appear in Chinese periodicals in the 1910s and 1920s. It often appears in bilingual 
Chinese English publications as a neologism, and its first usage accompanies articles on amateur sport competitions 
in Shanghai. Usage spreads to include amateur theater, choir, art, and literary organizations by the 1940s.  
47 See Laurence Binyon, Painting in the Far East: An Introduction to the History of Pictorial Art in Asia Especially 
China and Japan, Third edition (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1923); and Herbert Giles, An Introduction to the 
History of Chinese Pictorial Art (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1905). I am grateful to Marty Powers for pointing out the longer 
transcultural histories of the term “amateur.”  
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fellowship within a network of other leisurely passion-seekers, and distance from the hallmarks 
of the analogous commercial painting practice: they described theirs as a culture of amateurs. 
The return of the wenren culture to the Chinese language as yeyu is roughly congruous with the 
rise of amateur discourses in the United States. Because the earliest record of the term yeyu that I 
have been able to locate occurs in Chinese translations of English language print media, yeyu 
seems to be a neologism of the English “amateur,” itself a discourse in part popularized by 
Western discussion of literati Chinese painting culture.  
Under this guise, the concept of the amateur gained traction predominantly in urban 
Chinese cities during the early twentieth century, and by the late 1920s, was being explored as a 
matter of social formation and art practice by prominent urban Chinese cultural figures. For 
example, the Republican author, photographer, and man of letters Liu Bannong (Liu Fu) 
translated amateur as “fei zhiye” in his preface to a volume of photography by a group of 
photography enthusiasts who called themselves the Beijing Light Society (Beijing guang she):  
 
The Light Society is an amateur (fei zhiye) organization of comrades in photography. In English 
and French, this word is ‘amareur,’ the opposite of which is ‘professional’ (qiye.) In Latin, on the 
other hand, the word ‘amator’ is translated as ‘lover’ and comes from ‘amare,’ which means ‘to 
love.’ There are some folks who like to play at being clever and translate ‘amateur’ as ‘aimei de’ 
(lover of beauty), as if the meaning of these words is only related to fine art (meishu), but actually 
the word’s meaning includes ‘love’ and not ‘beauty.’… As long as what one does has nothing to 
do with one’s own profession, then one can be called ‘an amateur.’48 
 
 
48 Liu Bannong, “Beijing guang she preface,” in Bannong tan ying [Bannong on photography] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
sheying chubanshe, 2000), p. 8. I am grateful to Stephanie H. Tung for alerting me to this text. This translation is a 
modified version of Tung’s original translation of Liu Bannong’s preface. 
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Liu’s comments on the role of the amateur emphasize one’s deep personal passion for an activity 
as its defining characteristic. By understanding amateurism as a private realm defined by 
interiority and desire, and his amateur photography practice exists fully separate from the wage 
labor that otherwise structures social relations in his society, fueled by consumption as by desire.  
In her study of amateur film practice in the United States, Patricia R. Zimmerman argues 
that “the social formations and ideologies of professionalism and amateurism” rose together in 
the early nineteenth century in the United States (which she sets roughly from 1840 to 1887) as 
modern professions grew.49 Thus, as historical and cultural phenomena, the professional and the 
amateur are best understood not as mere binary opposites, but rather as mutually constitutive 
social roles. Zimmerman describes the relationship between the two as a symbiotic mitigation of 
the divide between work and freedom, where the amateur ideal promises the illusion of passion 
and choice within the realm of the private as the economy controls and fragments wage labor in 
the professional realm. The growth of the modern capitalist economy gave birth to a culture 
celebrating captains of industry and Horatio Alger stories, a mythology of entrepreneurial 
heroism that obscured the widespread penetration of industrial production models built around 
increasing productivity and efficiency (such as the assembly line.) As both entrepreneurial 
folklore and industrial manufacturing became more widespread, the cultural functions of the 
professional and the amateur came into higher relief. Thus, from the 1880s to 1920s, amateurism 
in the United States functions as the “cultural inversion to the development of economic 
capitalism,” and the imagined fluidity between the professional and the amateur sustained myths 
of personal fulfillment otherwise obstructed by the increased economic regimentation of daily 
life.  
 
49 Patricia R. Zimmerman, Reel Families: A Social History of Amateur Film (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), p. 5. 
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The amateur art practice of the socialist period grew out of cultural and intellectual trends 
explored by leftist Republican figures. Academics at Peking University, for example, were 
increasingly interested in the countryside as a source of national culture. At Peking University, 
Liu Fu, Shen Yinmo, and Zhou Zuoren spearheaded a folk literature movement for studying the 
“literary products of humble folk,” as Chang-tai Hung describes in his monograph on the 
movement.50 The folk literature movement wholly coincided with the May Fourth movement, an 
embrace of “new” cultural vitality that stood as counterpart to the movement’s rejection of 
Confucian tradition, but scholars such as Chang-tai Hung believe that the movement ultimately 
never left the confines of the university. Where Liu Bannong’s concept of amateurism was 
formulated in bourgeois contradistinction to the commercialism of professional (profitable) art 
practice, amateur art practice in the socialist period was rooted in leftist discourses of 
popularization (puji) and massificiation (dazhonghua) proposed by Mao Zedong in the early 
1940s while the Communist party was based in rural and remote Yan’an, the seat of its wartime 
operations. Mao made clear in his January 1940 “On New Democracy” that the vitality of a new 
Chinese nation would depend upon the vitality of a new Chinese culture, imagining “an 
enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture” that would be a “national, 
scientific, mass culture” based upon an elevated version of existing peasant cultures.51  
Yet Mao’s call was not immediately followed up by significant efforts to popularize 
literature and the arts, and David Holm notes that few writers at Yan’an were actively working 
on popularization.52 Mao’s 1942 “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” were meant 
 
50 Chang-tai Hung, Going to the People: Chinese Intellectuals and Folk Culture, 1918-1937 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 162.  
51 Mao Tse-tung, “On New Democracy,” from Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 
1967), pp. 340. Reproduced on the Marxists Internet Archive,  
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm (accessed Nov. 8, 2018).  
52 David Holm, Art and Ideology in Revolutionary China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 98.  
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to clarify what the cultural priorities and policies of the C.C.P. would be. The speech revisited 
many of the areas Mao first addressed in “On New Democracy.” For example, Mao redefined the 
scope of massification: whereas massification had previously been presented as a question of 
utilizing literary and artistic forms that would facilitate greater engagement with the masses, now 
Mao described artists themselves as needing to be massified. “The writers and artists do not have 
a good knowledge either of those whom they describe or of their audience; indeed they may 
hardly know them at all,” said Mao, urging them to “remold their thinking and their feelings.”53 
To accomplish this, literary and art workers “must… shift their stand,” to physically “move their 
feet over to the side of the workers, peasants, and soldiers,” and change their perspective 
“through the process of going into their very midst and into the thick of practical struggles and 
through the process of studying Marxism and society.”54 
For the urban intellectual, the process of reorientation that Mao described was that of 
“xiaxiang,” or the deployment of established cultural figures to the countryside to live amongst 
the masses and engage in basic cultural work. Xiaxiang was one component of a two-pronged 
approach toward developing a vibrant new socialist culture, the first being the elimination of 
“incorrect” and pernicious views in cultural affairs, and the second being the aforementioned 
program of learning from the masses by going down to the countryside. In his speech, Mao 
encouraged “specialists in literature” to heed the “wall newspapers of the masses,” “specialists in 
drama” to pay attention to small theater troupes in the army and villages, for music specialists to 
seek out “the songs of the masses,” and the “specialists in fine arts” to study “the fine arts of the 
 
53 Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yan’an forum,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1967), p. 72. Reproduced online at the Marxists Internet Archive,  
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_08.htm (accessed Nov. 8, 2018).  
54 Mao Zedong, “Talks at Yan’an,” pp. 77-8. 
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masses.”55 Art forms that were seen as belonging to the masses are the key to what Mao called a 
“literature and art in a budding state” (mengya zhuangtai de wenyi), and Mao believed that 
engaging with these forms would give urban, bourgeois artists an entrée to engaging with politics 
and culture on a grass-roots level. David Holm argues that Mao’s intention was “not so much [to 
discuss] form as the need for professional artists to link up with amateurs,”56 thus making the 
implications of Mao’s speech as much a policy for the new literature and art as it was a policy 
toward the urban intelligentsia itself.  
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Soviet War was disruptive to all aspects of life, 
including fine art practice. The Japanese bombing of Shanghai, the occupation of Beijing and 
other major cities during the war damaged or destroyed many art schools, teaching facilities, art 
studios, and artworks, while those artists and art teachers who escaped physical harm were 
scattered in all directions. Some artists moved with the Nationalist government to the country’s 
interior, in Sichuan and southwest China, setting up interim versions of the home institutions that 
they had fled. Other artists remained behind in the occupied regions, sought out the Communist 
base in Yan’an, or simply tried to stay one step ahead of the invading Japanese army.57 When the 
war ended in 1945, artists returning to their home cities resumed the teaching and practices that 
had been disrupted by the conflict. According to Ellen Johnston Laing, “by 1947 the arts had 
begun to recover,” as evidenced by the 1946-1947 yearbook for the arts, which recorded the 
biographies of over 1,700 artists and documented over 150 public exhibitions of art.58 By the late 
1940s, prominent art schools academies including the National Art Academy in Beijing, the 
 
55 Mao Zedong, “Talks at Yan’an,” pp. 34-5. 
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Nanzhong Private Academy of Fine Art in Guangzhou, the Shanghai Academy, the Suzhou 
Academy, and the fine art department of the Hubei Province Women’s Normal Academy.  
Thus, when the Chinese Communist Party gained control of the country from the 
Nationalist government in 1949, they inherited a robust network of art schools, artists, and art 
educators. Yet neither that system nor the individuals who populated it were necessarily 
knowledgeable about or receptive to the ideals of the C.C.P. Although organizations such as the 
Lu Xun Academy of Fine Art—which later was formed into a larger conglomerate of cultural 
organizations called the North China United University—had been established during the 
wartime years while the party was based in Yan’an, a minority of the total population of 
practicing artists and existing art institutions in 1949 had connections with the leftist cultural 
programs developed during the Yan’an period.59 In the fine arts, the C.C.P.’s task upon arriving 
in new cities was manifold: not only take over administrative control of the existing art 
academies, but in the long term to reshape them such that the artists and the art that they 
produced would reflect the culture and values of a new socialist Chinese state.  
In his study of cultural life during the P.R.C., Richard Kraus argues that this goal was 
accomplished with relative ease owing to the weakness of the country’s pre-1949 art market.60 
While a demand for art and artists certainly existed, many artists made their living in a piecemeal 
fashion. Thus, “the Communist revolution did not so much destroy the arts market as stabilize 
 
59 For more on the cultural programs of the Yan’an period, see David Holm, Art and Ideology in Revolutionary 
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and expand opportunities for steady employment,” and “the vast majority [of artists] either 
regarded the new regime as an improvement or were in no position to leave.”61 
 In Beijing, the National Beiping Art College was taken over by the military little more 
than a month after the P.L.A.’s arrival. While the administrative changes in the fine arts 
institutions of Beijing were specific to that particular city, many of the larger trends in art 
education and administration occurred in similar patterns around the country. Sha Kefu, the 
director of the College of Arts and Literature at North China United Revolutionary University in 
the Jin-Cha-Ji border region, was assigned as military representative to the school, and he formed 
a “Cultural Takeover Small Group” comprised of former administrators from the North China 
United Revolutionary University, including the poet Ai Qing, the artist Jiang Feng, the art 
theorist and sculptor Wang Zhaowen, and the composer Li Huanzhi. The group decided that the 
college would be funded by the Beiping Municipal Military Affairs Committee, and the college’s 
president, the realist painter Xu Beihong, would be retained as director, as well would be the 
existing faculty.62 
Temporary military oversight of cultural institutions is typical of this early period, and 
creating a long-term party structure within existing institutions was a high priority. In Beijing, 
the military administration of the National Beiping Arts College was soon replaced with a new 
Communist party group overseeing the college,63 and the college was also incorporated into the 
fine arts department of Huabei University (Huabei daxue disanbu meishu ke) and renamed the 
Central Academy of Fine Arts (Zhongyang meishu xueyuan, or CAFA, the name it still bears 
 
61 Richard Kraus, The Party and the Arty, p. 40.  
62 See Julia Andrews, Painters and Politics in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), p. 34.  
63 The group included president Xu Beihong, Hu Yichuan, Luo Gongliu, Wang Zhaowen, Zhang Ding, and Jiang 
Feng, most of whom were veterans of the Yan’an woodcut movement. For more details, see Julia Andrews, Painters 
and Politics in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 40-1.  
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today.) The reorganization was an elevation in status for the Central Academy of Fine Arts, 
which had previously come second to the more prestigious National Art School in Hangzhou. 
The Central Academy of Fine Arts was brought directly under the Ministry of Culture’s purview, 
as opposed to the local cultural affairs bureau, and the Hangzhou academy was demoted to a 
subsidiary campus of CAFA,64 which Julia Andrews believes was because the faculty in Beijing 
were already more sympathetic to the Communist cause than were the faculty in Hangzhou.65  
Changing the administrative structure of art schools was just one tactic by which 
dynamics in the fine arts changed after 1949. Generally, the number of government employment 
opportunities for artists increased dramatically through the 1950s as the state created or 
expanded cultural organizations, often with structures reflecting strong Soviet influence.66 These 
institutions include the Ministry of Culture, established in October 1949 overseeing an extensive 
network of arts organizations; the Communist Party Propaganda Department, reporting to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and responsible for broad oversight of 
culture and ideology; and the China Federation of Literary and Arts Circles, the umbrella 
organization for a broad network of artists, filmmakers, musicians, writers, actors, directors, 
etc.67 The People’s Liberation Army became a major employer of artists through its army bands, 
opera companies, dance troupes, novelists, and poets and their corresponding cultural 
institutions. These bureaucracies all operated in parallel to one another, and penetrated from the 
central level down to the provincial and local levels. Furthermore, these four major organizations 
comprised a mix of institutions operated by the state (such as the Ministry of Culture or the 
 
64 The Hangzhou academy retained this status until 1958, when it was renamed the Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts 
(Zhejiang meishu xueyuan). In 1993, it was renamed the China Academy of Art (Zhongguo meishu xueyuan), the 
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PLA’s culture department), the party (such as the Propaganda department), and “mass groups” 
(such as the China Federation of Literary and Arts Circles and its subgroups.) As Richard Kraus 
cautions, although these distinctions are important, ultimately they are often obscured by the 
high overlap between individuals who might play leadership roles in multiple organizations in 
addition to possessing party membership.68 Kraus adopts the term “cultural system” (wenhua 
tizhi) to describe this set of bureaucracies responsible for supporting and developing the arts in 
the P.R.C., a term that insists upon recognition of the party-state’s involvement in the arts not as 
a totalizing, centralized top-down operation, but rather as a body of constituent parts with 
overlapping interests whose conflicting agendas are sometimes concealed, but never resolved, by 
the constancy of the party’s presence.  
The China Federation of Literary and Arts Circles in particular traces its history back to 
the first All-China Congress of Literary and Art Workers (Zhongguo quanguo wenxue yishu 
gongzuozhe daibiao dahui). The congress was a national convention held in Beijing from July 2 
to 19, 1949, and attended by representatives from all recognized cultural fields. Speakers 
included Zhou Enlai and Jiang Feng, who laid out visions for early P.R.C. cultural policy. Zhou 
Enlai’s speech laid out five overarching principles by which the arts should be restructured. 
Taken in total, the speech reflected a dramatically different vision of the role that the 
professional artist was to play in the new state:  
 
First, he said, unification of all China's literary and art workers was essential. Zhou identified 
several different types of art workers, including those in the PLA, those in PLA-controlled areas, 
and those in areas controlled by the Nationalists. He urged delegates to promote a united spirit 
among all cultural workers in their home regions. Second, artists were to serve the people, 
 
68 See Richard Kraus, The Party and the Arty, pp. 45-6.  
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especially the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Third, popularization was to take precedence over 
raising of standards. Fourth, old literature and art were to be remolded. Old contents were to be 
remolded first, but attention should also be paid to old forms so that contents and forms might be 
unified. Fifth, artists and art leaders must avoid particularism but instead consider the needs of the 
whole country in their art.69  
 
In order to accomplish these objectives, the congress established the China Federation of Literary 
and Arts Circles, which was to oversee five subgroups: the All-China Art Workers Association 
(Zhongghua quanguo meishu gongzuozhe xiehui), the All-China Film Art Workers Association 
(Zhonghua quanguo dianying yishu gongzuozhe xiehui), the All-China Music Workers 
Association (Zhonghua quanguo yinyue gongzuozhe xiehui), the All-China Literature Workers 
Association (Zhonghua guanguo wenxue gongzuozhe xiehui), and the All-China Theater 
Workers Association (Zhonghua quanguo xiju gongzuozhe xiehui).70 CFLAC and its subgroups 
would be responsible for implementing this vision not only by reshaping the existing art practice, 
but also by training new artists and expanding the purview of the arts. Like the titles of the 
organizations suggest, the groups were also meant to foster “unity”—the first priority on the 
cultural affairs agenda, according to Zhou Enlai’s speech—as well as the reclassification of 
artists, filmmakers, writers, actors, directors, etc. from intellectual literati to “workers.” By 
replacing the suffix “jia” with “gongzuozhe”—for example, from “artist” (yishujia) to “art 
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worker” (meishu gongzuozhe)—the congress “[signaled] the intention to redefine the identity of 
artists and writers as part of the working class,”71 and to recognize cultural work as a type of 
labor as opposed to creative genius or commercial trade.  
To be described as a “professional” artist on the cusp of the mid-century in China meant 
belonging to a complex social category whose identity was in flux, as indicated by the rivalry 
between terms like “meishujia,” “yishujia,” and “huajia” (artist, painter) with the neologism 
“meishu gongzuozhe” (art worker.) What would it mean to be a professional artist in a society 
striving toward communist ideals, including the abolishment of private property? Would art be a 
private commodity or a public good? Would it be bought and sold, and to whom would it 
belong? Would the livelihood of artists depend upon the robustness of the art market, or would 
they be supported by state-run institutions?  
By the tenth anniversary of the P.R.C.’s founding in 1959, answers to many of these 
questions were apparent. It was clear, for example, that the ecosystem for cultural production had 
expanded significantly post-1949, with dramatic increases in the number of museums, cultural 
centers, and art academies in the country.72 It was also clear that the party-state, as the driver 
behind all this growth, would play the dominant role in shaping the development of the arts, and 
that the state was now the major patron of the arts. The C.C.P.’s assault on landlords and 
capitalists had eliminated wide swaths of wealthy Chinese who might have otherwise constituted 
the commercial market for art. And by creating a large institutional infrastructure for 
administering the arts, the state had also created a glut of new employment opportunities for 
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artists. New art academies, universities, and departments of fine art were established in the 
1950s, such as the East China Art School (Huadong yishu zhuanke xuexiao),73 the Central 
Academy of Arts and Crafts (zhongyang gongyi meishu xueyuan),74 and the art department of the 
Central Minorities Institute (zhongyang minzu xueyuan yishu xi) in addition to the establishment 
and expansion of important cultural units including the Ministry of Culture, the P.L.A.’s cultural 
department, the Propaganda department of the C.C.P., and the China Federation of Literary and 
Arts Circles and its subgroups.  
State sponsorship of artists was a major stabilizing force for the field, but also further 
professionalized and bureaucratized artistic work. Again, the meaning of the “professional artist” 
remained in flux: artists were increasingly described as “experts” (zhuanjia) in addition to 
“artist” (huajia, yishujia, meishujia), foregrounding their training, skill, and expertise. The 
meaning of “professional” as indicative of financial remuneration for performing work receded, 
and the professional artist increasingly came to mean not only a trained artist, but one legitimized 
through employment as an artist in the state-sponsored art education or art administration 
systems.  
To find success in the post-1949 art world, the trained artist needed to reshape their 
practice in the service of the people. In theory, an artist whose work found broad support 
amongst workers, peasants, and soldiers was one making healthy contributions toward the 
cultural development of the new socialist state. Artistic practices—like certain types of opera, for 
example—that were seen as commercial were stigmatized as decadent, redolent of bourgeois 
ideals and the feudal past. The bird-and-flower style of painting, for another example, was seen 
to be at odds with revolutionary needs, and was removed from art school curricula during their 
 
73 Known today as the Nanjing Art Academy (Nanjing yishu xueyuan). 
74 Today, the Academy of Arts and Design at Tsinghua University in Beijing. 
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reorganizations in 1950, and bird-and-flower painters did not fare well in the decade that 
followed.75 The most prominent genres in art academies in the early 1950s were those that were 
seen as broadly popular with the masses: New Year’s prints, for example, received special 
attention in the immediate aftermath of C.C.P. takeover of art academies.  
But the art academy was not to be the only location from which socialist culture was 
authored. Control of the nation’s fine arts institutions was only one aspect of the socialist cultural 
agenda in China, and the transformation of the Chinese fine arts would be deeper than an 
ideological shift amongst the existing fine artists. Changing art in the P.R.C. meant changing the 
artist, and transforming the fine arts from a practice of consumption to one of production. Going 
into the second half of the century, amateur art practice was productive in multiple senses, 
producing not only new art but new subjectivities, new communities, and new cultures. 
Amateur Art Practice and the New Socialist Artist 
Amateur art practice played an outsized role in challenging traditional and commercial 
concepts of the artists. Where the artist was typically seen as an urban, male, and educated 
member of the upper and middle classes, amateur art practice asked for members of the 
masses—particularly workers, peasants, and soldiers—to fill the role, challenging not only the 
idea that one needed to belong to a privileged and urban class to be taken seriously as an artist, 
but also that one needed to belong to a certain gender. In its attempt to eliminate the barriers to 
art practice, amateur art took the fine arts out of the academy and centered art practice at the 
grassroots level, in the military barracks, in the factories and work units, and in the collectives 
and communes. Amateur art practice changed the scale on which art was practiced, transforming 
 
75 See “Li Kuchan’s Eagle Fazes Far” in Shelley Drake Hawk’s The Art of Resistance: Painting by Candlelight in 
Mao’s China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017), pp. 75-94, for an account of one bird-and-flower 
painter’s experiences post-1949.  
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it from the highly individualized, specialized pursuit of small, credentialed, and professionalized 
communities, to a mass activity built up from the bottom level of society.  
This change was accomplished gradually across a period of several decades, and on a 
nationwide scale with dispersed geographic points of focus. Redefining who could be an artist 
also changed the function of art itself, as it went from commodity object to a part of the 
productive process. One of the first applications of amateur art in factories was to encourage 
workers in particular to identify problems in the productive process, and to create drawings 
which illuminated the problem, or cartoons which satirized inefficient productive or 
administrative practices. Similarly, peasants were encouraged to criticize problems in the 
commune. As amateur art practice spread, amateur artists increasingly turned their attention from 
exposition to the representation of the world around them, and amateur art practice increasingly 
became a process through which the artist asserted and explored their class identity. At the height 
of amateur art practice’s popularity in the socialist era, artistic accomplishments were hailed as 
belonging to a lineage of humanistic achievement built upon the fruits of labor. 
 In order to accommodate the amateur, the concept of the artist as a cultural formation 
had to be adjusted. Two concepts—technique and genius—needed to be shift in order to allow 
untrained, non-professional, and atypical individuals to be taken seriously as art practitioners. 
Rather than separating trained and untrained artists, artistic technique was understood as a 
modular skill that could be acquired simply through extended practice and a shared interest that 
brought together artists with disparate levels of experience in art. Amateur art practice 
significantly destabilized the concept of creative genius, which had previously functioned as one 
of the artist’s defining qualities. Pre-existing concepts of genius were identified as harmful to the 
amateur, cultural formations that explicitly excluded the masses from being recognized for their 
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creative accomplishments. By the beginning of the P.R.C.’s transition from socialist to post-
socialist cultural mores, amateur art practice had left the fine arts changed in fundamental ways.  
Scholarship on peasant art in the P.R.C. generally concurs that the practice can be traced 
to the 1950s, when art study groups (meishu xiaozu) were first formed in rural communes for 
workers to meet, discuss, and practice drawing and painting together. These groups usually met 
under the guidance of art students or instructors affiliated with nearby regional art academies. 
The small group (xiaozu) was essentially a study group that could be focused around a wide 
variety of subjects, including the study of specific documents, the political reform of its 
members, or, in this case, art practice. The small group was ubiquitous during the socialist 
period, and Martin King Whyte traces its form from the organization of Bolshevik Party cells to 
earlier Russian narodik revolutionaries. But the Chinese small group differed from its Soviet 
counterpart in that Soviet small groups were never as widespread as they were in China, where 
they “[systematically] extended to the ordinary populace.”76 The small group format traveled 
outside the Soviet Union and the P.R.C.; for example, in Japan during the 1950s, literary groups 
of leftist factory workers formed, writing poetry on walls in a “workers’ culture circle” 
movement that bore many parallels to amateur cultural activities in the P.R.C.77 
Hu Xian peasant art specialist Duan Jingli believes that “peasant art” originated in either 
Pi Xian in Jiangsu Province, or Shulu Xian in Hebei Province. Pi Xian’s first art study group 
formed in 1956. Founded by a commune member named Zhang Kaixiang, the group’s mission 
statement declared the members’ intention to examine the state of ideological consciousness 
(sixiang qingkuang) amongst its members, to express progressive values, criticize backward 
 
76 Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1974), pp. 23. 
77 Mitsuda Yuri, Tokyo, 1955-1970: A New Avant-Garde, ed. Doryun Chong, Michio Hayashi, Miryam Sas, Mika 
Yoshitake (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2012), p. 160.  
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practices, and invigorate agricultural production through painting and drawing (huihua xingshi). 
Shulu Xian’s first art small group formed in 1958 in response to the Great Leap Forward, coining 
a couplet (“jiajia shige huhu hua, renren dou shi yishujia [Every family a poem every household 
a painting, each and every one is an artist]”) to encourage peasant involvement in art. Hu Xian’s 
first art study group was organized by Chen Shiheng, a young graduate from the Xi’an Provincial 
Art Academy. Asked by the academy’s party secretary to conduct research on socialism in the 
countryside, Chen was sent to rural Shaanxi for his mission, where he wandered between villages 
for several months before arriving in Hu Xian, where the local party secretary and commune 
members welcomed his presence.  
In Hu Xian, Chen organized a night course in beginning drawing and painting, with over 
twenty students in the first class. Hu Xian’s commune was in the midst of building a reservoir, 
and so Chen decided to locate his classroom on the site of the construction project in order to 
facilitate the participation of peasant workers. Chen taught nightly lessons from November to 
December of 1958, and described the difficult conditions in his memoirs of the period: “There 
were no desks, writing boards, easels, or blackboards to use when we held class, not to mention 
the worrying fact that at night there were no lights, and no fire in the classroom.”78 Because his 
classes were held in winter, Chen describes several instances in which his students were reluctant 
to paint due to the cold: while working outside on wall paintings, some students had difficulty 
holding the brush without gloves or mittens in the cold, and in another instance, students 
couldn’t see well enough during an evening class to draw indoors as their room had no lighting. 
They could open the classroom door to let in an outside source of light, but couldn’t stand to 
leave the door open long in the middle of winter.  
 
78 Chen Shiheng, quoted in Duan Jingli, Hu xian nongmin hua yanjiu, p. 17.  
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Chen’s arrival in Hu Xian coincided with the start of the Great Leap Forward, most 
commonly remembered as a failed economic campaign in which the P.R.C. reorganized labor 
into communes, attempted to surpass developed Western countries in production, and in which 
millions of Chinese starved to death. However, the historian Maurice Meisner emphasizes that 
when the Great Leap Forward was first announced, its economic policies were far from clear. At 
the outset, its concrete programs consisted of ambitious attempts at cultural change, with the 
formation of rural communes and steel production targets only following later.79 Cultural change 
and structural economic change were seen as mutually linked processes, and the Great Leap 
Forward was accompanied by “the expectation that rapid economic growth would be 
accompanied by (and indeed, propelled by) equally rapid processes of radical social and 
ideological change.” This was “an inseparable and essential” part of the movement, a dialectical 
approach whose cultural pillar has been minimized in the historical narrative.80  
With the exception of Duan Jingli, scholarship on “peasant art” describes it as a cultural 
initiative of the Great Leap Forward, taking a political marker—the year 1958, when the policy 
was announced—as its starting point. Ellen Johnston Laing, for example, describes peasant art as 
a program “to immortalize the positive benefits of the Great Leap and the commune in stories, 
poems, plays, and pictures,” and this direct causal link between the Great Leap Forward and the 
peasant art movement is repeated by scholars including Joan Lebold Cohen, Michael Sullivan, 
and Ralph Croizier.81 Laing describes the early output of peasant artists as crude, “exactly what 
one would expect of untutored painters,” and a high portion of these works were outdoor murals 
painted on the sides of homes and local buildings, a highly publicly visible and more temporary 
 
79 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 
p. 205. 
80 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After, p. 204.  
81 Laing, p. 6. 
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genre of style not easily given to collecting called “wall art” (bi hua).82 In this narrative, not only 
was peasant art practice a consequence of the Great Leap Forward, but socialist amateur art 
practice before 1958 is non-existent because such art practice was “a deliberate creation of the 
cultural arm of the Communist Party.”83  
Yet primary sources indicate that amateur art practice had been prevalent several years 
prior to the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, if not earlier, in the form of art study groups. 
Meishu, the flagship art publication of the P.R.C.’s socialist period, published articles discussing 
amateur art practice almost as soon as the journal was established in 1954.84 The May 1954 issue 
includes an article titled “Art creation activities by Shanghai workers” by Li Cunsong, with the 
bulk of the article dedicated to discussing groups of workers in Shanghai area factories who 
formed art study groups in which they drew and commented on each other’s work under the 
guidance of an experienced artist, the same model followed a few years later in Shulu Xian, Pi 
Xian, and Hu Xian.85 Often, the workers drew scenes from factory life with the intention of 
drawing critical attention to an undesirable work habit, such as production geared toward 
quantity and not quality. Li notes that following Liberation in 1949, sketching and painting 
became popular with workers who had “turned over (fanshen),” recognizing it as a powerful 
propaganda tool. Duan Jingli dates the formation of Pixian’s art study group to 1956, and their 
organizing may have been contemporaneous with other unconnected amateur art groups.86 It is 
reasonable to infer that amateur art practice in the P.R.C. began before the start of the Great Leap 
Forward, and that it drew upon precedents that pre-date the formation of the P.R.C., reflecting a 
 
82 The September 1958 issue of Meishu is a special issue devoted to rural wall art (nongmin bi hua zhuan hao).  
83 Sullivan, p. 147. 
84 The journal was relaunched from the title Renmin meishu [People’s Art.] 
85 See Li Cunsong, “Art creation activities by Shanghai workers [Shanghai gongren meishu chuangzuo huodong],” 
Meishu, May 1954, p. 38.  
86 Duan Jingli, Hu Xian nongmin hua yanjiu [Research on Hu xian peasant art], (Xi’an: Xi’an chubanshe, 2001), p. 
6. 
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cultural vision much broader than simply the endorsement and promotion of the Great Leap 
Forward campaign.  
Because of its celebrity, Hu Xian has come to stand in for the entirety of peasant art 
practice—or indeed, all amateur art practice in the P.R.C. Yet the record is clear that peasant art 
practice did not originate in Hu Xian, with earlier precedents in Pi Xian and Shulu Xian, and that 
untrained artists had been practicing together well before the launch of the Great Leap Forward. 
Furthermore, “peasant art” has come to stand for the entirety of amateur art practice, overlooking 
amateur art practice by industrial workers and rank members of the military. Although worker art 
and soldier art never reached the international profile that peasant art did, domestically they 
carried as much significance as peasant art, and their prominence in exhibition records from the 
period suggests that they were as prevalent as peasant art, if not more so prior to the early 1970s. 
The first showing of amateur art listed in an official exhibition history published by the Chinese 
Artists Association is an April 1955 exhibit jointly organized by the China National Art 
Workers’ Association and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, “First Annual All-China 
Exhibition of Amateur Art by Workers,” and exhibitions of artwork by workers and peasants 
were shown in art venues throughout the country with as much frequency as exhibitions of 
peasant artwork during the 1950s and 1960s.87  
The participation of amateur artists challenged existing concepts of the artist, and 
immediately art publications began to reflect these changes. From its launch in January 1954, the 
journal Meishu carried articles on different aspects of amateur art practice in every issue. At first, 
these articles were authored by the trained academy artists who made up the publication’s 
editorial board, but beginning in 1957, the journal began to run pieces written by amateur artists 
 
87 Liu Xilin, Zhongguo meishu nianjian 1949-1989 [Annual of Chinese Art 1949-1989] (Nanning, China: Guangxi 
Fine Art Publishing House, 1993), p. 1020.  
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themselves, lending space in the publication for them to speak on their experiences with art. A 
collectively authored piece signed by seventeen workers in a Shanghai area factory (“Wo men de 
yeyu meishu xuexi he chuangzuo [Our amateur art study and practice]”) is the first piece written 
by amateur artists to be published in Meishu, and the authors describe their diligent approach to 
studying art, participating in art study groups, listening to talks from art experts (zhuanjia), 
seeking critique of their work, and going on trips to sketch from nature. Their approach to art is 
notable for its collaborative nature, working in groups to critique each others’ work and suggest 
ways of improving. “We are confident in feeling that as members of the working class, we are 
not only materially wealthy creators (chuangzuo zhe), but capable of learning how creation 
creates spiritual wealth,” the authors conclude. Their editorial emphasizes not only the material 
aspects of fine art practice but the intangible satisfaction it brings its practitioners.88 
In spite of an amateur art phenomenon that was growing in popularity across the country, 
there were still barriers to amateur participation, chief among them a lack of preparation in art 
practice. Hitherto, public perceptions of the artist included the entrenched expectation that the 
artist possess a sufficient degree of authoritative knowledge of art and art practice to present him 
or herself as a legitimate artist, a knowledge most frequently glossed as technique (jishu), or the 
set of specialized skills acquired through experience and training that enable one to create art. 
Previously, training at art academies or in commercial practice were the primary means through 
which art skill was recognized, and the specialized nature of these skills were reflected in the 
names of art institutions—the Chinese name of the Shanghai Academy of Fine Arts, Shanghai 
meishu zhuanke xueyuan, for example, emphasized the institute’s specialized nature with the 
word “zhuanke,” and socialist art groups often styled their modest activities in the same manner 
 
88 Hong Guangwen et al., “Wo men de yeyu meishu xuexi he chuangzuo [Our amateur art study and practice],” 
Meishu 2 (1957): p. 20.  
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(for example, the Hu Xian art small groups chose the name Hu Xian meizhuan for themselves.) 89 
But as the P.R.C.’s cultural programs began encouraging its untrained, non-elite, and sometimes 
uneducated citizens (the worker-peasant-soldier masses gongnongbing qunzhong) to participate 
in the creation of art, the possession of specialized knowledge became an increasingly difficult 
standard by which to recognize the output of amateur artists, some of whom may not have 
possessed any formal education.  
Technique emerged as a highly contested grounds over which the qualifications to be 
considered an artist were fought, and debates over technique were part of wider reflections on 
removing structural inequities from society. The cultural programs of the Great Leap Forward 
targeted erasing the distinctions between the urban and the rural, between mental and manual 
labor, and between industry and agriculture (as proclaimed by the slogan “Xiaomie san da 
chabie.”)90 “Pioneering peasants” were seen as having the agency to eliminate the differences 
between the city and the countryside, between peasants and workers, and between elite and non-
elite forms of labor. Mao took his cues from Marx, who had written of a post-revolutionary 
worker whose “productions would be so many mirrors reflecting our nature” in “a free 
manifestation of life and enjoyment,” a foundation upon which Mao imagined a utopia that 
allowed for “everyone [to be] a mental laborer and at the same time a physical laborer; everyone 
can be a philosopher, scientist, writer, and artist.”91 The alienation of capitalist workers, who had 
to separate their labor from their livelihoods, was meant to be corrected by a non-alienated form 
of work in which workers could control both the means and products of their labor. Marx and 
 
89 The title “specialized art academy” (meishu zhuanke xueyuan) would prove so popular that by the 1950s and 
1960s, aspirational art study groups such as in Hu Xian would title themselves simply “Hu Xian meizhuan.” 
90 See Mao Tse-tung, “On the Ten Major Relationships” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1977), Vol. 5, pp. 284-307.  
91 Maurice Meisner, “The Deradicalization of Chinese Socialism” in Marxism and the Chinese Experience, ed. 
Maurice Meisner and Arif Dirlik (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 341-61.  
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Mao imagined a post-revolutionary worker whose material needs had been met by society, and 
whose activity was truly free.  
The role that technique would play in realizing a more utopic present was not 
immediately clear. On the one hand, technique (understood as a specialized skillset) could divide 
types of labor into groups qualified and unqualified to perform it, and accordingly separate the 
masses from free activity and the uninhibited pursuit of human potential. On the other hand, the 
acquisition of technique could also act as a democratizing power that, if wielded by the masses, 
would usher in a revolution in science, knowledge, and human accomplishment. Technique 
could contribute to the change in consciousness advocated by the Great Leap Forward by 
elevating and uniting the masses, or it could further alienate and exploit.  
The trained artists and cultural Party cadres responsible for developing and executing 
policies on art began to articulate a critique of technique in the late 1950s, questioning a 
valuation of art that placed technique above all else, and insisting upon a good politics as an 
equally important criteria of evaluation. Their comments on the relationship between good 
technique and good art loosened the correlation between the two, ultimately making it easier to 
take the creative output of untrained artists more seriously. For example, an article authored in 
1958 by the editorial board of Meishu stressed that professional artists must re-orient their 
practices toward the experiences of workers and peasants, a policy in-keeping with the Great 
Leap Forward drive to embed artists within the masses. The article begins by criticizing opinions 
voiced by professional artists during the Anti-Rightist Campaign a year earlier:  
“We wish there was more time to practice sketching (sumiao); we wish that when cadres attended 
advanced studies courses at the art academy there were extra lessons on technique; we wish there 
were more conferences on art technique; we wish we had more opportunities to travel to scenic places 
to draw from life (xiesheng); we wish we didn’t have the responsibilities of our jobs (gangwei) to 
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keep us from becoming professional artists (zhiye huajia); we wish we didn’t have to attend so many 
societal activities (shehui huodong)…Before the Anti-Rightist campaign occurred in the art world 
(meishu jie), if you asked young art workers for their opinions, you’d hear a lot of responses like this. 
It was especially common to hear about the need to practice technique. If these wishes hadn’t been 
realized, then you’d hear people saying things like, ‘O, flourishing creation (chuangzuo)—I don’t 
even have the basic conditions to create!’”92 
 
Their words dripping with sarcasm, the editors say that in emphasizing the acquisition of 
technical skill above all else, young artists appear to believe that nothing but technique is 
required of an artist: “This type of thinking is completely mistaken, and extremely pernicious.” 
Instead, art should be infused with moral purpose. Or, put another way, artistic skills must be 
built upon the foundations of socialist morality. “The duty of the arts is not only to possess skills 
adequate to the task of depicting life, but also to be familiar with the essential politics (zhengzhi 
tounao) of life,” the editors write. “Thus, artistic creation is not simply a product, but uses 
technical skills to manifest the products of thought (sixiang de chanwu).”93 In other words, a 
high level of skill doesn’t necessarily result in the creation of good art. The editors conclude that 
single-minded application to the acquisition of artistic technique (which they summarize in 
sayings like ‘You take care of the thought, I’ll take care of the technical skills’ and ‘having 
technical skills is everything’) is a vestige of bourgeois individualism’s influence on the arts, and 
needs to be discarded in favor of a socialist artistic praxis. 
Other artists and cultural cadres went even further in their critique of technique, 
questioning whether or not the existing concept of technique was valid as new artists were 
 
92 Editorial board of Meishu, “Yu gongnong jiehe: geming meishujia biyou zhilu [Joining the workers and peasants: 
the road revolutionary artists must take],” Meishu 1 (1958): pp. 1-5.  
93 Editorial board of Meishu, p. 3.  
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embraced by the fine art establishment. Huang Dingjun defended worker and peasant artists, 
criticizing the trained artists who didn’t take their untrained peers seriously: “There are some 
comrades with conservative thinking who have always felt that workers and peasants lack artistic 
talent, and that fine art shouldn’t be theatrical, performative, or contain those sorts of things that 
appeal easily to the masses,” writes Huang. “Those friends who have not yet become endeared to 
the art of workers and peasants have no basis upon which to perform guidance work (fudao 
gongzuo).”94  
Still others went even further than Huang, questioning the very standards upon which art 
had hitherto been evaluated. The painter and woodcut artist Li Qun described the challenges in 
evaluating art in a November 1958 issue of Meishu. Pointing out that artistic achievement was 
much more difficult to measure than crop yields or iron production, as a result it was much more 
difficult to get everyone to agree on the merits of art made by workers, peasants, and soldiers. Li 
Qun takes it upon himself to delve into the assumptions underwriting this bias against amateur 
art:  
Of course not every work by a worker, peasant, or soldier is great. Some are good and some are bad, 
and even good artwork has its shortcomings. Naturally we should point these out in the spirit of 
seeking truth from facts. But the problem is that there are people who cannot perceive the strengths of 
even works that are overwhelmingly good (da you haochu de zuopin), and this is what we really need 
to understand better. Obviously this involves issues relating to the standards and methodologies 
(biaozhun he fangfa) by which we appreciate art (xinshang yishu).95 
 
 
94 Huang Dingjun, p. 37.  
95 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai gongnongbing meishu chuangzuo [How to regard the artistic creations of the worker, 
peasant, and soldier],” Meishu 11 (1958): pp. 8-9.  
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Targeting those in the cultural sphere who were biased against art created by untrained 
artists, Li Qun proceeds to explain that the typical standards by which art has hitherto been 
judged are inherently problematic, and in need of radical rethinking as art practice in the 
P.R.C. changes: 
The standard that is actually being used here is ‘artistry (yishuxing) as the only standard for fine art.’ 
And the idea of supposed artistry is very problematic; this idea of artistry doesn’t account for the 
predominant thought (zhuti sixiang), for the formalism (xingshi zhuyi), or for the naturalism (ziran 
zhuyi) of artistry. And neither is this the revolutionary realism (geming xianshi zhuyi) or revolutionary 
romanticism (geming langman zhuyi) of artistry. Therefore, we have standards in common with them 
[the culturally conservative]. Taking the art of workers, peasants, and soldiers as an example, if you 
cast aside the spirit of the content, in which the content is depicted, the arrangement of the 
composition (gousi buju), the people who are depicted, and the spirit of the times, and your only 
concern is the accuracy of the sketching, shading, line drawing, coloring, volume, and anatomy—then 
you can only come to a negative verdict (fouding de jielun). Because if you take these to be the 
essential qualities of artistry or the fundaments of artistic standards, then naturally it is difficult to find 
the merits of worker, peasant, and soldier art.96 
 
Li takes a drawing by a soldier named Yu Simeng as an example (Figure 2-1). Titled “The 
Political Commissar Pays a Visit to the Company, Sharing War Stories with the Soldiers,” 
Li praises the work: “I think this is fundamentally a good drawing (hao hua). Even though 
it looks like an early preparatory sketch, I’m very fond of it.”97 Li proceeds to explain to 
the reader why he believes this work is good, and in the process proposes a new set of 
standards for evaluating the quality of art. The work is strong, he argues, not because it 
depicts the soldiers’ bodies with anatomical accuracy or the volume of their bunk bed with 
 
96 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” pp. 8-9.  
97 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” p. 9.  
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depth and precision, but because the viewer comes away with a clear sense of the image’s 
narrative and of its subjects’ relationship with one another. “It doesn’t use illustration to 
explain how life is, but rather generalizes (gaikuo) life with an image.”98 
 
Figure 3-1 “The Political Commissar Pays a Visit to the Company,” sketch by Yu Simeng, a soldier, reproduced in Meishu (11) 
1958: p. 8. 
 Li extracts a lengthy narrative from the sketch, imagining the warm relationship 
between the commissar and the soldiers based on the body language depicted, and the 
riveting stories that the commissar shares with them. “This is an exemplary concept and 
arrangement,” Li pronounces before conceding that “there are also parts that are incorrect 
(bu zhengque de difang).”99 He lists a litany of elements that could use technical 
improvement, including the depiction of clothing, furniture, anatomy, and the lack of detail 
 
98 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” p. 9.  
99 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” p. 9.  
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in the work. Still, “we absolutely cannot look at these technical inaccuracies without seeing 
how thematically accurate it is. That would be missing the forest for the trees.”100 
 In effect, Li proposes that mastery of technical details no longer serve as the 
primary criterion by which art be evaluated. Furthermore, his new standards for 
appreciation includes significant attention to the identity of the artist. While he recognizes 
the numerous technical difficulties that would handicap Yu Simeng’s sketch had it been 
completed by a trained artist, Li simultaneously “readily acknowledges [his own] 
interiority” in depicting brigade life. Li argues that he is essentially unqualified to depict a 
military life, and if the point of artistic creation is to depict the lives of the worker-peasant-
soldier masses (which it is, as many contemporary primary source documents testify), then 
only a soldier is truly an authority in depicting the life of the soldier.  
Li acknowledges that for the academy-trained artist, this can be a bitter pill to 
swallow—possessing the technical skills needed to execute an artwork but not the personal 
experience that would qualify one to be the artist can leave trained artists feeling like a 
warrior without a battle to fight (yingxiong wu yong wu zhi di).101 He readily points out that 
he would never have been able to author such a composition primarily because he doesn’t 
understand brigade life well enough to know what type of composition would best reflect 
its truth. He mocks the superficiality of professionally trained artists who portray soldiers 
simply by putting themselves in a uniform and drawing themselves from the mirror, 
pointing out that these artists still wouldn’t have access to the details necessary to create a 
convincing depiction of a soldier’s life: for example, what uniforms at different ranks look 
like, or the fact that generals tend to be older, with battle-worn faces covered in wrinkles 
 
100 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” p. 9.  
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such as the commissar in the sketch. Li concludes that for the trained artist, the only 
worthwhile task is to aid the amateur artist in improving their art—a process that results in 
the creation of outstanding works of art such as the model opera, “The White-Haired Girl.” 
“If the experts (zhuanjiamen) cannot see the strengths of worker, peasant, and soldier art, 
then it is impossible to build upon the foundations of their artistic creation. How will we be 
able to create a work like ‘The White-Haired Girl’ in the arts?”102 
Campaigns around technique were multi-directional, and aimed to shift multiple 
subjectivities. In her monograph on mass sketching during the Seventeen years period, 
Christine Ho argues that mass sketching was one such attempt to precipitate a “state-led 
shift to processual methods of art-making, an approach to cultural production that brought 
to the fore experiential and communitarian registers within modern artistic practice in 
China,” a fundamentally anti-academic act that was paradoxically prescribed by state 
institutions.103 For the professional artist, relocation from urban centers of culture like 
Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai to the countryside were meant to “reeducate” the 
privileged, whose subjectivities were expected to change after extended contact with the 
peasantry.104 For the peasantry, a bottom-up approach of “technique dissemination” would 
allow those who hadn’t been previously exposed to the arts to gain the “basic skills” 
needed to create art. For example, a little less than a year after Meishu had been launched, 
the publication began running in serial form translated excerpts from a text titled 
“Sketching and Painting Teaching Materials for Amateur Artists (Yeyu huajia sumiao yu 
huihua jiaocai)” by Nadezhda Krupskaya, the Bolshevik revolutionary, Soviet educator, 
 
102 Li Qun, “Ruhe kandai,” p. 9.  
103 See Christine I. Ho, Drawing from Life: Sketching and Socialist Realism in the People’s Republic of China 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2020), p. 19.  
104 See Ellen Johnston Laing, p. 29 for further details.  
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and wife of Vladimir Lenin. The course was explicitly targeted at encouraging amateur, 
non-professional artists, and over the course of several chapters, Krupskaya’s text instructs 
readers in lessons on sketching, modeling volume, portraiture, etc. Yet the number of rural 
readers with access to Meishu suggested that the magazine might not be the best form of 
outreach, and in the 1960s and 1970s, instruction guides meant for rural readership were 
published, which laid out the basics of sketching and drawing in step-by-step format.105 
Yet amateur artists were not trained in isolation, and the relationship between trained and 
amateur artists was the subject of much attention. The relationship went both ways: professional 
artists (zhuanye huajia) sought to learn from the masses, while the masses sought technical 
instruction from professional artists. The guidance provided by professional artists was no secret, 
and the relationship between professional and amateur was widely discussed in the pages of 
Meishu. A special December 1958 issue dedicated to the nation-wide conference on art work in 
the same year included statements on issues in art practice from nearly a dozen worker and 
peasant artists across the nation. A worker at a power plant in Wuhan, Xu Pinxiang, elaborated 
on the relationship between professional and amateur artists (yeyu meishu gongzuozhe) in a piece 
titled “We need the help of professionals:”   
 
I remember how difficult it was when I first started learning how to draw, enlarging the grids and 
drawing them one by one. I’d watch the workers in the workshop, and record their postures in my 
mind. When I went home, I’d call my kids over and ask them to serve as my models. Slowly, I 
learned how to draw. After that, a professional artist was sent to coach us, and that helped a lot but it 
still wasn’t enough. I welcome the help of professional artists very much, but at the same time we 
have to hold firm in our own views. There are professional artists with bourgeois thinking, and they 
 
105 Nongmin meishu shouce [A guide to fine art for peasants] (Shijiazhuang, Hebei province: Hebei renmin 
chubanshe, 1975).  
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need help and criticism. Recently, a professional artist has been assigned to my power plant. He helps 
me learn to how to make art, and I make suggestions to him. We help each other learn, helping each 
other improve together. Next year, the Party says that we’ll need newer and better artwork for the 
celebration of our country’s ten-year anniversary… We will all have to work together to accomplish 
this, and we need to invite professional artists to come help out.106 
  
Professional artists were seen as very much necessary to the success of amateur art practice, as 
without them, worker, peasant, and soldier artists would struggle to learn the technical “basics” 
of art practice. Acknowledgement of the role played by professional artists in developing the art 
practice of amateur artists was consistent across the socialist period.107 108 
Yet the academy-led re-evaluation of the relevance of technique was not without 
challenge. The Anti-Rightist Campaign and Great Leap Forward were seen as tarnishing 
the reputations of the artist and intellectual, and by 1960 the blowback against the 
denigration of professional artists was such that Zhou Yang, then vice-president of the 
China Federation of Literature and Art, commented on it in a speech. In remarks delivered 
prior to the opening of the Third National Art Exhibition of 1960, Zhou Yang defined 
technique as “a means with which the writer or the artist, based on his world outlook, his 
general culture and profound observation of life, gives an artistic representation of reality.” 
 
106 Xu Pinxiang, “Women xuyao zhuanjia de bangzhu [We need the help of professionals],” Meishu 12 (1958): p. 
41. All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.  
107 Even Li Fenglan, whose work Ellen Johnston Laing finds particularly fraudulent, mentions in her essay for the 
1974 catalog of art by Hu Xian peasants that she works alongside professional artists (zhuanye yishu gongzuozhe) to 
create art: “[I work] together with professional art workers to research, and only after several revisions does my 
artwork look the way it does here.” See Li Fenglan, “Wei geming kulian jibengong [Working hard to practice basic 
skills for the revolution]” in Hu Xian nongmin hua xuanji [Selected works by Hu Xian peasant painters], (Xi’an: 
Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1974), pages unnumbered. 
108 In fact, open criticism of the involvement of professional artists only seems to begin post-1976. Professional 
artists are smeared in publications like Meishu for being loyal to the gang of four, and for manipulating peasants into 
creating art in support of the Gang of Four’s agenda. Although prior to 1976 peasant artists were often critical of 
professional artists for harboring bourgeois tendencies, in the written record peasant artists consistently welcomed 
their help.  
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To Zhou, technique is “a product of highly skilled and meticulous labor,” therefore 
disregard for technique was tantamount to “a contempt for human labor and wisdom.”109 
Zhou elevated the status of technical accomplishment by linking it to reality, on the one 
hand, and labor on the other, symbolizing the accumulation of labor and dignified by the 
moral purpose of its mission to depict reality. Zhou proposed that professional and amateur 
artists work together to make better art, but stressed that the point of such collaboration 
wasn’t to make better art, but to have a richer spiritual life. “Aesthetic education is an 
important aspect of communist education.” By 1960, then, the ideal purpose of art was no 
longer to function as a luxury commodity object. Rather, cultural officials praised art’s 
potential to serve as “aesthetic education,” valorizing the process of making art over the 
final object itself.  
Amateur participation in art practice also challenged the cultural traditions that had 
previously defined who could be taken seriously as an artist, and chipped away at the aura 
of those who had previously been considered creative “geniuses.” In a 1955 Meishu article 
on genius, the painter and woodcut artist Li Qun explored the concept of genius (tiancai) 
as it relates to the fine arts (meishu). Li’s article is primarily addressed to young art 
students and his colleagues in China’s major art institutions, and he both affirms that 
“genius exists” (which he repeats three times in the space of the article), and that it allows 
certain individuals to make extraordinary contributions to the cultural heritage of mankind, 
while also striving to prove to his peers that genius is not an innate quality, and that it is 
not pre-ordained at birth.110  
 
109 Chou Yang, “The Path of Socialist Literature and Art in China,” Peking Review, 1960 No. 39, p. 24.  
110 The gender and race dimensions of genius are, of course, always operative as well, although Li Qun does not 
discuss them.  
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To Li, the presence of genius can be confirmed whenever genius is widely 
recognized by society, and whenever an individual makes an enormous contribution to 
humanity. He stresses that genius is not a term to be used lightly, and indeed any who 
would declare themselves a genius prove that they are not through the very act of self-
declaration. “Does [genius] rely on having a superior physiology (shengli)? In reality, it’s 
clear that the existence of genius is inseparable from its cultivation, from limitless loyalty 
to the people, from scientific working methods, from the ingenuity of labor, from the 
difficulty of hard work and the relationship with the people.”111 Although Li concedes that 
the mental make-up (tounao goucheng) and biological properties (jiti suzhi) of a genius 
may differ from those of a non-genius, without the right material environment, moral 
cultivation, and political direction, genius will not flourish. “A supposedly innate 
(xiantian) ‘genius’ is just quality (sushi) that has to be nourished through dogged practice 
in order to be expressed and to make a great contribution. Otherwise, this supposedly 
innate ‘genius’ is empty,” wrote Li.112  
Li devotes considerable attention to the modesty that he sees as true genius’s 
calling card. “There’s no lack of people who think they’re geniuses just because they’ve 
made a bit of art,” Li writes. “But this is just evidence of their own bloated self-appraisal. 
Whosoever uses the word ‘genius’ to describe a young art worker or student can ruin a 
person’s capacity for achievement if they harbor bad intentions and encourage that person 
to feel proud. Pride is the mortal enemy of improvement.”113 Li cites the Russian 
playwright Anton Chekov’s description of the Russian realist painter Ilya Repin 
 
111 Li Qun, “Cong ‘tiancai’ tanqi [Taking ‘genius’ as point of departure]” Meishu 10 (1955): pp. 39-40.  
112 Li Qun, “Cong ‘tiancai’ tanqi,” p. 39.  
113 Li Qun, “Cong ‘tiancai’ tanqi,” p. 40.  
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extensively as proof of the humility necessary in the fine arts. Repin clearly suffered from 
what we would now refer to today as imposter’s syndrome, referring to himself as 
talentless to Chekov, repeatedly denigrating his work’s quality, and bemoaning the many 
mistakes he believed he had made. Li cites approvingly Chekov’s description of Repin’s 
dim view of his own talents as actually being proof of Repin’s genius.  
Although Li Qun bemoans the capitalist division of labor that separates art from the 
people, his understanding of a people’s art does not seem to involve the people becoming artists. 
Rather, he concludes the article by citing the culture czar Zhou Yang, who urged artists to devote 
their métier to the people. “Artists must always show concern for the people’s lives, understand 
their mindset and their needs, love them passionately and sincerely serve them. Only then can 
they say without shame that they are the people’s artists,” wrote Zhou.114 Li agrees with Zhou 
that being a people’s artist is a realization of fine art’s highest ideals, but to Zhou and Li, being a 
people’s artist means professional artists devote their art to the people.  
Li’s editorial is meant to encourage young artists and art students that through humility, 
dedication, and the right morality, they too can become geniuses, and yet it is access to training 
that eventually allows an artist to achieve genius. When artists were sent down to the countryside 
to learn from the masses beginning in 1958, the discourse in Meishu began to shift toward 
consideration of peasants themselves as creators of art, and not simply artists who worked in the 
service of the lower classes. A 1958 profile of two peasant artists allowed the image of the 
amateur artist to come into sharp relief, asserting their identity in competition with existing 
representations of the artist. Zhang Shaonan and Zhang Penqing, two “well-known peasant artists 
from East village in Zhuji, Zhejiang county,” are described as broad-shouldered with rough 
 
114 Zhou Yang cited in Li Qun, “Cong ‘tiancai’ tanqi,” p. 40.  
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hands and strong legs from work in the fields. They walk barefoot, and their appearance is 
consistent with that of “sincere old peasants.115” The two Zhangs are committed members of 
their commune and very busy with work, yet they manage to find the spare time to paint. 
Peasants in neighboring villages invite them to draw on their communal blackboards, to paint 
murals on their walls, and design works of propaganda for them, and they have over ten thousand 
completed works under their belt. Their authenticity as peasants (didi daodao de nongmin) 
allows them to create images reflective of peasant life that resonate with locals. They are 
distinguished by their lack of familiarity with the lifestyles and values of the upper classes, and 
credit the creation of the new state with allowing people like them to be recognized as artists.  
Perhaps the most celebrated amateur artist of the socialist period is Li Fenglan, the 
celebrated mother of four who painted some of the most well-known works from Hu Xian, 
including “Spring Hoeing” and “Joyful Cotton Picking.” In the catalog essay to the international 
exhibition of art from Hu Xian, Li Fenglan describes some of the challenges she faced in 
pursuing art, especially as a peasant and a woman. “There were people with conservative 
thinking (sixiang shoujiu) who didn’t want peasants to make art, and especially not peasant 
women.116 She concludes that there is no reason a peasant cannot learn to make art: “We lower-
middle peasants are completely capable of learning the skills needed to make art. It’s necessary 
to have only revolutionary ambitions (geming zhiqi), to be willing to study diligently and train 
hard (qinxue kulian).”117 Li sees artistic technique as a modular skill that can be acquired through 
regular practice regardless of background or preparation. “These basic skills don’t drop down 
 
115 Zou Shencheng, “Liang wei nongmin huajia [Two peasant artists],” Meishu 6 (1958): p. 20.  
116 Li Fenglan, “Practicing Basic Skills for the Revolution [Wei geming kulian jiben gong],” Hu Xian nongmin xuan 
ji [Selected works of the Hu Xian peasants] (Shaanxi People’s Press, 1974), unnumbered pages, first page of Li 
Fenglan essay. 
117 Li Fenglan, first page.  
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from heaven, and they aren’t endowed at birth. They have to be learned from life, from the 
masses, and from art practice,” she elaborates. Li recounts two instances in which her own 
technique fell short: one in which she didn’t use the right paint color for painting a backdrop to a 
slide projector, and another in which a portrait she drew didn’t look enough like its subject. In 
each instance, Li sought the criticism of others, including professional artists, and was able to 
correct the inaccuracies in her work to create more convincing artwork. 
Conclusion: Labor Creates Wealth!  
Today, the Hu Xian peasant painting community remains active. Although interest in Hu 
Xian’s artist community peaked in 1976, during the Reform era that followed Hu Xian and its 
painters managed to successfully navigate the cultural politics of the new era. In the years 
immediately following Mao’s death, art from Hu Xian remained popular domestically and 
abroad. “Mao Zedong thought and the mass line were still icons used to legitimate party rule,” 
notes Ralph Croizier, and “peasant art continued to be used in political campaigns.118 According 
to Croizier, during the late 1970s Hu Xian painters continued to send works to prominent 
national exhibitions, and contributed art used to promote campaigns including Smash the Gang 
of Four and the Four Modernizations. 
 Meanwhile, the market for “peasant” art continued to grow. Thanks in large part to the 
successful exhibitions of works by artists from Hu Xian, as well as Hu Xian’s primacy of place 
on the travel itinerary of foreign visitors, foreign demand for distinctively Chinese paintings 
grew, especially as the country welcomed larger numbers of foreign tourists. By the mid-1980s, 
hotel shops in all major cities sold artwork by peasants, including from Hu Xian.119 Sale to 
 
118 Ralph Croizier, “Hu Xian Peasant Painting: From Revolutionary Icon to Market Commodity,” in Art in Turmoil: 
The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, ed. Richard King (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 152.  
119 Croizier, p. 156. 
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foreigners effectively made export art out of amateur art practice, as peasant artists chose artistic 
subjects that appealed to buyers and worked in portable, easily saleable mediums that easily lent 
themselves to commodification, as opposed to the media of its origins, cartoons and wall art, 
neither of which lend themselves as easily to fine art collection.  
 The growing market for art by peasants, as well as the progressive dismantling of the 
agricultural commune, meant that increasingly, peasant artists were no longer involved in 
peasant labor. Several of the most well-known painters from Hu Xian, such as Liu Zhide, went 
into administrative teaching positions, official jobs that often entailed a state sinecure. But 
official positions were extremely limited, with no jobs available for the vast majority of artists 
who trained in art practice during the socialist period. Those who remained artists sought 
opportunities outside the state system, working as independently and relying on sales for a living. 
In Hu Xian, the children of well-known peasant artists soon began choosing to pursue painting in 
the footsteps of their parents: Li Fenglan’s daughter, Li Xiaolan, is herself a painter, working 
under the name Shen Yingxia, while the son, daughter-in-law, and grandson of Liu Qunhan, one 
of the first Hu Xian residents to take up painting, also work as artists. Painting in Hu Xian now 
appears to be an entirely professional métier, and the children of artists face must lower barriers 
to entry in the profession.  
Gradually, the term “amateur” (yeyu) has disappeared from discussion of art by workers, 
peasants, and soldiers, collapsing a widespread national art practice into an exclusively “peasant” 
practice. To a certain extent, the label “peasant” art has also become synonymous with “folk” art, 
reflecting a revival of interest in the decorative arts and crafts that are perceived to reflect the 
ethnic character and folk origins of rural art practice. Even then, interest in “peasant” or “folk” 
art has dropped so low that by the early 2000s, the art critic Gu Chengfeng bemoaned “the 
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absence of peasants in Chinese contemporary art,” estimating that at the country’s most high-
profile art events, “less than two percent of the exhibits concerned peasants.”120 
As the proletarian amateur has receded from view, the art academy has re-emerged as the 
pre-eminent site of credentialing and legitimization for aspiring artists, even for those of rural 
origins.  Croizier recounts a visit in the early 2000s to the then newly built Peasant Painting 
Center, where a painter, Cao Quntang, had an exhibition on display. The artist was present, and 
Croizier recalls that Cao was more eager to share with him detailed and technical sketches from 
his notebook than the works on the wall, which were done in a bright, folk style. “He [Cao] 
explained that in recent years he had studied drawing and printmaking at the Xi’an Provincial 
Art Academy,” acquiring the professional skills that he was proud to claim that he was proud to 
claim as a graduate of the art academy.121 
But even as the ecosystem supporting art practice has radically reorganized itself around 
market lines, vestiges of the past remain—not only in the living history of contemporary art 
practice in China, but also through what remains of its re-organized institutions, including a 
considerable cultural infrastructure at the provincial and district levels, including cultural cadres, 
administrators, exhibition venues, programming and association-recognized artists. In Hu Xian, 
art looks less like an everyday practice for the amateur, and more like the specialized work of 
trained professionals. As other former centers of worker, peasant, and soldier art have dropped 
out from view, the most well-known, including Hu Xian, still produce a thing called “peasant” 
art even though its artists are only peasants in the sense that they still live in predominantly rural 
 
120 Gu Chengfeng cited in Yi Gu, “The ‘Peasant Problem’ and Time in Contemporary Chinese Art,” Representations 
136 (Fall 2016), p. 54. 
121 Croizier, “Hu Xian Peasant Painting: From Revolutionary Icon to Market Commodity,” pp. 160-1. 
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communities. And even that is changing.122 The amateur art practice of small art study groups 
comprised of peasants, workers, and soldiers has past. On the website Hu Xian yinxiang [Hu 
Xian impression], an official retailer for several of the most famous of the Hu Xian artists, the 
website’s page banner is an image of Li Fenglan’s Spring Hoeing. The words “laodong 
chuangzao caifu! [labor creates wealth!]” are emblazoned across the image. 
 
122 In 2016, Hu Xian was renamed Huyi District, one of eleven urban districts of the prefecture-level city of Xi’an. 
The majority of the district’s population remains predominantly rural, although as a whole, the nation is urbanizing 
and is no longer majority rural.  
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Chapter 4 | The Laboring of Education: Juelie and the Making of the Socialist Student 
 
Introduction: The Uses and Abuses of the Horse’s Tail 
An iconic comedic sequence from the 1976 film Juelie [Breaking with Old Ideas] begins 
with a pedantic, bespectacled teacher standing in front of his classroom. His name is Sun Ziqing, 
and he is a career educator, having worked in education before the P.R.C. was founded in 1949. 
The year is now 1958, and he lectures a classroom full of students at the newly established 
Songshan campus of the Jiangxi Communist Labor University (Jiangxi gongchanzhuyi laodong 
daxue, or Gongda for short), located in a rural mountain community in Jiangxi province. 
With a model horse beside him, the camera closes in on him as he begins lecturing in a 
practiced drone: “A few days ago, I went over the digestive and respiratory systems of the horse, 
as well as the characteristics of its bone structure.” The classroom is silent. He continues: 
“Today, I’m going to lecture on the functions the horse’s tail,” gesturing at the blackboard 
behind him, where he has written “Functions of the Horse’s Tail” (ma weiba de gongneng) for 
emphasis.  
The turgid silence is interrupted by a pitiful bleat coming from outside. Perturbed, 
Teacher Sun tries to continue with his lecture, but the animal outside continues to wail, and Sun 
goes outside to investigate. A water buffalo stands outside the door to the classroom, its handler 
beaming beside it. 
“Teacher, I’m from the Shanping Production Brigade. This buffalo is sick. Could you 
take a look?”  
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Horrified by the outlandish request, Teacher Sun shoos the man away. But the buffalo 
handler is not discouraged, and the camera stays with him after Sun returns to the classroom. The 
man hitches the buffalo—still bleating—to a tree, and comes inside the classroom, where he asks 
Sun once again for help. Disrupting the planned lesson, he explains that the buffalo outside is his 
brigade’s best cow, but it stopped eating yesterday and is running a fever. With spring ploughing 
to start soon, the brigade needs the buffalo back in good health to work. Given Sun’s expertise 
with veterinary science, he asks again for Sun to examine the animal. 
But Sun is unmoved, and he scolds the man, telling him, “This is a university, not a 
livestock veterinary station!” It is not clear if Sun is bothered more by the request or the 
challenge to his control of the classroom. Sun insists the villager leave, and when he finally does, 
Sun returns to his lecture: “Now, let’s continue discussing”—he slows for emphasis—“the 
functions… of the horse’s… tail.”  
A student in the back stands. His name is Xu Niuzai, and he was recruited to attend the 
university from a cattle-herding family in the local mountain village (in fact, his name might be 
translated as Cowboy Xu.) He’s been sitting in Sun’s classroom for too long, but the peasant’s 
interruption emboldens him, and now he finally speaks his mind. The camera frames Sun and 
Jiang standing directly across from one another, emphasizing their confrontation.  
“You’ve lectured us on horses for several months. But is the college going to send us to 
Inner Mongolia to herd horses?” It’s a rhetorical question, and his classmates laugh at the 
absurdity of it.  “Horses are rare in this part of the country, particularly in the mountainous areas. 
Even the horses on the blackboard are the first one’s I’ve ever seen. And, your lecturing his hard 
to understand.” The class laughs again, relieved that someone has had the guts to call out 
Teacher Sun’s abstruse lecture style. 
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“The harder it is to understand, the more profound the knowledge,” Teacher Sun 
responds. Unfazed, he returns to the front of the room, where he picks up a teaching display of 
various horses. “Take a good look. This is the Mongolian horse of China. And this is the zebra of 
Africa. Today, we’ll go through all the horses of the world, all right class?” 
“I’m not done!” interrupts Jiang from the back. He straightens his back and squares his 
shoulders. “I suggest making a change to the class. We should learn less about horses, and more 
about pigs and cows (shao jiang yidian’er ma, duo jiang zhu he niu).” 
Teacher Sun is enraged. “Since you’re not interested in learning, you can leave!” Furious, 
Xu storms to the door, but he won’t be silenced. “I’ll still have my say, even if it’s from outside 
the class!” As Xu leaves, the camera cuts away from the classroom to the next scene: big 
character posters (dazibao) emblazoned with the phrase “Teach Less About Horses, More About 
Pigs and Cows” are plastered on the school’s walls.1 
 
Figure 4-1 Ge Cunzhuang as Sun Ziqing, still from "Juelie." 
 
1 Li Wenhua, Breaking with Old Ideas [Juelie], VHS (Voyager Press, 1986); Chun Chao and Zhou Jie, “Juelie,” 
Renmin Dianying, no. 1 (1976): 41–76. 
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Part-Work, Part-Study: The Socialist Student  
When Juelie was filmed in 1975, the release of a major motion picture enacted a very 
different set of cultural precepts than those that operate in the release of a major film now. A film 
made during the mid-1970s in the P.R.C. was neither a work of art made by a visionary auteur, 
nor was it a work of capitalist corporate entertainment. Instead, a film was made and meant to 
shape and reflect national mass culture, to defend national policies, and to showcase socialist 
culture and entertainment. In those terms, Juelie was intended to celebrate the success of a new 
national educational culture, a culture exemplified by the film’s depiction of Gongda’s 
establishment and early operation. This new educational culture was practical, cultivating useful 
skills such as animal husbandry and agricultural production over useless knowledge, such as of 
European literature. It was also egalitarian, striving to offer rural students as much access to 
higher education as their wealthier urban peers. Gongda’s curriculum reflected these values by 
adopting a “part-work, part-study” model (bangong, banxue) for students, integrating the lessons 
of the classroom with the lessons of labor in a unification of theory and practice.  
But Juelie and its depiction of education were controversial even at the time the film was 
made, in particular the film’s depiction of the “open-door” enrollment policies implemented 
during the Cultural Revolution. In order to allow students from poor and rural backgrounds to 
attend college, many of whom had not had the opportunity to attend secondary or even primary 
school, the Ministry of Education adopted enrollment policies that relied more heavily on 
political recommendations than educational credentials, and an enrollment scene (zhao sheng xi) 
from Juelie depicted these new policies: without holding a high school diploma or sitting for an 
entrance exam, village students are admitted to university for being devoted to their work and to 
the communist cause. When these policies were reversed in the political and ideological fallout 
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after Mao’s death, the idea that a student could be admitted to college without the “proper” 
credentials (wenping) came to be seen as non-sensical, and Juelie’s recruitment scene was a clear 
example of the ideological excess of the Cultural Revolution.2 Eventually, Juelie would be 
banned from screening and the film’s director placed under house arrest for his activity during 
the period.3 
Juelie represents a moment in P.R.C. cultural history when the student was radically re-
conceptualized, not only in terms of their subject position (rural/urban, female/male, red/expert) 
but also through a consideration of the student’s production through knowledge and labor. More 
than a comedic catchphrase, the iconic “horse’s tail” sequence asks questions of the episteme in 
which the category of “student” is immersed: What does the student learn, and whom does that 
knowledge serve—the teacher or the cowherd, the school or society? Should schools teach 
theory—a striped horse they will never see—or practice, the care of the cows and pigs in their 
own communities? Who is in control of the classroom, and what is the student’s agency? Where 
does their future lie?  
In this chapter, I examine the figure of the student during the socialist period in the 
P.R.C. My reading is grounded in the film Juelie as the most extensive narrative from that period 
to explore the student and the university. I approach the student through a consideration of the 
student’s labor, asking what was the work of the student, and what did it produce? I argue that 
the student’s labor was a key site through which the student, as a figure of the cultural imaginary, 
was reconsidered during the period, as they were transformed from the bespectacled urban 
 
2 For an illustrative example of such criticism, see Fang Yanming, “Yiding yao suqing Juelie de liudu [Juelie’s 
baleful influence must be eliminated],” Renmin ribao, January 10, 1979. 
3 Li Wenhua, Wang Shi Liu Ying: Li Wenhua de dianying ren sheng, (Beijing: Hua wen chu ban she, 2011), pp. 212-
3. 
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intellectual of the May Fourth era into a diffuse, pluralistic subject position embedded within the 
socialist project and its productive social relations.  
At the time Juelie was made, the film, its production, and its reception were embedded 
within a dialectic conversation negotiating the boundary between narrative fiction and recent 
history. At its boldest, Juelie aspired to represent the Cultural Revolution on screen, adapting 
stories of real-life experiments in proletarian education and of student rebellion onto the screen. 
But Juelie can also be understood as a response to the crises that had been raised by the Cultural 
Revolution, particularly through its student activism. Student action during the historic Cultural 
Revolution had materialized the unresolved tensions and contradictions inherent to the new 
socialist order, and representations of the student engaged in both study and labor (bangong, 
banxue)—of which Juelie is the premiere example—formed part of a larger intellectual project 
through which education was integrated with production and production itself understood as an 
education.  
The historical, social, and educational policies of integrating production with education 
(such as the establishment of communist labor universities such as Gongda and the rustication of 
students to the countryside) were not merely policy decisions intended to contain the violent and 
unruly factions of activist students. Rather, they were instances in which the student’s labor 
functioned as the key site through which socialist subjectivity was re-inscribed. Juelie fully 
participates in this social, historical, and ideological project. Its depiction of student rebellion on 
the Gongda campus is a filmic embrace of the historic student activism of the Cultural 
Revolution. But where the Red Guard student activists of the Cultural Revolution challenged and 
disrupted the historical conditions that defined them, Juelie’s narrative re-inscribes student 
agency within a socialist moral universe as delimited by the institutions of the state. 
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Education as Social Reproduction  
Materialist social theory begins from the proposition that human societies and their 
cultures are best understood as systems of social and cultural production. Education is a prime 
site for such materialist theorizing: schools are incubators of society’s youth, where children are 
socialized to become fully participatory social subjects through the acquisition of the necessary 
skills, knowledge, and values (i.e. literacy, geography, patriotism). But understanding who 
produces the student, what labor goes into the student’s production, and how that labor is 
rewarded or recognized is not straightforward.4 On the one hand, the educator or the teacher, 
here theorized as any individual participating in structuring and executing the program of 
activities that occur under the auspices of the school on any given day, is responsible for 
directing the social reproduction of the next generation. The teacher is the agent of the 
reproduction of a social and educational system’s values, and during the socialist period, 
teaching was recognized as formal employment through compensation as salaried employment. 
 On the other hand, the student’s willing participation in the educational system is equally 
necessary to accomplish the social reproduction of the next generation. Yet attending school is 
rarely seen as work, in spite of requiring an incredible expenditure of time and energy on the 
student’s part. Students’ work—attending class, studying and completing homework and 
assignments, interacting with peers, extra-curricular pursuits, traveling to and from school—is 
rarely, if ever compensated; homework is not piecework. In capitalist societies, education itself is 
often conceptualized as a commodity that can be bought and sold, often with the expectation that 
 
4 Or, as Louis Althusser put it, “What, then, is the reproduction of the conditions of production?” See Althusser,  
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses [Notes Toward an Investigation],” in Mapping Ideology, Slavoj Zizek, 
ed., (New York: Verso, 1994), pp. 100–140. 
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more expensive education can provide social mobility to its recipient, and those engagements 
required of the student by the educational system understood as a non-working form of activity.  
During the socialist period in China, a widespread reconsideration of the labor of social 
reproduction explicitly addressed the role of the student in their own production. The student was 
understood both as a laborer, as well as a passive vessel and active agent of their own social 
reproduction. When people’s communes (renmin gongshe) were formally established in 1958, 
the architects of the people’s communes recognized that greater production could only be 
achieved by establishing wide-ranging social services to facilitate the full participation of all 
available agricultural workers. “Farm co-operatives must be not only organizers of production 
but also organizers of the way of life,” wrote the editors of Hongqi magazine in 1958, explaining 
that people’s communes would also establish “public canteens, nurseries, kindergartens, sewing 
teams, etc.,”5 and the Great Leap Forward period saw a widespread expansion of the rural 
educational system, particularly at the primary and secondary levels.6 By sending their children 
to school, rural women would not need to look after them at home, thus enabling their 
participation in agricultural labor.  
A 1958 article titled “How to Run a People’s Commune” summarized the commune’s 
expansive scope: “The people’s commune combines industry (workers), agriculture (peasants), 
exchange (traders), culture and education (students), and military affairs (militia) into one, and 
 
5 Editors of Hongqi magazine, “She Lun: Huanjie Renmin Gongshe Hua Gongshehua? de Gaochao [Commentary: 
Greet the Upsurge in Forming People’s Communes],” Hongqi, no. 7 (1958): 13–15. Uncredited English translation 
included in People’s Communes in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 10-5. 
6 See Chapter 12, “The Great Leap in Education” in Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-
Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 278-301. Pepper states that secondary school enrollments were reported to have doubled 
from 1957 to 1958 through the establishment of minban-style agricultural middle schools that adopted work-study 
curricula. See also Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2008), pp. 24-5. Han states that in Jimo county, a rural district of Qingdao in 
Shandong province, the number of primary schools doubled between 1957 and 1958, as did the county’s expenditure 
on education. 
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takes charge of political, economic, cultural, and military affairs at the same time.”7 These 
services were described as the seven basic services that would be afforded to commune members 
free of charge: “eating, clothing, housing, childbirth, education, medical treatment, marriage and 
funeral expenses.”8 The education of a commune’s youth fell under “culture and education,” and 
communes were tasked with establishing or running primary, secondary, and technical schools 
that commune members could send their children to for free. By taking responsibility for the 
education of its youth, a commune fostered the “high educational level” of its members, and 
contributed to the “[gradual elimination] of the difference between mental and manual labor.”9 
Further, by imagining that the expansion of the nation’s social services, the education system 
chief among them, would transform the overall productivity of agricultural labor, the commune 
was introduced as a new “basic unit of socialist society” that restructured social relations around 
the rural resident’s capacity for productive agricultural labor.  
Offering universal primary and secondary school through the people’s commune was a 
policy extension of the previous popular rural literacy campaigns.10 For many rural communes, 
this meant establishing schools that had not previously existed, and educating rural children who 
had not previously attended school. A cultural shift in how education was understood drove the 
rapid expansion of China’s educational infrastructure: where it had previously been seen as the 
prerogative of the wealthy, by the mid-twentieth century education was increasingly understood 
to be a basic human right in China and elsewhere in the world.11 The schools set up by 
 
7 “Cong ‘Weixing’ Gongshe de Jianzhang Tan Ruhe Ban Gongshe [How to Run a People’s Commune, with 
Reference to the Regulations of the Sputnik People’s Commune],” Renmin ribao, September 4, 1958. 
8 Wu Zhipu, “Cong Nongye Shengchan Hezuo She Dao Renmin Gongshe [From Agricultural Producers’ Co-
Operatives to People’s Communes],” Hongqi 8 (1958): 5–11. 
9 “Cong ‘Weixing’ Gongshe de Jianzhang Tan Ruhe Ban Gongshe [How to Run a People’s Commune, with 
Reference to the Regulations of the Sputnik People’s Commune].” 
10 For more on mid-century literacy campaigns in the P.R.C., see Glen Peterson, The Power of Words: Literacy and 
Revolution in South China, 1949-95, Contemporary Chinese Studies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997). 
11 Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China, pp. 21-2. 
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communes were intended to allow their workers to, “in a short period, attain an adequate amount 
of general and scientific knowledge, and to master science, technology, and culture.”12 These 
were the skills that were seen as necessary for achieving greater industrial and agricultural 
productivity. But, education was additionally part of an egalitarian social mission, itself fueled 
by the widely held proposition that more widespread educational attainment would create the 
conditions for equality as the basic logic of the socialist order.  
By making the people’s commune responsible for setting up and running primary, 
secondary, and technical schools, as well as conducting scientific research, the institution 
integrated education within the purview of productive labor, thus articulating and creating the 
conditions for the re-conceptualization of education as a social right rather than a social 
privilege. Education was thus embedded into the very definition of productive labor. 
Increasingly, this entailed a major shift in the image of the student in the cultural imaginary, as 
the imaginary student transformed from romantic urban intellectual into a well-rounded laborer.  
In this sense, the film Juelie’s depiction of young students transformed through 
participation in productive labor was not exceptional during the Maoist period (although the film 
was certainly exceptional in other ways.) For example, between 1970 and 1976, at least fifteen 
full-length novels were published that included primary characters who are students.13 In most of 
these stories, the young protagonists are either young members of agricultural communes or sent-
down youth either on holiday or assigned to work on a rural commune. The narrative arc of each 
 
12 Wu, “Cong Nongye Shengchan Hezuo She Dao Renmin Gongshe [From Agricultural Producers’ Co-Operatives 
to People’s Communes].” 
13 In mid-1966, the events of the Cultural Revolution forced nearly all publishers to cease their operations. They 
resumed normal business in 1970. Although by today’s standards, fifteen novels doesn’t constitute a major portion 
of yearly publishing volume, from 1970 to 1976 this was a significant number of original books. See Beijing 
Tushuguan banben shuku bian [Edited by the Beijing Library Publications Storage Facility], Quan Guo Zong Shu 
Mu [National Index of Book Publications], vols. 1970-1976 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1970-8). to see complete lists 
of published titles from each year. (The index was published beginning in 1956, and did not publish from 1966 to 
1969, resuming publication in 1970. 
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novel is structured around the student’s participation in the productive labor of their commune, 
which is often growing crops, converting wasteland into arable land, or developing technological 
innovations that spur on greater levels of agricultural productivity.14 By narrating their 
experiences working as members of agricultural communes, the novels illustrate the 
transformative power of participation in labor. Juelie’s depiction of a student body learning both 
from the classroom and from the fields was part of a greater cultural narrative asserting that 
production itself constituted an education, and that education was best served through 
production.  
‘Full of Realistic Color’: A Production History of Juelie  
 In 1974, Li Wenhua was a rising filmmaker affiliated with the Beijing Film Studio. He 
began working as a cinematographer in his twenties, and a decade later had nearly a dozen film 
credits under his belt, including the nationally prominent Zaochun Eryue [Early Spring in 
February, 1963] and Qianwan buyao wangji [Never Forget, 1964]. After serving as 
cinematographer for the 1970 filmed performance of Hongse niangzi jun [The Red Detachment 
 
14 Novels published during the Cultural Revolution featuring students as their protagonists include Beijing Shi Tong 
Xian san jiehe chuangzuo zu (The ‘Three-in-one’ Writing Group of Tong County, Beijing City), Chengguang Qu [A 
Song of Dawn] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue Chubanshe, 1976); Bian Zizheng, Zaolin Cun [Zaolin Village] (Hefei: 
Anhui Renmin Chubanshe, 1976); Ding Mao and Wang Lin, Xique Cun de haizi [The Children of Xique Village] 
(Hehehaote: Neimenggu Renminn Chubanshee, 1976); Guan Jianxun, Yunyan [The Swallow through Cloud] 
(Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshee, 1976); Guo Xianhong, Zhengtu [Long Trek] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renminn 
Chubanshee, 1973); Hong hua chuangzuo zu [The “Red Flowers” Writing Group], Hong Hua [Red Flowers] 
(Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1976); Zhenguo Song, Cha Shan Chun [Spring Comes to the Tea 
Mountains] (Wuhu: Anhui Renmin Chubanshe, 1976); Lei Wang, Jianhe Lang [Waves on the Jian River] 
(Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1974); Shimei Wang, Tie Xuanfeng [Mighty Whirlwind] (Beijing: Renmin 
wenxue Chubanshe, 1975); Xiaoyang Wang, Hong Yan (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1975); Yanhe zai 
zhauhuan xiezuo zu [The writing group of The Yan River is Beckoning], Yanhe Zai Zhaohuan [The Yan River Is 
Beckoning] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue Chubanshe, 1976); Changgong Zhang, Qingchun [Youth] (Hulanhaote: Nei 
Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1973); Zhang Jianguo, Xia Man Longwan [Pink Clouds Envelop Dragon Bend] 
(Beijing: Renmin wenxue Chubanshe, 1976); Zhang Kangkang, Fenjie Xian [Demarcation] (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Renmin Chubanshe, 1975); Zhou Jiajun, Shanfeng [Mountain Wine] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 
1975). 
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of Women], Li made his directorial debut with Zhencha bing [Scouts, 1974], a military 
espionage thriller set during the Chinese Civil War.  
 Zhencha bing was released to mixed reviews. Although audiences were attracted to the 
film’s thriller genre, reviews criticized the plot as contrived and unrealistic (“tuo li shenghuo, 
xujia”).15 Yet despite the public criticism of Zhencha bing, neither Li nor his film were accused 
of ideological blunders more outrageous than simply having an unrealistic plot, and the film 
screened without disruption. Smarting from the criticism of his last film and on the hunt for his 
next project, Li was especially keen to find a script that would showcase “real life” (shenghuo), 
or narratives grounded in the detail and richness of everyday experiences shared by members of 
the broad masses.  
 An unsolicited manuscript from an administrator at the Jiangxi Communist Labor 
University had caught the attention of top brass at the Beijing Film Studio. Titled Wan dai hong 
[A thousand generations of red],16 the studio had shopped the script to multiple directors. Upon 
reading it, Li was immediately interested. The script checked every box: “The script’s overall 
direction was right (da fangxiang), the artistic value was strong, and it was full of realistic color 
(shenghuo secai).”17 Wang Yang, then director of the Beijing Film Academy, greenlit the project 
and hired Zhou Jie, a career screenwriter, to revise the script with Hu Chunchao.  
 Part of the project’s appeal lay in the sterling political credentials of its subject, the 
Jiangxi Communist Labor University. Founded in 1958, the university's mission was to create 
“an educated labor force dedicated to work in the countryside” through a curriculum of 
 
15 Fang Jin, “Nuli shixian, jilei jingyan: gushipian Zhencha bing guanhou [Work hard at practice, accumulate 
experience: the narrative ],” People’s Daily, Aug.  14, 1974.  
16 Liu Shu, Ru ying sui xing: Li Wenhua de dianying shijie [Shaped like a shadow: the film world of Li Wenhua] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo dianying Chubanshe, 2014), p. 146. 
17 Di Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis],” DIanying Yishu, no. 2 
(1993): p. 77. 
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productive labor combined with study.18 At the time, it was a risky venture and the first of its 
kind in the nation. But with the continued support of top leaders including Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhu De, by the mid-1970s the institution’s position was more secure, 
having been granted the on-going affirmation (kending) and support of the country’s top 
leadership. With Li Wenhua as director, a well-liked filmmaker and a party member himself, and 
the Beijing Film Studio as production unit, the film could not have been helmed by a more 
qualified team, leveraging the publicly solicited distinctions of the studio, subject, and director to 
animate the film into production.  
 A cast and crew were quickly assembled, and the film’s principals selected following 
conventions of typage.19 Guo Zhenqing, a lead actor at the Changchun Film Studio, was cast in 
the role of the principal; his “hale physique” (tige jianzhuang) would be convincing for the 
character’s worker background. Character actors Ge Cunzhuang and Chen Ying would play the 
film’s conservative educator antagonists, and Wang Suya, who had distinguished herself in her 
performance in the film Zhanhuo zhong de qingchun [Youth in the midst of war’s flames], was 
cast as the university’s model student. The film was expected to pass easily through official 
inspection and approval processes. In fact, when a member of the P.L.A. propaganda unit was 
assigned to oversee the project as the film’s party secretary, actor Guo Zhenqing recalled that 
although the propagandist was technically the director’s superior, in practice the propagandist 
took direction from Li Wenhua.20 Before beginning production, the script needed to go through 
revisions; at the bare minimum, the language needed to be updated for the context of 1975. Hu 
 
18 John F. Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers: The Communist Labor University of Jiangxi Province (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. xxiv. 
19 For more on typage as a casting practice, particularly in the Soviet Union, see, for example, Pamela Robertson 
Wojcik, Movie Acting, the Film Reader (New York, N.Y.; London: Routledge, 2004). 
20 Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis]," p. 77.  
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Chunchao and Zhou Jie retitled the project Juelie, and in July of 1974 it was one of several 
feature film projects reviewed by a conference of top culture officials.21 The conference, the All-
China Feature Film Creation and Production Meeting (Quanguo gushipian chuangzuo shengchan 
zuotan hui), was convened by the Culture Group under the State Council in Beijing. The Chinese 
film historian Yang Yuanming describes the meeting as taking place within the context of the 
campaign to Criticize Lin [Biao], Criticize Confucius (Pi Lin, pi Kong yundong). At the 
meeting’s conclusion, the Culture Group resolved that films in production needed to strengthen 
their depiction of line struggle and class struggle, recommendations that prompted every major 
film studio to modify films they then had in development.22 The resolutions produced by the 
meeting prompted a set of prophylactic changes to Juelie’s script, but because the Culture Group 
had not singled out Juelie specifically for negative comment, production went ahead. The script 
was updated to remove historic events placing the narrative within the late 1950s, and the 
language was updated to reflect the contemporary parlance of the mid-1970s.23 The protagonist, 
the brigade leader turned principal Long Guozhen 龙国震, became Long Guozheng 龙国正, 
changing from one who shocks (zhen) the nation (guo) to one who represents the righteousness 
(zheng) of the nation (guo). By changing Long’s first name, the script reflects a desire for the 
principal to be understood less as a brave rebel and more as the emissary of an upright national 
 
21 Liu Shu, Ru ying sui xing: Li Wenhua de dianying shijie [Shaped like a shadow: the film world of Li Wenhua], p. 
146. 
22 Yuanying Yang, ed., Bei Ying Ji Shi, Di 1 ban (Beijing: Zhongguo dian ying chu ban she, 2011), p. 158. 
23 In spite of these changes, throughout revisions, Juelie was always set during the Great Leap Forward. It can be 
difficult to understand why a film set during the Great Leap Forward would remove references to events from the 
late 1950s and update the language to reflect the concerns of the early 1970s, when the script was written. But think, 
for example, of the HBO television series Deadwood, which is set in the 1870s. Deadwood’s showrunners went to 
great lengths to communicate a convincing sense of the historical period in which the show is set, including through 
dialogue, and yet the show’s distinctive cursing is decidedly historically inaccurate, opting for more 
contemporaneous swearwords that would sound unmistakably vulgar to modern ears. See Matt Feeny, “Talk Pretty: 
The Linguistic Brilliance of HBO’s Deadwood,” accessed February 25, 2020, 
https://slate.com/culture/2004/05/deadwood-s-linguistic-brilliance.html. 
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order. But although Guozhen (“shakes the nation”) may correspond more closely with 
contemporary (i.e. the present of 2020) understandings of the Cultural Revolution as a period of 
anti-bureaucratic disruption, the name Guozheng (“righteousness of the nation”) is consistent 
with contemporary (i.e. the present of the early 1970s) understanding of the period as a re-
entrenchment of the state’s revolutionary mandate.  
 Other characters who were renamed include an antagonist, Deputy Party Secretary Zhao  
(赵副书记), whose renaming demoted him to Deputy Commissioner Zhao (赵副专员). 
Although Deputy Commissioner Zhao does not receive much screen time, he is essential 
because, as the antagonist Cao Zhonghe’s superior, he enables Cao to enact his conservative 
agenda at the school as his ally and co-conspirator in party leadership. Where Long Guozheng’s 
renaming re-enshrined the righteousness of the state’s revolutionary project, Deputy 
Commissioner Zhao’s renaming minimizes the film’s critique of powerful bad actors within the 
ranks of party leadership. The heroic peasant student Zheng Saizhen (“competing for pearls”) 
gets the less feudal-sounding name Li Jinfeng (“golden wind,” perhaps an evocation of the gentle 
breezes of the countryside and her talent at coaxing golden wheat seedlings from the ground), 
while the antagonist Cao Zhongping becomes Cao Zhonghe. As a conservative career educator, 
Cao Zhonghe’s name does not change much (from “mid-evenness” to “mid-peace”), perhaps 
reflecting the ambivalence with which his character is ultimately portrayed in the film.24 
 By the summer of the following year, Li Wenhua sent a revised draft of the script to its 
original writer, Hu Chunchao, for comment; Hu gave the draft his blessing. The studio then 
submitted the script to a committee of high-ranking film officials and culture czars, who 
 
24 See later in this chapter.  
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endorsed the project, but outlined several issues that needed to be addressed in further revisions, 
ultimately recommending that the studio continue its research before moving into production.25 
 The committee’s comments were conceptual, and aimed at strengthening the core project 
of the film. For example, the committee felt the main character, Long Guozheng, had not been 
developed enough to carry the film. Long lacked a credible sense of interiority, and as a result 
came off not “elevated (gao)” enough, not “typical (dianxing)” enough, and without sufficient 
artistic appeal (yishu ganranli). This came through in details as small as Long’s leisure reading 
material (he should read Marxist-Leninist classics, and not the latest in agricultural technology), 
and as large as the manner in which he resolves conflict (he should do it with collective support, 
and not on his own). The script hewed too closely to the real-life Jiangxi Communist Labor 
University, which confined the narrative to specific concerns of the historic university, and not 
the loftier universal concerns raised by the case of Gongda. And, the script played it safe by only 
depicting events prior to the start of the Cultural Revolution, and was not set during the Cultural 
Revolution itself—a serious anachronism for a narrative premised upon a revolutionary project 
for higher education itself only made possible by the greater project of the Cultural Revolution 
writ large.  
 But perhaps the script’s biggest issue, according to the committee, was its failure to 
explain “why establishing a communist labor university was necessary, what plan the communist 
labor university would follow, and what were its biggest breaks with precedent in education?”26 
The committee felt the script essentially punted on answering these key questions, and it would 
 
25 Dianying ju [Film Bureau], “Dui Yingpian Juelie de Yijian [Opinion on the Film Juelie],” in Zhongguo Dianying 
Yanjiu Ziliao, 1949-1979 [Collected Research Materials of Chinese Film, 1949-1979], ed. Wu Di, vol. 2 (Beijing: 
Wenhua yishu Chubanshe, 2006), p. 309. 
26 Gushipian chuangzuo huiyi choubei zu [Preparation group for the feature film creation meeting], “Dui Dianying 
Wenxue Juben Juelie de Yijian [Opinion on the Script for the Film Juelie],” in Zhongguo Dianying Yanjiu Ziliao, 
1949-1979 [Collected Research Materials of Chinese Film, 1949-1979], ed. Di Wu, vol. 2 (Beijing: Wenhua yishu 
Chubanshe, n.d.), p. 309. 
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need to answer them successfully and repeatedly in order for the project to be successful. As it 
was written, the script failed to communicate why it was important to place proletarian class 
politics above all else, and it simply emphasized the importance of productive labor over the 
importance of education. This was an “inversion of priorities,” and one that placed productive 
labor (shengchan laodong) into conflict with education (xuexi wenhua). “All work at schools 
goes toward changing student thought,” the committee emphasized. Education should not be at 
odds with productive labor, but rather education and production should be unified (jiehe.) When 
the two were joined, “a struggle in political thinking would occur,” turning the labor of both 
production and education into powerfully transformative experiences.  
 In spite of the committee’s comments, the Beijing Film Studio had high confidence in the 
project, and sometime in June of 1975 the studio gave the order to begin production. Production 
teams were sent to Jiangxi, where they were embedded onto the Ji’an, Lianhua, and Yongxin 
campuses of Gongda. They were broken into two groups: Li Wenhua led one team, which was 
charged with researching and revising the script through fieldwork and interviews with staff and 
students at Gongda, while cast were sent to observe their real-life counterparts. The actor Guo 
Zhenqing, for example, who had been cast as Long Guozheng, shadowed a principal for several 
weeks on the Lianhua county campus of Gongda, while Wang Suya, cast as the peasant student 
Li Jinfeng, was embedded with Gongda students. Through interactions and observations with the 
Gongda community, the film’s cast learned to perform the authenticity that would translate into 
an authoritative portrayal of the school, leveraging the experiences of the less well-known 
members of the Gongda community into “authentic” performances on screen.  
 Final revisions to the script were done collaboratively, and involved the input of a group 
including the director, assistant director, script editor, script supervisor, cinematographer, 
 156 
production designer, sound editor, party secretary, PLA propaganda supervisor, the heads of 
relevant film and production bureaus, as well as lead actors.27 According to actor Ge Cunzhuang, 
a high-demand character actor who played Sun Ziqing, this collaborative production model for 
script revisions had been adopted from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, and revisions on 
Juelie proceeded smoothly; all parties provided their input and in the end, Li Wenhua, as the 
director, would make the final decision.  
 According to Li, even after receiving the written opinion of the film bureau, the main 
revisions to the script were not extensive. “We finished revisions to the script while blocking the 
scenes (fenjingtou), and kept the main outline. We made a few changes during filming, mostly 
adding in a few lines about ‘capitalist roaders’ (zou zipai).”28 During filming, a campaign to 
“describe the struggle against capitalist roaders inside the party within the era of socialist 
revolution” gained momentum, and Yu Huiyong, the Minister of Culture, passed the message 
onto playwrights and screenwriters, telling them to ensure works included depictions of the 
duplicitous nature of capitalist roaders.29 Notes from the ministry and the studio were well-
received, according to the film historian Di Di, who interviewed key actors and the director in 
the early 1990s. “The recommendations didn’t feel contradictory in the slightest to the film’s 
creators. They largely agreed with them and incorporated suggestions into the script.”30 
 On July 7, the studio approved the crew’s blocking, and the movie went into 
production.31 Filming lasted for two months. Cast and crew recall a hot summer with rough 
conditions on a closely supervised set. “Men and women weren’t supposed to interact with each 
 
27 Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis],” p. 80. 
28 Di, pp. 77-8. 
29 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 433-4. 
30 Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis]," p. 79.  
31 Liu Shu, Ru ying sui xing: Li Wenhua de dianying shijie [Shaped like a shadow: the film world of Li Wenhua], p. 
147. 
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other in order to focus on filming, and if you broke the rules someone would report you right 
away,” recalls Guo Zhenqing. Cast and crew spent long hours on set, and were expected to read 
alone in their rooms during down time. Outdoor scenes were shot at the Lianhua campus of 
Gongda, where actor Ge Cunzhuang remembers bringing “our own bedrolls and sleeping twenty 
to a room in the lecture hall of [campus].”32 
 The film wrapped in early October, and once a final cut had been made, it was sent to the 
Film Bureau and Ministry Culture for approval (shencha). The film passed through inspection 
easily, and in their written opinion, the bureau wrote that “the main ideological themes (zhuti 
sixiang) are good, the realism is strong, and artistically it is well-made, with many moving 
scenes filmed outdoors or with close-ups to good effect.” The Ministry of Culture decided to 
give the film top billing, scheduling the premiere for New Year’s Day 1976. 
“I’m an educated person now:” The Bourgeois University and Unproductive Social 
Relations 
Juelie’s fictional depiction of a real-life university, the Jiangxi Communist Labor 
University, presented a critique of the “bourgeois” university through its depiction of an 
educational institution that integrates productive labor within the university experience. Unlike 
most other higher education institutions in China at the time, Gongda was registered as both a 
university and a productive unit, and received no funds from the Ministry of Education. Instead, 
the university relied on the sale of products from its farms and small factories to fund its 
operations, primarily bamboo and timber products from logging sites throughout Jiangxi, but 
also pork, soap, insecticide, printed goods, and medicine.33 
 
32 Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis]," p. 80. 
33 See Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers, p. 22, 72. The school also manufactured products to facilitate its production, 
such as tools, explosives for quarrying, and cement. Branches ran shops for mechanical repairs as well as apiaries, 
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No sequence from the film makes the critique of the bourgeois university more explicit 
than the new school principal’s tour of the country’s “famous universities” (mingpai daxue). The 
film’s hero, Long Guozheng, is a production brigade leader and veteran of the Long March. 
When Long is tapped to serve as principal for the new Songshan branch of the Jiangxi 
Communist Labor University, he wonders aloud why the country’s educational system has not 
been transformed along with the rest of China. “We’ve been liberated for nine years. Why 
haven’t we transformed (gai zao guolai) the bourgeois universities yet?” As head of the newly 
established Songshan campus of Gongda, this will be precisely his task.34 When he arrives at the 
university, Long immediately sets to work changing it, beginning with challenging policies and 
practices of the bourgeois vice-principal, Cao Zhonghe, and a dean, Sun Ziqing. As career 
educators, Cao and Sun began teaching during the pre-Communist Republic of China era, and 
they bring the ways of the “old” society into the new. Sun and Cao believe that the best 
university would be located close to the city, where the best students can be found, and that 
admissions should be offered on the basis of entrance exam scores and the possession of a high 
school diploma. Once at the university, students should learn for the sake of learning (and not for 
the sake of doing), a privileging of mental labor over manual labor and of expertise over practice. 
Cao and Sun believe that a university diploma should afford its holder with greater access to a 
higher-paying job, a view that sees college as a marker of higher class. Above all, this 
 
and sericulture, aquaculture, and cuniculture farms. Some campuses eventually had their own vineyards and 
distilleries, and apparently a medicinal tonic produced by the university’s July 30 Medical Factory campus called 
“Lingzhi grass” was so popular with party cadres that sale of the medicine became a very profitable venture for the 
school. 
34 The real-life Gongda consisted of over thirty branch campuses and farms producing a variety of goods described 
above. See Cleverley, p. 22. By the time the film was made, Gongda had a branch campus and farm in every county 
of Jiangxi province. The Songshan campus was fictional, although it became so well-known through the film that 
the fictional Songshan campus has now eclipsed any real Gongda campus in celebrity. See also Pepper, Radicalism 
and Education Reform in 20th-Century China, p. 281. 
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envisioning of the university is one that emphasizes its social goal of the reproduction of the 
bourgeoisie itself.  
 Long Guozheng’s mission is to transform the university from bourgeois reproductive 
stronghold to proletarian productive bulwark. Because he was born to a poor cattle herding 
family, Long understands better than Cao Zhonghe and Sun Ziqing how education reproduces 
social inequality, and he fights to implement university policies that allow the youth of the 
surrounding village community to both obtain an education and to make good use of it upon 
graduation. Unlike Cao and Sun, Long believes that universities should be located close to the 
rural communities where they are needed, and that strict entrance criteria prevent poor students 
without schools in their area from being educated. Curricula should be practical, teaching 
students the skills they would need to work locally upon graduation, and above all, the purpose 
of education should be to produce “educated workers with socialist consciousness” (you wenhua, 
you shehuizhuyi juewu de laodongzhe). 
 In order to transform the university, first the content it teaches must be transformed. 
Juelie makes clear that certain approaches to teaching are classed, and a curriculum that is not 
anchored in practice results in a socially destructive education, which the film illustrates through 
the inclusion of an unnamed peasant university student who attends an unspecified famous 
university elsewhere in the country. Instead, rather than producing and reproducing an 
intellectual class, Juelie depicts the university as a space where worker-students are socialized, 
integrating production with education to ensure that the university fulfills its productive 
socializing potential.  
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The most prominent example of the university’s capacity for the destruction of existing 
social relations comes when Principal Long is sent on a national tour of famous universities.35 
Although Long’s journey through the country is filmed against montages of the country’s 
majestic natural scenery, his time at the universities is a veritable tableau of the horrors of 
bourgeois education. For example, when Long visits the university library he sees students 
immersed in their studies, but when he asks what they are reading he learns it is scholarship by 
famous foreign authorities. When Long inspects a university’s wheat fields, a student researcher 
in the fields casually tosses ripe wheat to the ground, a waste of harvest that pains Long and the 
humble agricultural worker who is with them.36  
But perhaps the most horrifying illustration of the bourgeois university’s destructive 
potential comes when Long meets an amiable peasant woman on the train to the university. The 
two chat happily on the train, and Long learns that she is traveling to visit her son, who is in his 
third year at the unnamed university. She shows Long a basket full of walnuts, peanuts, dried 
fruit, and rice cakes, gifts from the villagers of his hometown who ask after him.  
When she arrives at the university, the mother goes to visit her son in his dormitory, an 
exchange that Long witnesses when he passes by the student’s dorm room and sees inside the 
woman he had befriended on the train. The camera takes on Long’s perspective as the mother 
chats with her son: at first, the mother’s banter is lighthearted, as she comments on her son’s 
outward changes in appearance. “What’s the matter, my child? You’re so thin and pale, and 
you’re wearing glasses now,” she chuckles. But her son has soured to her, and one by one, he 
refuses the gifts she has brought. He rejects a handmade jacket as too ugly to wear out, while the 
 
35 Long is sent on this tour by Associate Director Zhao, who schemes with Cao Zhonghe to send Principal Long 
away so that Cao can implement his own conservative agenda at the campus.  
36 When the agricultural worker asks the student researcher not to waste so much of the harvest, the student 
arrogantly tells the worker that the grain is inconsequential in comparison to his dissertation.  
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cloth shoes she has spent months making are unsophisticated (tuqi). He tells his mother that he’s 
a college student now, and she realizes with devastation that the son she raised has changed from 
the inside out. The camera pans down in a close shot as the mother looks her son up and down: 
behind thick black-rimmed glasses he has a cross, exasperated expression on his face, and he 
wears a striped collared shirt with a pen tucked into the front pocket. His smart chino pants are 
held up with a black leather belt, and black leather oxfords cover his feet—each item distinctly 
unaffordable to the lower-middle peasant, and the sign of a privileged urban intellectual.  
 The son’s smart clothes serve as physical evidence not just of classism, but as a material 
manifestation of corrupted social relations. Although his new glasses and shoes have bought him 
membership within an exclusive new community of elite students, they detach him from the 
community of the poor mountain village he comes from, and he arrogantly rejects the fruit basket 
and handmade clothes as unwanted reminders of embarrassing origins. Realizing the severity of 
the situation, the mother suddenly urges her son to leave the university with her, lest he be lost to 
her permanently. She reminds him that his dream when he left for college was to come back to 
his home village and to use his education to improve it. But he now sees his earlier ambitious as 
naïve to the point of being risible: “How can I go back to that mudhole?” her son exclaims. 
Things are different now that he has been educated (“Wo xianzai shi you zhishi de ren”), and he 
rushes off to attend a Professor Ouyang’s lecture.37 The camera returns to a neutral point of view 
as Long enters the dormitory to comfort the desolate mother, who wonders how such a good 
child could be ruined.  
 
37 Professor Ouyang merits only one reference in the film, but the choice of family name is telling, given the 
surname’s historical association with prominent scholars, as well as the suggestion that Professor Ouyang was born 
into his professorship. For more on social mobility in China across historical periods, especially as tracked through 
correlation between occupation and surname, see Yu Hao, Chapter 1, “Social Mobility in China, 1645-2012: A 
Surname Study,” in “Social Mobility Under Three Regimes, China, 1645-2012” (PhD Dissertation, UC Davis, 
2013), pp. 1-58. 
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 Through the peasant woman’s eyes, Long witnesses her son’s transformation from poor 
country boy to slick and arrogant college student. The transformation illustrates the destructive 
potential of education conceived as a generator of class distinction. Although the village boy 
achieves social mobility, moving from the lower-middle peasant class (pinxia zhongnong) into 
the educated, urban upper class, he removed from the generative social relations of his birth. By 
embracing a bourgeois identity, he no longer wishes to return to his home village, thus removing 
himself from his village’s productive social relations. The knowledge he has attained has 
changed him as much as attending university has, revealing the problematic equation of 
knowledge with class standing. The village boy turned college student illustrates the perils of 
education for education’s sake, a fundamentally destructive pursuit that prevents the production 
of a new socialist subjectivities, that of the educated peasant.  
 
Figure 4-2 Close up of college student’s clothing, still from "Juelie." 
A Model of Socialist Consciousness: Li Jinfeng 
By contrast, the film’s heroine, Li Jinfeng, demonstrates what it means to be an educated 
worker with socialist consciousness. First introduced during the enrollment scene as a team 
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leader, model worker, and gifted grower of rice seedlings, Li is nominated by her work team to 
apply to the Songshan campus of Gongda. She is so well-liked that the class representative is 
moved to speak on her behalf, telling of her hardship, poverty, and bravery before 1949. 
Principal Long asks Li if she can read and write, and Li explains to him that although she never 
had the chance to attend school, she took night courses after 1949, where she learned to read and 
write. Long asks her to demonstrate, and she writes a sentence—“Chairman Mao is our great 
liberator”—but not before her daughter runs up through the crowd and playfully tugs on her 
mother’s skirt. Stunned speechless by Li’s ability to write in neat calligraphy, as well as her 
sterling choice of sentence, Long admits Li to the college on the spot.  
The qualifications and illiteracy of the peasantry were a huge point of anxiety for 
supporters of mass education, and Li Wenhua’s direction of Li Jinfeng’s admission scene 
cinematically underscores her dignity and heroism in a rebuke of these concerns. When Li is first 
introduced on camera, a group of villagers bring her to the front of the room, presenting her to 
Principal Long and the village representative (lao daibiao) for admission. As the village 
introduces Li to Principal Long, narrating her suffering as a poor peasant woman prior to 
Liberation, the camera moves in for a close-up of her face: she gazes resolutely yet demurely off-
camera to a sublime horizon beyond the screen in what Stephanie Donald has described as “the 
socialist realist gaze.”38 The scene is blocked around Li Jinfeng’s centrality and filmed with 
frontal staging, artistic decisions Li Wenhua described in an article for the Guangming ribao. 
When Li Jinfeng’s beautifully written sentence is revealed to the audience, the revelation of her 
words is paired with the climax of the scene’s orchestral score.39 
 
38 See Stephanie Donald, Public Secrets, Public Spaces: Cinema and Civility in China (Lanham, Md: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000), pp. 59-67. 
39 Li Wenhua, “Gan Ka Ding Feng Chuan [Dare to Sail into the Wind],” Guangming ribao, February 15, 1976. 
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By writing in beautiful calligraphy, Li Jinfeng dispels the hypothetical audience’s 
concern that she is not sufficiently educated or literate to attend university. Her beautiful 
calligraphy and political devotion prove to Long that she exceeds the minimum standard for 
admission, making an equivalence of literacy with formal education that echoes earlier dialogue 
in which characters use the term “wenhua,” typically translated as “culture,” to mean 
“educated.”40 In fact, the university’s admission of poor and informally educated folk was, at the 
time, the most controversial scene from the film. A collectively authored piece by the film’s 
crew in 1976 described how Long Guozheng’s assertion that callouses on the hands of villagers 
were credentials enough to be admitted made some of them uneasy, which was a problem of 
“sentiment (ganqing wenti)” and a “question of class line in running schools” (banxue de jieji 
luxian wenti).41 The scene attempts to defend the poor, rural student’s right to attend the 
university, going to great lengths to establish Li Jinfeng’s dignity and worthiness even as she 
remains conventionally qualified by virtue of her literacy-as-education. 
But it is Li Jinfeng’s status as a mother that characters in the film find most challenging 
to her identity as a college student. Sun Ziqing is alarmed when Long admits Li to the university, 
and asks in a derogatory tone whether she intends to bring her daughter to college with her, a 
clear violation of Sun’s concept of who a student should be (i.e., young, unmarried, and 
childless). Li responds that she will leave her daughter with her mother-in-law while she is at 
university, and her daughter remains off screen for the majority of the film. But crucially, her 
 
40 Earlier in the scene, Sun Ziqing rejects Jiang Danian’s application on account of his lack of formal education, 
which Sun describes as “wenhua tai di.” Although “wenhua” is commonly translated as “culture,” Sun is not 
accusing Jiang of being uncultured so much as uneducated, a usage that continues to the present.  
41 Beijing dianying zhipian chang “Juelie” shezhi zu dangzhibu [Party branch production unit of “Juelie” at Beijing 
Film Factory], “Tong Xiuzheng Zhuyi Luxian Duizhao Gao: Paishe Caise Gushipian ‘Juelie’ de Yixie Tihui [Going 
against the Revisionist Line: A Few Experiences from the Filming of the Color Feature Film ’Juelie’],” Renmin 
ribao, February 21, 1976. Indeed, as I discuss later in this chapter, this scene remained controversial even after the 
end of the Cultural Revolution. 
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daughter re-appears near the end of the film, when Li is criticized at a commune-wide meeting 
for skipping an exam to save the university’s crops from infestation.  
It is no coincidence that Li Jinfeng, a mother, is the story’s heroine. In contrast to the 
third-year student from the famous university, Li expands and redefines the social identity of the 
student even as she gains a college education, her motherhood recognized by the audience as she 
pursues actions in the interests of her community. When she decides to skip final exams to save 
the school’s crops, it is her socialist consciousness that compels her to act. Li and the fellow 
students who skipped exams with her are expelled for “flunking” their final exams, and as news 
of Li’s act of loyal disobedience spreads, it becomes a focal point for discussing the legitimacy 
of the university and Long’s methods as a whole. The meeting to criticize Li’s actions serves as 
the dramatic confrontation of the film, and Li is ultimately vindicated by a letter from Chairman 
Mao himself, a filmic representation of a real-life letter Mao wrote in July 1961 in which he 
praised Gongda as a model university.42 At this point, Li’s daughter re-appears, handed back to 
Li as a crowd gathers around to celebrate her success.  
 The socialist consciousness that Li Jinfeng exhibits, valuing crops over exams, allows her 
to act as the catalyst that transforms the spiritual heart of the university, signifying its transition 
from a contested battleground of the two-line struggle to a wholly proletarian institution. 
Significantly, as the central model of an educated worker with a socialist consciousness, Li is 
explicitly reproduced in the form of her daughter. The inclusion of Li’s daughter serves multiple 
ends, asserting that motherhood and education are not incompatible, and embodying Li’s 
biological reproduction in the figure of her young daughter. But ironically, by keeping Li’s 
 
42 Mao wrote a letter on July 1961 in support of Gongda. A series of educational reforms earlier that year had 
weakened Gongda’s future, and as enrollments dwindled, university leadership sought backing from high-level 
leaders. The full text of the letter was published widely in national press in late July 1977, a decision John Cleverly 
attributes to then party chairman Hua Guofeng. See Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers, pp. 117-9. 
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daughter largely off screen and not including the daughter’s father in the film, the reproductive 
labor of bearing and rearing children itself also happens off screen and outside the school. 
Conservative and Radical Agendas in the P.R.C.’s Rural Education System: An 
Institutional History 
In 1949, when the C.C.P.’s Ministry of Education set to their task of running the 
country’s schooling system, it was informed by more than two decades of experience running 
schools for the C.C.P. in the Jiangxi Soviet and Yan’an. In Yan’an, the American reporter Edgar 
Snow had observed three basic educational systems in place: institutional, military, and social. 
The Yan’an educational program was designed to apply Marxist principles to educational reform 
by creating an adaptive schooling system that was sensitive to specific manpower needs. The 
first institutional system was “more or less run by the soviets,” and consisted of elementary 
school training for children, plus training courses for the teachers and cadres who taught the 
children. The military system replicated the general education system but was run for soldiers by 
the army, and the third system consisted of literacy training and social programming for adults 
run by Communist social organizations.43 The educational system at Yan’an, in turn, was 
informed by experiences educating rural Jiangxi communities during the brief tenure of the 
Jiangxi Soviet in the early 1930s. In Jiangxi, the C.C.P. and Kuomintang competed for rural 
support. Rural reconstruction programs in Kuomintang-controlled areas initiated by such figures 
as Y.C. James Yen focused on mass literacy as the first component of a holistic program that 
understood illiteracy, poverty, disease, and civic disengagement has interlocking problems. 
Yen’s method led to dramatic results in Hebei Province’s Ding County, where illiteracy was 
 
43 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), pp. 235-6; also Pepper, Radicalism and 
Education Reform in 20th-Century China, p. 129. 
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eliminated three years after the start of his experimental development project, but without 
ambitions to systemically transform the position of the rural peasant, C.C.P.-led alternatives 
attracted strong support.44 A directive issued by Mao on September 15, 1933 constituted the first 
clear educational policy for the Jiangxi Soviet, stipulating that a system of universal mass 
education must be created for children alongside anti-illiteracy programs for adults. A year later, 
a 1934 report to the Second National Soviet Congress claimed over three thousand “Lenin 
primary schools” and over six thousand night schools had been established in the province.45 
Early communist approaches to education were shaped by repeated calls for universal 
education in the previous decades. Throughout the Republican period, modernizing educators 
such as Tao Xingzhi championed interest in popular (pingmin) education.46 Increasingly, 
education came to be seen as a universal right that should be accessible to all, and not a 
distinction afforded only to the wealthiest.47 Mao’s famous 1927 report on an investigation of 
five counties in Hunan was a landmark document reflecting CCP embrace of mass education as a 
key political cause, and laid a framework for approaching education as part of an ambitious 
orientation around rural, rather than urban, concerns. In it, Mao argued that mass education could 
only develop after the landlords and other power-holding classes were overthrown: “In China, 
education has always been the exclusive preserve of the landlords, and the peasants have had no 
access to it,” wrote Mao.48 The ruling classes weaponized educational achievement as a means of 
 
44 Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China, p. 118-9. 
45 Pepper, pp. 123-4. 
46 See Yusheng Yao, “National Salvation through Education: Tao Xingzhi’s Educational Radicalism” (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1999). 
47 For histories of perceptions of education as a right versus commodity in the American context, see Alex Molnar, 
School Commercialism: From Democratic Ideal to Market Commodity, (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Kenneth 
J. Saltman, The Edison Schools: Corporate Schooling and the Assault on Public Education, (New York: Routledge, 
2005). 
48 Mao Tse-tung, “Report on Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-
Tung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 23–59. 
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oppressing the poor, resulting in classed forms of learning and the corresponding institutions that 
disseminated them. Revolution was thus a prerequisite for the education of the proletariat, and 
true mass education could only develop after the landlords and other power-holding classes were 
overthrown.  
But where Mao, in 1927, theorized a direct and irrevocable relationship between the 
oppression of the peasantry through elite control of private education, by the time of the 
September 15, 1933, directive on education policy in the Jiangxi Soviet, the C.C.P. was willing 
to work with loyal intellectuals to achieve its goals in spite of their belonging to the power-
holding classes. “Bourgeois intellectuals and experts who are enthusiastic in wanting to serve the 
Soviet must also be used to participate in education work,” wrote Mao, and any intellectual 
working as a teacher or in “any other nonexploiting occupation” was classified as performing 
mental labor for the Soviet and thus afforded its legal protections.49 Suzanne Pepper identifies 
this as a key “paradox” of the CCP’s approach to education: “The land and valuables of the 
[propertied elite] could be divided up and redistributed to the poor, as was done during land 
reform. Intellectual resources, however, could not be separated from their owners in quite the 
same way.”50 
When the new state arrived in 1949, these contradictions were inherited by the new 
Ministry of Education, which now set about its task on a nationwide scale. The ministry had 
inherited a system of higher education that had been diminished by over a decade of warfare, 
with many college and universities displaced into the country’s interior due to Japanese invasion. 
And the number of college graduates in the country was miniscule: an estimated one hundred 
 
49 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu Jiaoyu Gongzuo [Directive on Education Work],” in Mao Zedong Ji [Collected Works of 
Mao Zedong], vol. 4 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 29–31. 
50 Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China, p. 124. 
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and fifty thousand students were enrolled from 1947 to 1948, representing a sliver of a fraction 
of the country’s total population.51 
On the one hand, the Ministry was expected to train the expert personnel necessary to 
modernize the nation, while at the same time to broaden the reach of its mass education. 
Jonathan Unger characterizes this as the push and pull between a “conservative” and “radical” 
agenda in education, respectively, with the pendulum swinging decisively toward the 
“conservative” agenda at the start of the 1950s.52 Accordingly, the state’s first five year plan 
(1953-1957) emphasized developing the expertise necessary to fulfill the plan’s larger 
production and growth targets over mass education, a point Zhang Xiruo, appointed Minister of 
Education in 1953, made explicit in a directive explaining that mass education would take the 
backseat to training personnel for economic growth.53 
The consequences of the “conservative” approach to education can be traced through 
policy and into culture, and back again. In accordance with the educational goals of the first five-
year plan, several comprehensive universities were consolidated and converted into technical 
institutions, such as Tsinghua, which was re-organized into a polytechnic industrial university.54 
In order to better identify students who would excel in university and in the technical positions 
that required higher education, a national examination system was implemented in 1952.55 Prior 
 
51 According to S.Y. Chiu, there were fifty-five universities and colleges with an enrollment of around 148,000 from 
1947-1948. This equates to less than three-hundredths of a percent of the country’s total population of around 541 
million. S.Y. Chiu, “Public Education,” in The Year Book of Education, 1949, ed. George B. Jeffrey (London: 
Evans, 1949). 
52 Jonathan Unger, Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980, Studies of the East 
Asian Institute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 48. Joel Andreas also identifies a similar swing in 
his study of Tsinghua University during the socialist period; see Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The 
Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class, Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific (Stanford, 
Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 43. 
53 Zhang Xiruo, “Muqian Guomin Jiaoyu Fangmian de Qingkuang He Wenti [The Present Situation and Problems in 
National Education],” Renmin ribao, June 21, 1956. 
54 For more details on Tsinghua in the early 1950s, see Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, pp. 42-4. 
55 While I do not wish to discount the voluminous scholarship on the long historical roots of exam culture in China, 
neither do I wish to construct a continuous socio-political history of the exam system from imperial times to the 
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to 1952, many universities administered their own entrance exams, but by 1952 this process was 
centralized and standardized.  
The class of 1953 was thus the first selected through the national examination system, an 
admissions process underpinned by the meritocratic belief that the brightest students could be 
identified through performance on exams. Yet as Joel Andreas demonstrates, during the period 
the national examination system was in place (1952 to 1965), students from only a small number 
of educated families made up the majority of students accepted into college.56 At Tsinghua 
University alone, the 1953 class comprised a disappointing 14 percent of students from working-
class or peasant families, far from conclusive proof that the exam was an effective means of 
guaranteeing equal access to college. Andreas concludes that “as long as admission was 
regulated by examinations, most students who tested in Tsinghua and other top universities were 
from the old elite classes.”57 
Of course, the inequitable distribution of educational resources did not begin at the 
college level, nor was it necessarily entirely a product of an impassioned conviction in the 
superiority of meritocratic education policies. At the primary and secondary school levels, an 
acute scarcity of schools themselves created competition over entry, even in the comparatively 
wealthier urban areas where there were more schools. When the P.R.C. was founded, peace-time 
 
present. As this chapter demonstrates, this culture went through significant ruptures, disruptions, and contestations at 
various point, no more so than during the socialist period. For further reading on exams in imperial and modern 
China, see Deng Siyu, Zhongguo Kaoshi Zhidu Shi [History of Chinese Exam Institutions] (Taipei: Student 
Bookstore, 1967); Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000); Benjamin A. Elman, Alexander Woodside, and Joint Committee on Chinese 
Studies (U.S.), eds., Education and Society in Late Imperial China, 1600-1900, Studies on China 19 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994); Thomas D. Curran, Educational Reform in Republican China: The Failure of 
Educators to Create a Modern Nation = [Minguo Shi Dai de Jiao Yu Gai Ge: Jiao Yu Jia Chuang Zao Xian Dai 
Min Zu de Shi Bai], Chinese Studies, v. 40 (Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005); Ye Liu, Higher Education, 
Meritocracy and Inequality in China (New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016); Iona Man-Cheong, The 
Class of 1761: Examinations, State, and Elites in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2004). 
56 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, pp. 61-86. 
57 Andreas, p. 43. 
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conditions after more than a decade of war resulted in a population boom over the course of the 
following decade. The population boom of the 1950s resulted in a surplus of potential students 
and a shortage of schools. By the early 1960s, students at all levels of education faced intense 
competition to attend the existing schools. 
Stop-gap measures implemented to address the shortage of schools included the 
establishment of private schools (minban), set up in make-shift classrooms to absorb some of the 
overflow.58 But most schools simply became more selective, and began to specialize in enrolling 
certain types of students. Schools targeted different student profiles by adjusting the amount 
different admission criteria were weighted. In secondary schools, admission typically depended 
on a student’s record of academic performance (chengji), class origins (chengfen), and political 
performance (zhengzhi biaoxian). But the best secondary schools (key-point schools, zhongdian 
xuexiao), seeking to enroll an academically distinguished student body that would go on to 
attend college and work in white-collar jobs, weighted grades more heavily than class origins or 
political performance. Hence, their students came from educated families living in urban areas. 
Other schools specialized in attracting students with poorer grades but from politically powerful 
families (“aristocratic,” guizu). As a result, the high school system channeled students from 
different backgrounds into different schools, resulting in “different ‘classes’ of youths... [being] 
concentrated at secondary schools of different qualities.”59 
The lack of schools was even more pronounced in the countryside, where there were 
fewer schools than in the cities. Because cities already possessed a more developed educational 
 
58 See Unger, Education under Mao, p. 17 for more details about minban schools. Although minban schools were 
meant to redress the shortage of schools, poorer families and families with more children were less equipped to send 
their children to minban schools, which charged higher tuition. Minban school were only a solution for wealthier 
urban families. 
59 Unger, pp. 26-8. 
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infrastructure, it was easier for the Ministry of Education to invest its resources in urban areas. 
Additional support to urban schools could fund the expansion of the existing school systems, 
which still could not keep pace with growth in the number of eligible students. But in the 
countryside, these schools simply did not exist. Greater upfront investment was needed to build 
new schools than to expand the capacity of existing ones. By funding urban education at a higher 
rate than rural education, the Ministry of Education essentially funded an urban/rural disparity 
that became increasingly pronounced through the 1950s and 1960s, as rural students were 
increasingly excluded from the educational system.60 
Thus, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the figure of the student indexed a host of 
complex issues, from class, family background, and political engagement to urban/rural 
disparity. By the mid-1960s, the consequences of the new educational system were apparent, 
chief among them the extent to which education played a determining role in reproducing and 
exacerbating class differentiation. Because class was encoded within an official categorization 
system, students were increasingly aware of the extent to which their background defined their 
opportunities and interests. Jonathan Unger argues that by 1966, four distinct groups of students 
were apparent: “cadres’ children, the worker-peasant children, the middle-class children, and the 
bad-class background children.”61 Haiyan Lee goes so far as to present the problematic argument 
that class was so dominant as an identifying category that it was effectively “racialized to serve 
as a principle of exclusion and closure in Mao’s China.” By conflating class conflict with racism, 
Lee’s argument that class struggle constituted the most “virulent form of ‘class racism’” 
 
60 Up through the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, there were various initiatives at local and provincial level 
to require primary education, further increasing the strain on the rural education system. However, universal 
compulsory education was not enacted until April 1986 with the adoption of the “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
yiwu jiaoyu fa [Compulsory Education Law of the P.R.C.]. See Lu Wang and Keith Lewin, Two Decades of Basic 
Education in Rural China: Transitions and Challenges for Development, 2016. 
61 Unger, Education under Mao, p. 109. 
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highlights the dominance of class within the revolutionary episteme, but erases the importance of 
race itself as a site of inequity and othering within the P.R.C.62 
Students were among the first to heed Mao’s call to arms in the opening months of the 
Cultural Revolution, and conventional histories of the period include university-based events 
such as the formation of the Red Guards at Tsinghua University, and Nie Yuanzi’s big character 
poster at Peking University as definitive moments in the opening salvos of the Cultural 
Revolution.63 Responding to an educational system that seemed deeply inequitable, 
dysfunctional, and resistant to reform, big character posters articulated the injustices of the 
school and of the body politic. It was not uncommon for the student body at a single school to 
split into opposed groups, each claiming loyalty to Mao. This phenomenon is usually glossed as 
“factionalism,” a term that trivializes the larger systemic social critique of student activists in 
favor of viewing their activism as a matter of petty self-interest. 
Student activism during the Cultural Revolution also enacted a politics that exceeded the 
established order of the socialist state, disrupting the boundaries that had hitherto defined the role 
of the student. Mao’s reputation as an educational reformer lent credibility to his calls for 
cultural revolution, making the school a central national stage upon which the Cultural 
Revolution was waged. But students also formed alliances that traversed the boundaries of social 
organizations such as the school and the danwei (work unit), with some student groups forming 
broader coalitions with factory workers, demobilized soldiers, and personnel in urban 
 
62 See Haiyan Lee, The Stranger and the Chinese Moral Imagination (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2014), but especially Chapter 5, “The Enemy Within,” pp. 197-242. 
63 Representative histories of the Cultural Revolution that include campus organizing as significant early episodes 
include MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution; Jiaqi Yan, Kao Kao, and D. W. Y. Kwok, Turbulent 
Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution, SHAPS Library of Translations (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1996); Richard Curt Kraus, The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
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administrative organs.64 Incredibly, this was accomplished even while most students continued to 
attend school: in fact, schools largely did not disperse for the entirety of the Cultural Revolution, 
and many students remained at school during the worst years of combat. 
The Cultural Revolution on Screen  
Juelie’s depiction of the Cultural Revolution was no accident. By design, the film was 
intended not only to historicize the Cultural Revolution by depicting it for the cinema, but also to 
provide a narrative that would justify the Cultural Revolution, as well as respond to criticisms of 
it. When a high-level committee charged with developing feature films reviewed a draft of Juelie 
in July of 1975, one of their main criticisms was over the depiction of the Cultural Revolution. 
Because the film was set in the late 1950s during the Great Leap Forward, they complained that 
“the script only addresses events prior to the Cultural Revolution.”65 The limited historical 
purview of the film raised glaring continuity issues, namely that “from 1958 to 1961, Liu 
Shaoqi’s ‘revisionist line’ dominated education policy,” and revisionist educators were 
“restrictive and utterly opposed to Chairman Mao’s advice on the revolution in education.”66 
Thus, there would have been no person like Deputy Secretary Tang in a position of leadership at 
the time, making his character a conspicuous anachronism.  
Instead, it would take a pervasive cultural revolution to change minds and change 
policies. That cultural revolution, in turn, could only be initiated by a vision of the epochal 
leader: a Mao Zedong, not any ordinary deputy secretary. Furthermore, because Deputy 
Secretary Tang acts of his own accord in establishing the Songshan campus, and in appointing 
 
64 See Unger, Education under Mao, p. 130; also Chapter 4, "Revolutionary Alchemy: Economism and the Making 
of Shanghai's January Revolution," in Yiching Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in 
Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
65 Dianying ju [Film Bureau], “Dui Yingpian Juelie de Yijian [Opinion on the Film Juelie].” 
66 Dianying ju [Film Bureau]. 
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Long as principal, the script as it was written gave the impression that one determined individual 
would be enough to reverse the tide of history. “But Gongda is absolutely not the sort of thing 
that one person can determine, and [Tang] wasn’t the only person who supported it,” wrote the 
committee. Instead, establishing a radical university required support from a coalition of leaders 
and the masses. Depicting the progressive legacy in the hands of just one individual left the film 
open to the revisionist criticism that leftist radicals had hijacked the schools for their own 
purposes.  
Instead, the legitimacy of the Maoist education agenda needed to be unassailable, and 
that historical legitimacy that could only be delivered by the events of the Cultural Revolution 
itself. “As the bureau leadership have pointed out..., if you want to write about the period after 
the Cultural Revolution but only depict events before the Cultural Revolution, you’ll create 
problems that are difficult to resolve,” cautioned the committee. Depicting the Cultural 
Revolution was therefore a necessity both for historical continuity as well as the immediacy of 
its moral claim. Depicting the Cultural Revolution on screen was therefore non-negotiable: “If 
you don’t write about the Cultural Revolution, then don’t make your film.”67  
Juelie was thus explicitly intended to stage the Cultural Revolution on screen, and many 
moments from the film depicted historical events of the Cultural Revolution in order to make 
that clear. For example, when the student Jiang Danian storms out of the classroom because his 
teacher refuses to hear his comments on the course’s content, Jiang amplifies his critique by 
posting dazibao all over the Songshan campus. By posting dazibao, Jiang not only draws 
parallels between himself and other students made famous for posting dazibao during the 
Cultural Revolution, but also utilizes an expressive medium closely associated with the Cultural 
 
67 Dianying ju [Film Bureau]. 
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Revolution.68 Later, the film reaches its narrative resolution when a letter from Chairman Mao 
arrives at the university. Addressed to the entire university, Mao’s letter overturns the decision of 
the college’s conservative Party Committee to shut down the Songshan campus after an episode 
of student activism, and a portion of a letter Mao sent to the real-life Gongda is read on camera: 
“Comrades, I am in full agreement with what you’ve done.”69 The film drew so closely from 
real-life that community members complained the actor Long Guozheng bore a striking 
similarity to the president of the Chaoyang Agricultural University, with whom Long had spent 
time in preparation for his role.70 
Red Exams  
But the most explicit staging of the Cultural Revolution within Juelie is the film’s central 
conflict over Li Jinfeng’s decision to skip a final exam. By choosing to save the university’s 
crops from infestation instead of sitting for a final exam, Li submits a “blank exam” (baijuan), 
and “grading” that blank exam pits the university’s revolutionaries against its revisionists. 
Instead of commending the students for their dedication to the crops and offering them the 
chance to make-up the exam, Vice Principal Cao conspires to expel Li and fourteen of her 
classmates, mostly of peasant origins including Jiang Danian and Xu Niuzai. When Principal 
Long Guozheng, who was away on a tour of Chinese universities, learns of Vice Principal Cao’s 
 
68 For an account of the close association of dazibao with the Cultural Revolution, see Sheng Hua, “Big Character 
Posters in China: A Historical Survey,” Law Journal Library 4, no. 2 (1990): 234–56. See also For recent work on 
dazibao, see Chapter Four, “A Rhetorical Analysis of Wall Posters,” in Xing Lu, Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication, Studies in Rhetoric/Communication 
(Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 73-96 . 
69 For Mao’s full letter to Gongda, see Zedong Mao, “Letter to Comrades: Communist Labor University of Jiangxi 
Province, July 30, 1961,” Peking Review, August 12, 1977, pp. 3-4. According to John Cleverly, during the 
production of Juelie Zhang Chunqiao and Chi Qin disagreed over the extent to which Mao’s letter should appear in 
the film, and Mao himself was reportedly upset when he saw how little of his letter ended up being quoted in the 
film. See Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers, p. 176. 
70 Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers, p. 180. 
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actions upon his return, he defends the students vigorously in a heated meeting with Cao: “These 
blank exams show us a lot (hen shuoming wenti). They show high political consciousness, and 
deep class feelings.” Although nothing had been written on them, the blank test papers 
“represented the students’ sweat, and the many tons of grain they saved for the peasants. What 
they did was good and right.”71 Long is filmed sympathetically, and the audience is cued to agree 
with him, but ultimately he is unable to convince the obstinate Cao, and the matter escalates.  
When Juelie was released, the drama over Li Jinfeng and her “blank exam” stood out as a 
key highlight of the film. Several newspaper articles were published in praise of Li’s blank 
exam, dissecting the positive lessons behind the scene. An article by Cheng Zhiwei, a high-
ranking cadre in the arts and culture wing of the propaganda bureau, described Li’s blank exam 
as “a powerful critique of the revisionist line in education” that Li “dares to submit to the 
bourgeoisie with the full support of the lower-middle peasants.”72 Another writer, Zuo Hong, 
compared Li Jinfeng’s “blank exam” (baijuan, where bai can mean white but also blank or 
empty) to a “red exam” (hongjuan), arguing that Li Jinfeng’s “white” exam was actually full of 
“red” feeling.73 “Did [Li Jinfeng and the other students] skip their exam? No, they sat for a very 
unusual (ji bu chang) exam. Their exam wasn’t in the classroom, but rather in the vastness of the 
countryside; their ‘examiner’ (kaoguan) was not an expert professor (zhuanjia jiaoshou), but 
rather the lower-middle peasants; what they submitted was not a ‘white exam’ but rather an 
extremely commendable ‘red exam.’”74 
 
71 Chun and Zhou, “Juelie," pp. 72-4.  
72 Zhiwei Cheng, “Zhe Zhang Baijuan Jiao de Hao [You Did Right by Turning in This Blank Exam],” Renmin ribao, 
January 18, 1976. 
73 “White” functions here on multiple levels. Not only is “white” sometimes used to modify nouns and verbs to 
indicate emptiness, or an action undertaken with no results and performed in vain, during the socialist period 
“white” was also frequently used in contrast to red as a label for bourgeois professionals, such as “white experts.” 
74 Hong Zuo, “‘Baijuan’ Yu ‘Hongjuan’ [’White Exams’ and ’Red Exams’],” Guangming ribao, January 7, 1976. 
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In some respects, the film’s decision to describe a group of students skipping a final exam 
as an submitting a “blank exam” is unusual, since no exam was taken and no exam papers 
submitted. But using the term “blank exam” was a deliberate choice meant to draw comparisons 
between the fictional students of Gongda and the real life “hero of the blank exam” (baijuan 
yingxiong), Zhang Tiesheng. Zhang Tiesheng rose to fame in the summer of 1973 for submitting 
an empty answer sheet during county college entrance exams. Six years earlier, he had been sent 
to the Liaoning countryside to work as a member of the Baita commune. When he was given the 
chance to sit for college entrance exams, he found he could not answer the questions, and 
submitted a blank answer sheet with an explanation on the backside. Even though he couldn’t 
pass the test, he asked that he still be considered for admission: “I do eighteen hours of heavy 
labor every day, and there’s no time to study,” he wrote. “To be frank, I'm not terribly inclined to 
accept those bookworms who’ve never worked, and live leisurely, unprincipled lives. They truly 
disgust me, and this test is unwittingly complicit in giving them a monopoly over college.”75 
Zhang’s exam caught the attention of officials in Liaoning, including Mao Yuanxin,76 then party 
secretary of Liaoning Province, and it was published first in the Liaoning ribao, and then in the 
national press, turning Zhang into a celebrity. 
Zhang’s blank exam reflected a moment of deep suspicion toward entrance exams and 
admission criteria to high school and college. With entrance exam requirements increasingly 
seen in the public eye as an impediment to mass education, Zhang’s act of principled dissent 
crystalized the flaws with the system: that a promising and intelligent child could devote his 
youth to the socialist cause in the countryside, and be denied an education because of it. With his 
 
75 Tiesheng Zhang, “Yi Fen Fa Ren Shensheng de Dajuan [A Thought-Provoking Answer Sheet],” Renmin ribao, 
August 10, 1973. 
76 Also the nephew of Mao Zedong.  
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failing exam elevated to a critique of the entire educational system, his rebellion was celebrated 
high and low; even Jiang Qing commended him as “a hero who goes against the tide” (fan 
chaoliu yingxiong). To be certain, Li Jinfeng’s “blank exam” improves upon Zhang Tiesheng’s: 
whereas Zhang hadn’t studied and wasn’t capable of passing his exam, Li makes the active 
choice not to sit for her exam, a narrative gloss that neatly side-steps the question of whether or 
not the rural student is able to do well on an exam.  
But Zhang was not alone in going against the tide. In 1973 and 1974, Zhang was one of at 
least three prominent heroes who “went against the tide.”77 A few months after Zhang’s famous 
exam, the diary of a twelve-year old primary school student living in Beijing, Huang Shuai, was 
published in the Renmin ribao, in which Huang criticized the authoritarian tendencies of her 
teacher (the diary was completed as a homework assignment, and Huang could have expected 
that it would have been read by others.) Then, a year later, when a Nanjing University student 
named Zhong Zhimin wrote a letter requesting an assignment in the countryside, it was also 
published on the front page of the People’s Daily. The son of a Long March veteran, Zhong had 
been admitted to college through his family’s connections; he preferred to withdraw from 
university rather than stay in school through the “back-door” (zou hou men). 
On screen, Li Jinfeng is not the only student who dares to go “against the tide.” In the 
film’s final act, she is joined by Cao Xiaomei, the daughter of the villainous Cao Zhonghe, in 
denouncing the corruption of the educational establishment. Through a narrative with clear 
parallels to the story of Zhong Zhimin, Cao Zhonghe arranges for his daughter to leave Gongda 
and attend a prestigious university outside the area; he justifies using the “back door” by saying 
the country owes him a few favors after years of dedicated service. But at the end of Li’s 
 
77 Each of these heroes spawned numerous copycats, but according to Jonathan Unger the original three were Zhang 
Tiesheng, Huang Shuai, and Zhong Zhimin.  
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struggle session, Xiaomei storms the stage and reveals her father’s actions to the crowd. 
Refusing her father’s offer, Xiaomei declares to the audience that she will stay on at Gongda, 
where she can follow Mao’s exhortation to make revolution in the countryside. As the audience 
cheers her decision, an elderly man and woman in the front row embrace Xiaomei while telling 
her that she has the support of the lower-middle peasants, and Xiaomei completes her 
transformation from the innocent, politically uninitiated daughter of a disloyal intellectual 
removed from the community, into an active, mature, and enlightened political subject fully 
socialized within her community. Cao Xiaomei and Li Jinfeng thus go against the tide from 
opposite directions, and in spite of their diametrically opposed backgrounds, they arrive on the 
same red path.  
The historian Suzanne Pepper understands the publicity around Zhang Tiesheng, Huang 
Shuai, and Zhong Zhimin as components of a larger “going against campaign” which sought to 
“[institutionalize], for post-mobilization use in all sectors, the original 1966 rallying cry: ‘[to 
rebel] is justified.’”78 In the aftermath of the worst violence of the Cultural Revolution, Pepper 
understands the public celebration of student activism as a staging of student agency within 
contained settings, and Jonathan Unger echoes Pepper’s understanding of the campaign as an 
attempt to stir up an activist student body within controllable limits.79 Neither Zhang’s exam, 
Huang’s diary, nor Zhong’s letter had been written for the front page of a national newspaper, 
but these documents were thrust into the spotlight as an indictment of an entire system. The 
authors themselves were positioned as the solution: by expanding the category of the “student” to 
include political actors on the larger social stage, the young students offered a corrective to 
systemic injustice through their dissent. In the winter of 1974, a flurry of big character posters 
 
78 Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China, p. 469. 
79 Unger, Education under Mao, p. 179. 
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posted by students further amplified the anti-equality tendencies of education’s elders, 
particularly teachers.80  
By the mid-1970s, the student had become a dominant figure in the cultural imaginary of 
China. At exactly the same time Juelie was being revised for production, newspapers were filled 
with countless stories of the heroic deeds of students, and the student loomed large as a symbol 
of social inequity and the promise of social resolution. Benefitting from the conviction and moral 
clarity of youth, the student was simultaneously powerless as well as infinite; a perfect mass 
subject. By interweaving cinematic narrative with historical texts, Juelie sought to stage the 
politics and social imaginary of the Cultural Revolution on screen, and at the university.  
Good Students and Poisonous Weeds  
Yet precisely which act constituted the Cultural Revolution on screen? Was it Mao’s 
letter? The posting of dazibao? Li Jinfeng’s blank exam? Cao Xiaomei’s refusal of her father’s 
back-door entrance to college? Intriguingly, although all of these historical incidents occurred 
during the Cultural Revolution, none of them constituted the Cultural Revolution depicted on 
screen. Production documents from other mid-1970s films, such as Chunmiao, reveal that studios 
and high-level cultural cadres placed a high premium on depicting the Cultural Revolution on 
screen, and paid close attention to the manner in which it was depicted.81 For example, Li 
Jinfeng’s decision to save the crops is the central dramatic conflict of Juelie’s second half, but 
that act is ultimately not the event that threatens the future of the school. Rather, after Li Jinfeng 
is expelled, the district work team arrives at the community. The work team is helmed by corrupt 
bureaucrats devoted to the restoration of the pre-Liberation status quo, Secretary Qian and his 
 
80 For a description of the winter 1974 big character posters on school campuses, see Unger, pp. 182-7. 
81 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for more analysis.  
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superior, Deputy Commissioner Chao. At a public meeting, the work team announces a new 
policy, the “Three Selfs and One Guarantee” policy, in which communal property will be 
returned to private hands, private plots increased in size, and greater free market small business 
allowed. On top of that, anyone who produces over a new production quota will be allowed to 
keep the surplus for themselves.  
The title of the policy signals to the viewer that it is regressive, especially in its emphasis 
on multiple guarantees due to the individual self as opposed to the collective good. The policy 
attacks the integrity of the commune as an organizing unit of labor, effectively reversing the 
advancements of the people’s commune. Li Jinfeng is present at the meeting, and she stands up 
immediately to oppose this new policy. Frontally framed by the camera with the seated audience 
behind her, she tells Deputy Chao that his report is a “poisonous weed” that will lead to the 
return of capitalism. She is cheered on by the rest of the meeting’s attendees. Sensing that they 
are losing public support, the work team throws Li into detention, and later issues accusations of 
crimes including “inciting the people to oppose the work team.”  
When Li Jinfeng’s criticism meeting is held, then, it is not in response to her “blank 
exam” but rather her defiance of the work team’s new policies. Her opposition to the work team 
constitutes a serious act of insubordination; after all, the state relied upon work teams being able 
to implement directives. Li Jinfeng’s rebellion is thus a direct challenge to a corrupted body of 
the state, in this case a work team that has been infiltrated and taken over by counter-
revolutionary elements. This, then, is the Cultural Revolution depicted on screen: by daring to 
question the authority of the work team, Li constitutes a serious threat to a corrupted established 
order. She rebels not as a student, but as a member of the community whose socialist 
consciousness alerts her to the threat of these new policies.  
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Yet when Li Jinfeng’s criticism meeting is held, her alleged crimes as a member of the 
commune are transposed onto her role as a student. Filmed inside a cavernous hall with no score 
save for the restive chattering of the crowd, Secretary Qian sits with Deputy Chao on a stage. He 
begins the meeting by telling the crowd that they “are here to criticize a Gongda student, Li 
Jinfeng,” listing the charges against her. She is accused of attempting to “sabotage the new 
policies” of the work team, but “most importantly, she opposes Deputy Chao,” Secretary Qian 
explains. “Opposing him means opposing the district committee, and opposing the committee 
means she is opposing the Party!” The implications are severe. Her insubordination has given the 
conservatives the ammunition they need to agitate for shutting down the school. Li’s future, as 
well as that of the entire college, hangs in the balance.  
But before Li Jinfeng can make a self-criticism, Principal Long comes to her defense. As 
principal of the school, he’s aware that by speaking for Li, he takes symbolic responsibility for 
her as a student and product of the university. “Is Li Jinfeng a good student or a bad student?” 
Long asks the crowd. Medium close-ups of Long speaking are interspersed with reaction shots of 
the audience, who issue largely haptic utterances in support of Long and disapproval of Qian. 
The question of whether or not Li Jinfeng is a good student or not is unrelated to the charges 
against her, and yet the substance of the entire meeting hinges not around whether or not she 
opposed the work team, but rather whether or not she is virtuous as a student of Gongda, a 
referendum not so much on Li’s ability to perform well at school but on whether or not the type 
of student produced by Gongda is a good member of society. To that question, Long Guozheng 
has his answer: “Can you call someone opposed to the capitalist road a bad student?” he asks the 
crowd. “The answer is a resounding no: … she is the best student at Gongda.”  
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Yet Cao Zhonghe retakes the stage to disagree with Long Guozheng, mounting a case 
against Li Jinfeng as promoting her own self-interests in the name of the party. With the school’s 
leadership at an impasse, Principal Long suggests that the lower-middle peasants who are present 
in the audience should have the final say on whether or not Li is guilty of her alleged crimes, 
putting justice in the hands of the masses. Finally, Li ascends the stage to defend herself. As she 
steps into the spotlight, the camera pulls in for a close-up, her eyes again trained in the socialist 
realist gaze. An elderly peasant in the audience encourages her to speak her mind—“Child, speak 
up!” The community’s recommendation got Li into college, and now it delivers to her a voice. 
Filmed close up with high contrast lighting against a dark background, Li delivers her self-
defense with steely resolution, refusing to make any self-criticism and concluding that “Only 
socialism can save China!” As the audience applauds and rushes to embrace Li, the elderly 
peasant turns toward her neighbor and tells him, “She is one of us.”  
But while approval of the masses spares Li Jinfeng, it doesn’t spare the college. After the 
meeting, the fate of Gongda remains uncertain. Principal Long is summoned to meet with 
Secretary Qian and Deputy Secretary Chao, who threaten to remove him from office and strip 
him of his party membership if he persists. Principal Long defies his political superiors, telling 
them that “Your actions only convince me further that Gongda is good.” Deputy Secretary Chao 
explodes in response, “What’s so good about it? People are saying that Gongda is a farm, a labor 
camp—it’s a mess!”  
Enraged by Long Guozheng’s obstinacy, Chao decides to shut down Gongda at once, 
setting up the film’s final scene: at an outdoor rally to unite the Gongda community, Principal 
Long tells the entire mountainside community of Deputy Chao’s decision. Standing on a stage 
encircled by the crowd, Long tells them they must make their final appeal to the highest power as 
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a zoom shot closes in on his torso. But just as he tells them “We must write to Mao!” a sedan 
pulls up through the crowd, its horn cuing the film’s triumphant, violin and brass-dominant 
orchestral theme. Party secretary Tang Ning steps out, and Principal Long immediately rushes to 
him to let him know of Gongda’s peril. “I already know about this,” he replies with severity. 
“The decision is wrong.” With the entire Gongda and mountain community watching, Secretary 
Tang tells the crowd that Mao has written a letter to Gongda praising the school and affirming its 
orientation. He reads from the letter to the crowd, and the crowd erupts in joy, bringing a 
decisive conclusion to the saga of Gongda. 
In thus staging the Cultural Revolution within the university, Juelie shows how the 
actions of a lowly student—a peasant, a woman, and a mother, at that—can challenge and 
ultimately prevail in the face of systemic corruption. In doing so, Juelie depicts a revolution in 
education in all, including the most literal, senses: by the end of the film, the university has been 
removed from the control of the elite few, and delivered into the hands of the lower-middle 
peasants, who choose to enroll as students members of their own community who, upon 
graduation, will remain contributing members of the community. Li Jinfeng’s opposition to the 
orders of Deputy Secretary Chao and the work team is a directly confrontational revolutionary 
act, but her rebellion is justified in its opposition to an organ of the state itself opposed to the 
socialist project. While Juelie creates a narrative depiction of the Cultural Revolution that 
interacts with the historical narrative of the Cultural Revolution, the two differ in important 
ways. Where the historical response of the state was to foreclose the possibility of a student-
articulated politics outside the state (by dispersing students to the countryside), Mao’s letter re-
inscribes Li’s social critique within the auspices of the school and the party by the end of the 
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film. Juelie ultimately narrativizes the return of the student to a historically and politically 
determined subject position that fulfills the nationalist and developmental project of the state.  
But even as Juelie puts forth a revolutionary vision for higher education, the unresolved 
tensions entailed by that project remain apparent. This ambivalence is best embodied in the fate 
of the antagonist educator Cao Zhonghe. Both Cao and Sun Ziqing enter the film as vestiges of 
the pre-revolutionary past, accustomed to running school to educate bourgeois students in 
accordance with bourgeois values and reluctant to change. But by the end of the film, Sun has a 
change of heart prompted by the old village representative, who shows to him the “red exam” 
submitted by the villagers: a signed petition opposing the school’s decision to expel the students 
who missed their exam. After the students are reinstated at the school, a montage showcases the 
successes of proletarian learning: Long, the former cowherd, lectures to a classroom, Li Jinfeng, 
a mother of peasant origins, conducts experiments in a laboratory, and Sun Ziqing teaches cow 
anatomy shoulder to shoulder with his erstwhile student, Xu Niuzai. When a villager tells Sun 
that the cow he has brought in for treatment is the calf of the one he had brought to the classroom 
earlier, Sun smiles and admits “Back then, I had a lot of wrong ideas.” 
Cao Zhonghe, however, remains unrepentant. When he and Deputy Chao are foiled in 
their attempts to impede the success of the labor university are foiled at the end of the film, it is 
unclear what fate will meet them. Will they continue to work in education? Will they be 
imprisoned and tried for crimes against the Party, as Li Jinfeng was? Will they be demoted, 
transferred, or expelled from the party? The film ends without meting out retribution to Cao and 
Chao, thus leaving unanswered the question of how bad elements in the party and university 
should be dealt with. Unlike land reform, which upended an existing system of reproduction 
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without much concern for the fate of the former landlord class, Juelie depicts a university system 
in the midst not so much of violent rupture, but of peaceful transition. 
Yet earlier drafts of Juelie had included a scene of confrontation between Long 
Guozheng and Cao Zhonghe that resulted in his ideological transformation (sixiang zhuanbian.) 
After receiving notes on the script from the film bureau, the reviewers suggested the script 
include more political lines (zhengzhi taici).82 Yu Huiyong, then Minister of Culture, was also 
encouraging film and theater producers to depict duplicitous capitalist roaders in their works. 
The production team gave added lines to Long Guozheng and made room for the additions by 
cutting dialogue from the scene of Cao Zhonghe’s confrontation, ultimately removing the 
transformation entirely. Cao’s unresolved fate speaks to deep ambivalence over the question of 
whether, and how, the existing university could be reformed. Even as Juelie asserts a bold new 
vision for the transformation of the nation’s educational agenda, Cao’s unresolved fate manifests 
the unsettled tensions of that project. Ironically, when the film was the subject of “conspiracy 
film” attacks several years later, Juelie’s critics pointed to the depiction of Cao Zhonghe as proof 
of its confused agenda.83 
Propaganda as Contextualization  
The question of whether or not Juelie’s message of radical education reform was credible 
or not lies at the heart of its reception, as well as the extent to which Jiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao, and other allied officials were involved in its reception. The reception of the film can 
be divided into two periods: during the first period, immediately following the film’s release in 
the early months of 1976, reviews and commentary on Juelie were overwhelmingly positive, 
 
82 Di, “Juelie Jishi Yu Fenxi [Breaking with Old Ideas: A Chronicle and Analysis]," p. 78.” 
83 Fengsong Xie, “Yingpian Juelie Shi Shenme Huose? [What Kind of Trash Is the Film Juelie?],” Renmin ribao, 
January 10, 1979. 
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praising its depiction of the on-going struggle for proletarian transformation of the university. In 
this second period, which lasted from late 1978 to the first half of 1979, a campaign to condemn 
the art and culture most closely associated with the Cultural Revolution implicated the film and 
its director. Discussions of the film in print media were blisteringly negative, condemning it as 
preposterous “trash” that dared to claim illiterate peasants and hoodlums made for the nation’s 
best and brightest. 
Making sense of the disparity between these two responses requires bringing greater 
depth and nuance to our understanding of the cultural institutions of the socialist period, the 
events that shaped the direction of their history, as well as the complexity and intermediality of 
the processes by which the production of culture signified meaning. In 1976, when a film such as 
Juelie was first shown, the release of a major studio film signified an object produced through 
complex institutional processes with creative agency and responsibility diffused across multiple 
departments, organizations, and individuals. The film’s message was not the message of a single 
individual—not of the director as auteur, and not of a single diabolical propagandist—but a 
message that spoke across multiple registers and for multiple social processes. Juelie needed to 
speak, for example, not only for the vision of the cast and crew, but also for a university’s 
history, for the validity and success of an ambitious new set of educational policies, as well as 
for the inevitability of a broader social movement.84 
If a single film, in 1976, was designed to speak across multiple registers, it was also 
intended to be understood not as an isolated artifact (art for art’s sake), but as an exemplar of a 
new mass culture that was fully participant in contemporary grassroots mobilization campaigns. 
 
84 This coupled with the fact that so many individuals and organizations were involved in crafting the narrative, from 
Li Wenhua as the director, the studio headed by Wang Yang, the film bureau, the Ministry of Culture headed by Yu 
Huiyong, to even Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and the other members of the Culture Group, who created the 
directive to depict the Cultural Revolution on film.  
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Indeed, as Timothy Cheek points out, propaganda in Maoist China was “not only a total media 
system; it was a project” that formed a “key link in the transformational process [of] empowering 
the masses and [reconnecting the] educated elite with China’s heart and soul, its people.”85 As a 
project, film did not stand on its own, and was not meant to be interpreted in isolation from other 
cultural products. Juelie was contextualized in a variety of ways, as Laurence Coderre 
demonstrates in her reading of the film Fanji [Counterattack]. Much of that contextualization 
was already implicit simply in the audience’s lived historical experience of the period. Audiences 
in the mid-1970s were “very familiar with revolutionary nomenclature—for instance, that 
capitalist roaders are bad—and with Cultural Revolution narrative tropes simply by virtue of 
having lived during this period, … the slogans and beliefs found in [the film]… would hardly 
have seemed controversial.”86 Although Coderre writes specifically of Fanji, her comments are 
equally true of Juelie, especially given the procedural overlap between the two films.87 
Instead, the interpretive project at hand was to highlight the right understanding of the 
film within the given historical framework, a project that was accomplished, in part, through the 
publication of a host of different types of writing on the film. A nationally-prominent film from a 
major production studio such as Juelie could expect to be featured in editorials and commentary 
published in official newspapers and magazines, including the newspapers Renmin ribao 
[People’s Daily] and Guangming ribao [Guangming Daily], and the film magazine Renmin 
dianying [People’s Cinema].88 Tina Mai Chen understands these writings as attempts to define 
 
85 Timothy Cheek, Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia, Studies on 
Contemporary China (Oxford [England] : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 14-5. 
86 Laurence Coderre, “Counterattack: (Re)Contextualizing Propaganda,” Journal of Chinese Cinemas 4, no. 3 
(January 2010): 211–27, https://doi.org/10.1386/jcc.4.3.211_1. 
87 The success of Juelie’s release was supposedly responsible for the commissioning of Fanji, although the extent to 
which that is true would the object of discussion in late 1978 and early 1979. Both Juelie and Fanji were directed by 
Li Wenhua, and produced by the Beijing Film Factory.  
88 Normal publishing activities were severely disrupted from 1966 to 1969. In 1970, some publications resumed 
printing, but few publications remained in print throughout the entirety of the years 1966 to 1976, and from 1978 on, 
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the permissible boundaries of discourse around a film and its content, a construction of a film’s 
ideal audience through the modeling of appropriate responses.89 Coderre calls this the 
“contextualization” of a filmic text, and considers it to be an essential part of a larger propaganda 
narrative process.90 In this sense, the publication of articles reviewing and commenting on Juelie 
in national newspapers and film publications were an essential component of the film’s overall 
messaging. 
Juelie’s Reception in 1976  
Reviews and commentary on Juelie published in 1976 were fully participant in the film’s 
agenda. As an officially styled medium, publications about Juelie nearly universally begin with 
opening paragraphs affirming the necessity of the “proletarian education revolution” (wuchan 
jieji geming) and the film’s depiction of it, suggesting the contours of a genre or form of writing 
to which article authors and publication editors adhered. Coverage of Juelie was also coordinated 
within and across national newspapers. On January 7, the Guangming ribao, a national 
newspaper with a reputation for catering more to intellectual readership, put Juelie on the front 
page above the fold with a full page of articles following inside.91 Renmin ribao followed on 
January 18 with a package of articles on the first three pages of the paper celebrating new 
directions in the nation’s educational policies, with the third page of the paper devoted 
exclusively to articles on Juelie.92 On January 23, Guangming ribao published another full page 
 
some publications changed their name while many others were launched (and in some cases, re-launched.) For a 
history of the publishing industry during the Cultural Revolution, see Qidong Yun, China’s Publishing Industry: 
From Mao to the Market (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2019). 
89 Tina Mai Chen, “Propagating the Propaganda Film: The Meaning of Film in Chinese Communist Party Writings, 
1949-1965,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 15, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 154–93. 
90 Coderre, “Counterattack,” pp. 219-21. Indeed, Coderre’s discussion of Fanji illustrates exactly what happens 
when this process of contextualization if interrupted and completed by hostile actors. 
91 See Guangming ribao, Jan. 7, 1976.  
92 The front page reports on new guidance from Mao on university policy, while the second page contains five 
articles on different aspects of rural education. See Renmin ribao, Jan. 18, 1976.  
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of Juelie coverage inside the front page,93 and the January edition of Renmin dianying contained 
commentary on the film, the score to its theme song, color stills, and the full script.94 
Because of archival limitations, materials such as internal film studio and bureau 
production materials or unedited screening records and viewer reports are extremely limited or 
simply unavailable.95 Access to such materials would certainly flesh out a more detailed picture 
of how Juelie was made and seen, but even in the absence of these materials, we can note that 
articles about Juelie were written by a wide variety of individuals. In addition to pieces published 
by the director, the screenwriters, and collectively authored by the entire Juelie production unit, 
reviews and commentaries on the film included pieces written by: 
1) media workers and propagandists working for the cultural division of the Ministry of Propaganda, the 
Tsinghua Propaganda Team, and the Chaoyang Agricultural Academy Propaganda Team;  
2) film critics and film industry professionals; 
3) workers from factories in Tangshan and Shanghai;  
4) students and teachers from Peking University and Tsinghua University, including a student from 
Tsinghua’s Department of Precision Instruments, students at Peking University's Chinese department, 
a teacher from Tsinghua's School of Civil Engineering, and another from Tsinghua's Department of 
Machinery;  
5) teachers, students, staff, and administrators at Gongda, including the Gongda party secretary, an 
instructor in the department of agriculture, a student of animal husbandry, the lower-middle peasants 
class representative, and a recent graduate. 
 
Within this wide group of different authors, commentary varied in its emphasis. Some articles 
explained through a prism why the film was good, such as Cheng Zhiwei’s “Zhe zhang baijuan 
jiao de hao” [It was right to turn in this blank exam], which praised the character Li Jinfeng for 
skipping an exam to save the commune’s imperiled crops, or Chen Guanbai’s “Cong zhaosheng 
zhan de yichang douzheng shuoqi” [On the scene of class struggle at the recruitment center], 
which explored how Juelie disrupted the dynamics of class reproduction in higher education 
 
93 See Guangming ribao, Jan. 23, 1976.  
94 See Renming dianying 1 (1976): pp. 41-76. The third issue put Juelie on its cover and included more commentary. 
95 For an exploration of sources for gauging audience during the Maoist period, see Paul Clark, “Closely Watched 
Viewers: A Taxonomy of Chinese Film Audiences from 1949 to the Cultural Revolution Seen from Hunan,” 
Journal of Chinese Cinemas 5, no. 1 (January 2011): 73–89, https://doi.org/10.1386/jcc.5.1.73_1. 
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through new student recruitment policies.96 Other articles focused on the emotional and 
intellectual process through which the authors arrived at their support for the project, such as 
“Tong xiuzheng zhuyi luxian duizhe gan: pai caise gushipian Juelie de yixie tihui” [Going 
against the revisionist line: Some experiences from filming the color feature film Juelie] 
collectively authored by Juelie’s production unit: the group describes their first impression of the 
project through the script, which they liked without fully understanding why it was good. After 
conducting extensive research on education and film, as well as fieldwork at Gongda and the 
Chaoyang Agricultural School, the cast and crew wrote that they came to truly understand and 
support the film’s mission.  
Although different authors agree that the film is good, they disagree over details from it: 
the Juelie production team notes, for example, that some members of the team were 
uncomfortable with the film’s assertion that a worker’s rough calluses are qualification enough 
to enter university, while others disagree over the narrative arcs given to Cao Zhonghe and Sun 
Ziqing, the antagonists of the film.  
In March 1976, media commentary on Juelie dropped off. Although it was a major 
release with a timely subject matter speaking to broad and important social concerns, other film 
releases crowded the calendar, and the press moved on to promoting other films, such as 
Chunmiao [Spring shoots], Shanshan de hongxing [Sparkling red star], and Huanteng de 
Xiaoliang He [The jubiliant Xiaoliang River], all also released in 1976. The model of film 
production operating in 1976—specific in style and process to the ideals and institutions of the 
late Cultural Revolution—was just kicking into higher gear. Compared to the early years of the 
Cultural Revolution, when no new films were made from 1967 to 1969, by 1974 film production 
 
96 Cheng, “Zhe Zhang Baijuan Jiao de Hao [You Did Right by Turning in This Blank Exam].”  
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had worked back up to its pre-Cultural Revolution levels: seventeen new films came out in 1974, 
twenty-five in 1975, and in 1976 thirty-seven new films were released.97 
Conspiracy Film Criticism: ‘Just What Kind of Trash Is Juelie?’  
National film production might have continued apace into the remainder of the late 1970s 
were it not for Mao’s death on September 9, 1976. Mao’s death—or the “last revolutionary 
disruption,” as Zhuoyi Wang refers to it—was a profound national trauma felt across the 
nation.98 In the film industry, it threw the day to day business of film production into disarray as 
the fates of high-level officials aligned with Mao and the cultural officials associated with them 
lay in limbo. Through September and into October, films in development and in production were 
suspended. Some resumed, while others were frozen or canceled. Shengli de jieri (Grand 
Festival), for example, had begun production at the Shanghai Film Studio in mid-August, but 
when the Gang of Four was arrested in early October, production came to a halt.99 From 1976 to 
1977, yearly film output was halved from thirty-seven to nineteen,100 with officials, producers, 
and directors unsure of which narratives would receive approval and support.101 
 
97 See the Appendix to Paul Clark, Chinese Cinema: Culture and Politics since 1949, Cambridge Studies in Film 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 185-6. These numbers do not include filmed 
musicals. The number of feature films produced increased dramatically beginning in 1974. Film historian Zhai 
Jiannong attributes this to a Jiang Qing and Gang of Four led push to increase the number of films representing the 
struggle against capitalist roaders, while Li Wenhua recalls in an oral hsitory of the film that Zhou Enlai had ordered 
the production of an increased number of feature films (gushi pian).  Jiannong Zhai, Hong se wang shi: 1966-1976 
nian de zhong guo dian ying, Di 1 ban (Bei jing: Tai hai chu ban she, 2001), p. 146. 
98 Zhuoyi Wang, Revolutionary Cycles in Chinese Cinema, 1951-1979, First edition (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), p. 177. 
99 Jian Guo, Yongyi Song, and Yuan Zhou, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Historical 
Dictionaries of Ancient Civilizations and Historical Eras, no. 17 (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2006), p. 126. 
100 Clark, Chinese Cinema, p. 185. 
101 For others, the fall of the Gang of Four was a blessing. The director Xie Tieli was to be the subject of a criticism 
meeting scheduled for the week of October 11, but the Gang’s arrest on October 6 almost certainly saved him from 
being sent to labor camp. The director Li Wenhua was not so lucky, and was placed under house arrest when his 
films fell under suspicion. The two had both played leading creative roles in the production of many films distinct to 
the Cultural Revolution, including their work together on Zao chun er yue [Early Spring], with Xie as director and 
Li as cinematographer. See Zhuoyi Wang for more discussion of Xie Tieli, Revolutionary Cycles in Chinese 
Cinema, 1951-1979, p. 178. 
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A little less than a year after Mao’s death, his successor, Hua Guofeng, formally declared 
the end of the Cultural Revolution at the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in a speech that thoroughly excoriated the Gang of Four.102 The Gang was accused of 
conspiring to usurp control of the Party and state, nefarious designs that extended to the realm of 
culture. Works of art overseen by the conspiracists was labeled “conspiracy art (yinmou wenyi),” 
defined as “[art] that purported to depict ‘capitalist roaders,’ but [in reality] wantonly attacked 
and vilified party leaders.”103 In the following months, a campaign to criticize the Gang of Four’s 
influence in the cultural realm was already undertaken, and newspapers and industry publications 
were filled with articles decrying the involvement of the Gang of Four in attempts to purge 
institutions of their influence. The term “conspiracy art,” or art that enforced a “dictatorship of 
the black cultural line (wenyi heixian zhuanzheng)” was quickly followed by the term 
“conspiracy film (yinmou dianying),” films which acted in service of the same agenda.104 
Five films were officially labeled conspiracy films: Chunmiao [Spring Shoots], Huanteng 
de Xiaoliang He [The jubilant Xiaoliang River], Fanji [Counterattack], Shengda de jieri [Grand 
Festival], and Qian qiu ye [The Thousand Autumns Enterprise]. Two additional films were also 
criticized as conspiracy films, although they existed only as screenplays and had not yet been 
committed to film: Jinzhong chang ming [The Golden Bell Rings Forever] and Zhan ling song 
[Eulogy for the Occupation].105 In addition, the Ministry of Culture undertook a “re-examination 
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(fushen)” of the over six-hundred and five feature films produced since 1949, approving the re-
release of five-hundred and eighty-two of them.106 
Officially, Juelie was not designated a conspiracy film, but nevertheless it fell under 
suspicion for its close association with the personnel, ideals, and production processes of the 
period. Li Wenhua had directed both Juelie and Fanji, the latter of which had been designated a 
conspiracy film, and because it had been greenlit off the positive momentum generated by Juelie, 
some considered it to be a sequel of sorts to Juelie.107 Soon after the Gang of Four was arrested, 
the Jiangxi ribao published an editorial in which Juelie was accused of being “reactionary,” and 
shortly thereafter the Beijing Film Studio suspended Li Wenhua from his official responsibilities 
and placed him under inspection. Both Juelie and Fanji were blacklisted by the Ministry of Film, 
and the Beijing Film Studio formed a special group to investigate Li. 
In the following months, the campaign to criticize conspiracy art and conspiracy film 
extended to Juelie, and the movie was lambasted in the press over the course of late 1978 and 
early 1979. Criticism of Juelie highlighted how controversial education policy during the 
Cultural Revolution was. A letter to the Renmin ribao by a college-educated media worker 
argued that in fact, Juelie repudiated the progress made in the field of education during the 
Seventeen Years period (1949-1966). Using the growth of the field of geology as example, the 
letter’s author, Fang Yanming, defended the value of gradual institutional growth, describing 
how the study of geology was founded within Chinese universities in 1952 and by building on 
 
106 The Ministry of Culture conducted the review from November 1977 to February 1979, a furious rate of review 
that equates to about thirty-eight films reviewed a month. See Zhuoyi Wang, Revolutionary Cycles in Chinese 
Cinema, 1951-1979, p. 178. 
107 Other than the fact that both films were directed by Li Wenhua at the Beijing Film Factory, there is little in the 
plots of the two films to suggest that they are sister films: Juelie concerns the founding of Gongda in 1958, while 
Fanji depicts the Anting Incident in Shanghai of November 1966. It is unclear to me if the term “sister film” is a 
retroactive label used to justify the attacks on Juelie, or if Fanji was considered a sister film to Juelie at the time it 
was conceived.  
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yearly growth, went on to become a major contributor to the nation’s wealth and development, 
with post-49 educated geologists in every province by 1979. According to Fang, the Cultural 
Revolution disrupted the “normal” operation of schools, 108 most of all in the process of college 
admissions, and it defied logic that a worker’s callouses could prove that they deserved an 
education. “Are callouses greater than the Four Modernizations? Can callouses get a satellite to 
the sky? A country overrun with illiterates cannot build socialism,” concludes Fang.109 
Perhaps the most severe commentary on Juelie was written by Xie Fengsong, a writer 
and film industry professional who had moved up the ranks of a film production company in 
Guangzhou to Beijing.110 In an article titled “Yingpian Juelie shi shenme huose? [Just what kind 
of trash is the film Juelie?],” Xie took the movie to task for its subversion of Mao’s ideals, 
especially in the field of education. The film betrayed a consistent lack of respect for things that 
were “common knowledge (changshi),” he charged, such as the necessity of universal admission 
standards, and had an anti-intellectual character. The film’s protagonists treated knowledge as a 
sin, he argued, believing that “the more knowledge you have, the more reactionary you are.”111 
Long Guozheng was a farce of a principal, an “extreme leftist” (jizuo) who acted on his own to 
enroll unqualified peasant and student workers in total disregard of the law.112 Xie’s disregard 
 
108 Fang does not distinguish between historical causes or periods of the Cultural Revolution in his analysis; the 
entire decade is lumped into one. It’s not clear, for example, if the disruption of “normal” schooling occurred from 
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for uneducated peasants and laborers is palpable in his description of the student Zhang Tiesheng 
as no more than an illiterate hoodlum (wenmang jia liumang). Far from being a “battle song of 
the proletarian education revolution,” Xie concludes that Juelie was in fact its precise opposite, 
“revisionist trash.”113 
Criticism of Juelie was not long-lasting, however, and by mid-1979, discussion of the 
film again drops off in press. Although the Cultural Revolution was still being litigated, most 
visibly through the public broadcast of the trial of the ten officials accused of being its 
ringleaders,114 exciting new developments in the film industry demanded attention as the range 
of permissible narratives expanded and new talents emerged. Li Wenhua remained under house 
arrest (ruanjin) for nearly two and a half years (from late 1976 to early 1979), and he was 
released with his name cleared only after writing a direct petition to Hu Yaobang, a high-level 
official who himself had recently been rehabilitated and was involved in re-assessing judgements 
from Cultural Revolution cases. Upon release, Li Wenhua returned to filmmaking by directing 
Lei hen [Tear stains],115 a film that depicted the traumas of the Cultural Revolution and 
forcefully indicated Li’s distance from its cultural politics.116 
 
years later, Xie’s critique emphasizes that legitimacy comes not through broad social support, but through actions 
performed within the purview of the law.  
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The Making of a Cinematic Auteur: The Gang of Four 
The 1976 praise for Juelie and its subsequent condemnation in 1978 and 1979 should not 
be understood separately, but rather as two parts of the same process of contextualization of 
meaning. Indeed, Juelie is best understood as the same filmic work subjected to two different 
processes of propagandistic contextualization, and the same could be said of any of the officially 
labeled conspiracy films, including Fanji.117 The criticisms of the late 1970s stand in contrast to 
the acclamations of 1976, yet it is dangerous to then conclude that one response has a greater 
claim to truth than the other, or that its conclusions were generated through a more neutral, 
impartial, and disinterested process of criticism. As Zhuoyi Wang points out, attacks on Juelie 
and conspiracy films were short-lived, and “ended with the Maoist revolution.”118 Yet that 
revolution’s methods and legacies extend well beyond the date of Mao’s death.  
It can be difficult to reconcile the fact that a propaganda process of contextualization 
belonging to a revolutionary period was commandeered to support decidedly un-revolutionary 
principles. Articles written in support of Juelie and articles written against it both share in the 
conviction that Mao’s “education thought” (jiaoyu sixiang) is fundamentally good and necessary, 
and yet the critiques of the late 1970s reverse much of the substance of what that was. The 
unification of production and education, for example, is now suspect, and instead, higher levels 
of education and increasing specialization are idealized and pursued. Knowledge is decoupled 
from both productive relations and from overt class politics, with Juelie’s critics defending the 
value of “knowledge for knowledge’s sake.” The education (and by extension, the educated 
class) are rehabilitated, while the lower classes (the uneducated) are denigrated as ignorant 
illiterates and criminalized as thuggish hoodlums (liumang, diduan renkou, suzhi di de ren), and 
 
117 Coderre, “Counterattack,” p. 225-6. 
118 Wang, Revolutionary Cycles in Chinese Cinema, 1951-1979, p. 178. 
 199 
these insights are depoliticized by being presented as “common knowledge.” In perhaps the 
biggest break with Maoist thought, the processes of gradual change are preferable to continuous 
revolution waged within the university. 
Today, the conclusions of the Dengist campaign to criticize leftist film made under the 
patronage of Maoist political leadership remain largely unchallenged in the scholarship. 
Although these criticisms carried powerful political agendas with them, they are now understood 
divorced from those agendas as non-political universal truths. Indeed, the conclusions of the 
campaign to criticize conspiracy films form much of the basis upon which contemporary 
critiques of revolutionary films are built. Yingjing Zhang’s reading of Juelie, for example, as a 
document of high-level “political intrigue” produced by a cast and crew “brainwashed by years 
of ultra-leftist ideology” does not extend to the conspiracy campaign against the film, and 
indeed, Zhang reproduces the language of the 1978/9 attacks through his adoption of terms like 
“ultra-leftist.”119 
The theory of film authorship called “auteurism” sees the films of certain directors 
elevated to a “pantheon” of great art through the director’s ability to maintain artistic control of 
all elements of the filmmaking process, executing a single vision of the film as art without 
commercial or studio intervention.120 Show runners, producers, and directors play into auteur 
narratives by encouraging audiences to see themselves as the visceral embodiment of the work of 
the hundreds or even thousands of professionals in the crew and studio.121 By contrast, film 
production in the P.R.C. during the late 1960s and the 1970s decidedly did not operate according 
to an individual auteur model of creative agency and of authorship; in name, and in process, 
 
119 Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema, 1st ed, National Cinemas (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.223. 
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films were created through wide, diffuse “actor-networks” involving input across multiple 
institutions, and even multiple levels within the same institutions. Films were explicitly made to 
both encourage and reflect grassroots support.  
It is ironic, then, that the campaign to criticize the art and culture made with the support 
of the Gang of Four operated by the same logic: by arguing that the Gang of Four was the 
primary creative author behind conspiracy culture (yinmou wenyi), denunciations of the Gang 
and its influence elevated the Gang to the role of individual auteur. “In a systematic, organized, 
and planned manner, the Gang of Four held managerial authority over an entire field of 
conspiracy art and culture in a politically ambitious but futile and mistaken attempt to usurp 
control of the Party,” write film industry veterans Zhang Junxiang and Ding Jiao in the pages of 
Renmin dianying.122 
Articles denouncing the Gang’s influence repeatedly stressed the Gang’s artistic control 
over all elements of the filmmaking process, authoring works that executed a single vision that 
belonged to the Gang. By continuously stressing the Gang’s artistic control over culture, the 
Gang emerges as the single physical embodiment of the hundreds of individuals whose work 
created the films of the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, labeling a selection of works “conspiracy 
films” created an official pantheon of Gang films that are made with a distinctive Gang style 
(referred to as “bangqi”) identifiable across a wide body of feature films produced at different 
times and at different film studios.  
Mao’s death certainly was a watershed event, and yet even cataclysmic, epochal change 
is a process that unfolds over time. In the years following, cultural institutions still operated 
according to the revolutionary principles and procedural precedents established in the previous 
 
122 Zhang Junxiang and Ding Jiao, “Qingsuan ‘sirenbang’ Gao Yinmou Dianying de Zhengzhi Yinmou,” Renmin 
Dianying 8 (1978): 1–5. 
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decades. Making sense of the disparity between the Maoist and post-Maoist responses to Juelie 
requires the re-politicization of the conclusions of the late 1970s. Politics did not leave us in the 
late 1970s, but the literature written since then has become increasingly successful at denying its 
presence. In order to re-evaluate and bring new insight to our understanding of this film, this 
period, and its ideals, we must bring critical distance to bear not only upon the revolutionary 
discourses but also the reformist discourses beginning in the late 1970s. 
Conclusion: The Nostalgic Return to the Horse’s Tail 
Over forty years have passed since the release of Juelie, and although the culture and the 
film system that produced the original movie have long been transformed beyond recognition, 
Juelie is still remembered for its horse’s tail sequence. The Jiangxi Communist Labor University 
still exists, albeit renamed and restructured as the Jiangxi Agricultural University.123 Its 
graduates are often teased, asked if their teachers still lecture on the functions of the horse’s 
tail.124 The scene is so well known that in 1995, a commercial for a health drink featured a 
research scientist, who told viewers that he had given up lecturing on the uses of the horse’s tail 
to develop a scientifically nutritious beverage.125 
Yet the film’s legacy remains unresolved, with contemporary audiences drawn to but 
often baffled by the epistemological universe in which Juelie was located. On the culture review 
website Douban, Juelie has over nine hundred reviews, many of which consist of just the 
catchphrase “the functions of the horse’s tail.” Although the Juelie was never officially 
blacklisted as a Gang of Four produced conspiracy film, discussion of the film cannot be 
undertaken without reference to the Maoist political leaders of the period, particularly Jiang 
 
123 The school was renamed in Nov. 1980. See http://www.jxau.edu.cn/4/list.htm, accessed Feb. 11, 2020.  
124 Cleverley, In the Lap of Tigers, p. 177. 
125 Cleverley, p. 177. 
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Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Chi Qun, and the leftist political and cultural leaders under whose 
patronage the film was produced. Douban user xiaomaiwang writes, “So ‘the functions of a 
horse’s tail’ comes from this—is this political satire? Is this the suicide of culture (wenhua de 
zisha)?”126 The film’s association with these political leaders, and the outsized role they are 
presumed to have played in ushering the project to completion, play a determining role in its 
contemporary reputation for being a work of arch propaganda, irrevocably wedded to the politics 
of the period.  
Juelie was an ambitious cinematic attempt to assert that the culture of education could be 
remade through its integration with labor. By highlighting Gongda, one of only a handful of 
colleges across the nation to recruit students from rural backgrounds and institute curriculum of 
education through labor (and vice versa), Juelie was part of a project to disrupt the cycles of 
social reproduction that had previously divided wealthy urban elites from the poor rural masses, 
and to create new cycles of social reproduction that would ensure the success and vitality of the 
proletariat. In order to radically re-conceptualize the object of education, Juelie sought to re-
write its student subject, embracing gender and class as key sites through which the subjectivity 
of the student could be re-defined.  
 Juelie imagined a national educational culture that would fully socialize the student as 
the nation’s future workers. The re-positioning and re-imagining of the student were necessary 
because the student on the eve of the Cultural Revolution was in crisis. After seventeen years of 
the “new society” (xin shehui), new inequalities specific to the P.R.C. had emerged and the 
student now stood “at the intersection… [of] unresolved tension between the state project of 
 
126 “Juelie (1975),” accessed February 25, 2020, https://movie.douban.com/subject/1306207/. 
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disciplined reproduction… and the promise of political and intellectual independence.”127 By 
making visible the unresolved tensions and contradictions of the socialist sociological order, 
Juelie articulated a larger intellectual project through which the integration of education and 
production would resolve the inequities that had become manifest in the socialist experience. 
But Juelie’s vision of the utopic proletarian university was ultimately short-lived, its 
ideological agenda orphaned and its creators attacked not long after its release. The education 
officials who directed the country’s education system in the wake of Mao’s death “were intent on 
restoring as perfectly as possible the status quo… before the Cultural Revolution.”128 This 
entailed breaking with the egalitarian goals of the Maoist university system. Entrance exams 
were reintroduced in December 1977, and university admissions again relied more heavily on 
selection exams, and not political recommendations, as Juelie had illustrated so memorably in its 
recruitment scene. Students were once again to be taught “according to ability,” and greater 
emphasis was placed on postgraduate programs. New school programs were “more elitist and 
more ‘talent’ oriented than any that existed in the ‘50s and ‘60s,” according to Jonathan Unger, 
and students were no longer required to perform productive labor on campus factories, farms, or 
construction sites as part of the curriculum.129 In the Central Committee’s 1981 resolution on 
party history officially repudiating the experience of the Cultural Revolution, resolution declared 
that “We must firmly eradicate such gross fallacies as the denigration of education, science and 
culture, and discrimination against intellectuals.”130 This affirmation of mental labor’s 
 
127 Fabio Lanza, Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing, Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, 
Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 208. 
128 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, p. 229. 
129 Unger, Education under Mao, p. 207. 
130 See “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China,” Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, housed online at 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm. 
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superiority to manual labor was understood as a return to the “natural” order of things, and in 
1979, Jiang Nanxiang, then the minister of education, delivered a speech in which he stated that 
“the outstanding problem today, is that intellectuals make less money than a worker of the same 
age.”131 Not long after, Jiang’s education system corrected the error. Since then, there has been 
little confusion over the importance of mental over manual labor in China.  
 
 
131 Jiang Nanxiang cited in Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, p. 231.  
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Chapter 5 | The Laboring of the Home: Women Work and Reproduction in the 
Countryside 
 
“Realize the slogan of women’s liberation.”  
– Resolution on the Women’s Movement, 1928 
 
Introduction: It’s Nothing, Just Some Housework 
In January 1980, the writer Ru Zhijuan penned a short story set during the Cultural 
Revolution. Jinfeng, the protagonist of the story, describes herself as “a thoroughly normal 
(putong) member of the masses.”1 A typist in regular times, she has escaped exceptional 
attention during the Cultural Revolution, yet her family has still been fundamentally altered by 
the demands of the era. An unnamed husband has gone off to play his part in the revolution, 
while her teenaged daughter, Xian Xian, left just that morning for Heilongjiang with other sent-
down youth. Her youngest daughter, eight-year-old Tao Tao, will be home alone tomorrow when 
Jinfeng must return to May Seventh Cadre Camp.  
The story is titled “Housework [Jiawu shi],” and it follows Jinfeng over the course of one 
day, from the time she sees off her first daughter to the time she needs to leave her second 
daughter the following morning. Before she leaves, Jinfeng needs to do the laundry, wash the 
dishes, shop for groceries, and cook four or five days worth of food for Tao Tao. She spends the 
majority of her time doing chores, incapacitated by the thought of doing them, or failing to do 
 
1 Ru Zhijuan, “Jiawu shi [Housework],” Caoyuan shang de xiao lu [The path in the prairie] (Tianjin: Baihe wenyi 
chubanshe, 1982), p. 147. Translation my own.  
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them: nobody makes it to the store to buy soy sauce before it closes, and a pan full of yellow 
croaker, meant feed Tao Tao through the next week, burns while Jinfeng looks after her.  
The story juxtaposes the call of revolutionary times with the banality of everyday 
housework, as the narrator strives and fails to look after her family during extraordinary times. 
Although Jinfeng is devastated to be separated from her youngest child, she makes no explicit 
criticism of her circumstances. “I think revolution is required of me, too,” she states in the 
beginning of the story. But when Tao Tao compares her mother to the bough of a majestic tree 
and herself as a branch growing off of it, Jinfeng struggles with knowing how to represent to her 
daughter their place in society. She finally settles upon a much more modest metaphor, hoping 
that Tao Tao will understand the humility and insignificance of their lives in the grand scheme of 
things: “I’m a little branch, and you’re a little knot on that branch.” 
Ru’s short story makes clear that ultimately, it is a mother’s housework that is the 
essential work of keeping families together, and that there is a desperate excruciation in a mother 
being denied the ability to care for her family. In Jinfeng’s absence, there is no one to step in: 
Tao Tao’s father is away, present only in the monthly remittances he makes to their home; Xian 
Xian has been rusticated, and the next door neighbor, known as Lion Cub’s grandma, will share 
the dinner she prepares for her grandchild with Tao Tao, but Tao Tao must wake up in an empty 
house, prepare breakfast, go to school, and look after herself all on her own. There is no greater 
social unit for Jinfeng’s family to call upon; Jinfeng’s family can only rely upon itself, and it has 
been split asunder by the demands of the state’s various revolutionary projects. “Housework” 
exemplifies the sacrifice of the essential ordinary for the extraordinary demands of the times, as 
well as the reality of the expectation that women must do the work of caring for families: Jinfeng 
teaches Tao Tao how to cook and clean for herself, initiating her daughter in the responsibilities 
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of reproductive labor, and thus reproducing herself in her daughter. At the story’s end, when a 
cadre school leader asks Jinfeng what’s bothering her on the train back to camp, Jinfeng 
responds, “It’s nothing, just some housework (mei shenme, buguo shi xie jiawu shi),” a woman’s 
resigned acceptance of her responsibility in upholding the status quo, as well as an indictment of 
the times.  
But two decades earlier, Ru Zhijuan had written very differently about women, families, 
and housework. The 1959 short story “The Warmth of Spring [Chun nuan shijie]” again features 
a young mother, Qinglan, as its protagonist. Like Jinfeng, Qinglan is married with two children, 
but her husband, Mingfa, hasn’t been sent away on any public infrastructure projects—he works 
as a machinist at the factory. “The Warmth of Spring” again follows a housewife as she goes 
about a day’s chores: Qinglan shops for groceries, prepares dinner, and serves it to her family, 
but all while feeling that something is missing, particularly between herself and Mingfa, who 
politely eats the food he’s served but doesn’t particularly notice or care what she makes for 
dinner. After dinner, Qinglan is so overcome with feelings of neglect that she breaks down in 
tears, and Ru Zhijuan explains to the reader that Qinglan’s feelings are due to the fact that she 
does not “[realize] that her husband’s world was larger than hers, his interests wider and his aim 
in life higher.”2 Her world is contained within his.  
Later that evening, Qinglan learns at a meeting of the neighborhood women’s committee 
that the factory has received an urgent order to manufacture ten thousand transmitters within 
seven days. Qinglan, who normally takes only a dispassionate interest in the affairs of the greater 
community, becomes obsessed with the idea of creating a machine that will automate production 
 
2 Ju Chih-chuan, “The Warmth of Spring,” trans. Gladys Yang, Chinese Literature 7 (1961): pp. 67-81. Originally 
published as Ru Zhijuan, “Chuan nuan shijie,” Renmin wenxue 7 (1959): pp. 64-71. The short story was only Ru 
Zhijuan’s fourth published work.  
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of transmitters, thus allowing the factory to fulfill the order in time. Qinglan first seeks out Sister 
Chu, head of the women’s committee, for help, but the wooden device they create together won’t 
do. Then, she seeks the local shoe cobbler, who works with her to shape a piece of rubber to her 
needs, but again the rubber won’t suffice. In the midst of it all, Qinglan completely forgets her 
responsibilities at home, neglecting to cook, clean, or look after her family. But each time she 
returns home she finds that someone else has done the essential work for her—first her husband 
makes dinner for their two sons, and another night her neighbor, Sister Chu, feeds them.  
Finally, when she is at her most desperate, Qinglan goes to Mingfa to tell him how 
frustrated she is at not being able to make a device that will automate transmitter production. 
When she explains to him the type of component she needs to complete her automation device, 
Mingfa tells her that he can easily make what she needs on factory equipment. Although it’s late, 
the task is urgent, and they set off immediately for the factory. But Mingfa insists that they have 
dinner at a late-night snack stall before they make the piece on the factory’s lathe. Offering her 
the shrimp from his bowl of noodles, Qinglan is verklempt at her husband’s consideration, and 
she cries again. In a flash, “that invisible, intangible ‘barrier’” between them has “vanished 
completely.”3 When the two of them set off for the factory, “they walked close together, not 
saying a word but very close in spirit. Working for the same end, they were traveling the same 
road.”  
For Qinglan, companionate marriage and emotional intimacy are realized not in the 
home, but through shared experiences of productive labor outside the home. In Ru Zhijuan’s 
telling, the home is a separate space that is subordinate to the factory as a privileged site of 
production, and what a woman can offer to her husband inside the home, from childcare to a 
 
3 Ju Chih-chuan, “The Warmth of Spring,” p. 80.  
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meal of shrimp laden with Proustian significance—pales in comparison to the rewards of shared 
devotion to the community’s productivity. When Qinglan puts everything into transmitter 
manufacturing, she “had never known such a heavy responsibility, such fearful anxiety,” but the 
experience is invigorating, and “The Warmth of Spring” celebrates a housewife’s arrival in the 
same public arena for productive labor that her husband already occupies.4  
Still, Qinglan’s entrance on the factory floor does not absolve her of her responsibilities 
in the home, and Ru Zhijuan’s narrative is attentive to the needs of Qinglan’s children in the 
midst of her manufacturing crisis. Every time Qinglan forgets to feed her children, a member of 
her community steps up and does it for her; and if worst were to come to worst, Qinglan always 
has canteen tickets in the back of her pocket. Qinglan’s ability to focus on manufacturing is 
enabled by her community’s willingness to compensate for her absence from domestic labor, and 
Ru Zhijuan treats housework as a minor detail ultimately of little consequence: realizing one 
evening that she’s forgotten to make dinner again, Qinglan hurries home, thinking “Never in 
over a dozen years had she failed her family like this before.” And yet Qinglan “knows it was of 
no great consequence: Mingfa wouldn't make an issue of it, and it wouldn’t hurt the boys.”5 Still, 
Qinglan is sick with worry, and her transition from housewife to a one-woman manufacturing 
phenomenon is depicted as a largely internal, psychological process of learning to let go of her 
devotion to house chores that her husband doesn’t think are important anyway. Thus, Qinglan’s 
labor power as a woman is “liberated” through a relatively small, easy, and diffuse socialization 
of her chores, as well as the transformative internal recognition of housework as ultimately 
inconsequential, just as her husband sees it.  
 
4 Ru Zhijuan, “The Warmth of Spring,” trans. Gladys Yang, p. 77.  
5 Ru Zhijuan, “The Warmth of Spring,” trans. Gladys Yang, p. 78.  
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“Housework” and “The Warmth of Spring” present two very different portraits of a 
woman navigating her role in the home and within society. In the first, a mother is frustrated at 
not being able to do the essential work of caring for her family, particularly her young daughter, 
eventually resigning herself to the dissolution of her family at the behest of the revolution. In the 
other, a young mother only becomes full partner to her husband and fully participant in her 
society when she commits herself to the pursuit of productive labor. Her reproductive labor is 
rendered negligible and non-essential, and her children are an afterthought in her transformation 
from subordinate to full and equal participant in the affairs of her community.  
This chapter examines depictions of reproductive labor in literature from the first two 
decades of the P.R.C., work that is often, but not exclusively, performed by women. From its 
moment of inception, theorizing and transforming specific gendered forms of labor posed a 
series of challenges and contradictions to the Chinese revolution. Whereas traditional Marxist 
accounts of labor privileged the factory as a space of revolutionary mobilization, the possibilities 
for transforming the conditions of gendered forms of labor under socialism remained an open 
question for large portions of the P.R.C.’s modern history. But for a brief moment in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese Party-state made a serious, if short-lived attempt to socialize 
women’s reproductive labor through the introduction of people’s communes. This chapter 
focuses around depictions of the socialization of what is variously known as household labor or 
domestic labor from literature published around the Great Leap Forward period, when people’s 
communes included provisions meant to collectivize the domestic labor of women through 
mechanisms including communal canteens (gonggong shitang), sewing groups (fengren zu), 
nurseries (tuo er suo), primary schools, and maternity wards (chan yuan), thus enabling women 
to participate more fully in productive or agricultural labor. In practice, these initiatives were 
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largely unfunded and short-lived. Many meal halls, for example, did not last for more than two 
months.6 Yet the period remains one of the most significant attempts to reconcile women’s 
reproductive labor alongside the nation’s productive labor, and literature from the period 
explored the new structures of feeling that would enable these decisive structural social shifts to 
take place. 
In this chapter, I explore literature written from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s depicting 
women, primarily on rural communes, and their engagement with domestic and productive labor. 
I focus on short stories written by Ru Zhijuan, a Han woman writer who rose to prominence in 
1958 when her short story “Lilies” (bai he) was singled out by the Minister of Culture Mao Dun, 
as well as the author Li Zhun, a Mongolian male author and contemporary of Ru Zhijuan’s 
famed for his light-hearted depiction of rural life. After experiencing a period in which the 
Chinese countryside had been plunged into reproductive crisis, authors including Ru Zhijuan and 
Li Zhun explored in their works the vicissitudes of the new social and cultural norms that had 
stabilized rural China, chief among them the social innovations of the people’s commune. Ru 
Zhijuan’s work in particular encapusulates late 1950s debates over the representation of domestic 
labor and the emotional lives of families, probing the difference between what Gail Hershatter 
calls the separate temporalities of “campaign time” and of “domestic time.”7  
Narratives of social change and family transformation in the countryside are underscored 
by the performance of reproductive labor. Through the depiction of exceptional country women, 
the short stories discussed in this chapter create an impossible standard for women’s entry into 
 
6 See Li Chunfeng, “Historical Observations Regarding the Large-Scale Establishment of Rural Public Canteens in 
Hebei Province,” in Agricultural Reform and Rural Transformation in China Since 1949, eds. Thomas David 
DuBois and Li Huaiyin (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 115-132.  
7 See Gail Hershatter, The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011), see “Introduction” and Chapter 4, “Activist,” pp. 1-13, 96-129.  
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productive labor: in order to do a man’s work, women must learn to endlessly reproduce 
themselves throughout the countryside, a trope that simultaneously minimizing the importance of 
women’s domestic vis a vis productive labor even as their domestic labor haunts the text.  
Coming to Terms with Women and Work:  
The question of what constitutes work is central to understanding how women’s 
contributions are valued by a society, and in the following section I will offer remarks on how I 
understand and use the basic terms that underpin this discussion. The Marxist understanding of 
labor-power is rooted in the corporeal form, understanding labor-power as a commodity that 
exists only in the “living body.”  Theoretically, then, the female act of reproduction, or the 
production of children, meant that women and their bodies provided the very means of human 
existence itself, a responsibility rivaled by scant others in importance. “According to the 
materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the final existence, the production 
and reproduction of immediate life,” wrote Engels in The Origins of the Family, Private 
Property, and State.8 The “production and reproduction of immediate life” encompassed “the 
production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species,” but also “the production 
of the means of existence, of food, clothing, shelter and the tools necessary for that production,” 
wrote Engels.  
Engels and Marx had written in 1846 that “The first division of labor is between man and 
woman for the propagation of children,” suggesting that gendered divisions of labor owed to 
biological differences between men and women.9 But by the time Engels wrote The Origins of 
 
8 Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and State, trans. Tristam Hunt (London: Penguin, 
2010), pp. 35-6.  
9 See Engels, The Origin of the Family, p. 217, in which Engels cites an unpublished manuscript he and Marx had 
written in 1846, which would later be published in 1932 as The German Ideology.  
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the Family in 1884, his understanding had changed; Engels now understood the structure of the 
family as a shifting superstructure that was formed and reformed by changing economic 
conditions over time, making the particulars of family relations a fact of successive modes of 
production forming one after the other.10 Citing communal forms of production with matrilineal 
family structures, Engels believed that male supremacy over women was a recent phenomenon, 
and that it was linked directly to the advent of private property, which caused the family to be 
“based not on natural but on economic conditions—on the victory of private property over 
primitive, natural communal property. The Greeks themselves put the matter quite frankly: the 
sole exclusive aims of monogamous marriage were to make the man supreme in the family and 
to propagate, as future heirs to his wealth, children indisputably his own.”11 According to this 
logic, the invention of property rights required that men have monogamous partners in order to 
ensure a child’s undisputed right to patrilineal capital inheritance. A further consequence of this 
arrangement entailed women being barred from participation in social production, forced instead 
into the “open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife,” who differed from the prostitute only 
“in that she does not let out her body on piecework as a wage worker, but sells it once and for all 
into slavery.”12  
If women’s inferior social status owed directly to their exclusion from productive labor, 
then Engels believed the antidote was equally powerful and simple: women needed to participate 
in productive labor. “The emancipation of woman will only be possible when women can take 
part in production on a large, social scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an 
 
10 See Tristam Hunt’s introduction to The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State for more on the 
sources of Engel’s understanding of the family structure as a kinetic organization, especially in the writings of the 
American anthropologist and social theorist Lewis Henry Morgan, “Introduction,” The Origin of the Family, pp. 12-
83.  
11 Engels, The Origin of the Family, p. 95-6.  
12 Engels, The Origin of the Family, pp. 101-2, 105.  
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insignificant part of her time,” he wrote. This seemed not only necessary but inevitable, because 
“modern large-scale industry … does not merely permit the employment of female labor over a 
wide range, but positively demands it.”13 Fortuitously, the exploitative structure of capitalism 
itself also contained within it the key to women’s liberation from family-based exploitation 
through women’s participation in wage labor, which would allow them to achieve economic 
independence. By changing women’s relationship to production, oppressive family structures 
and patriarchal attitudes would inevitably follow suit, making women’s involvement in 
productive labor a primary concern, and rendering domestic labor and familial relations of 
secondary consequence.  
Although Engels did not make use of the term “reproductive labor,” it is clear that his 
concept of the “production and reproduction of immediate life” included both “the production of 
human beings themselves” as well as “the production of the means of existence.” But “domestic 
labor,” as he called it, was the largest obstacle to women’s liberation, and according to Engels 
women’s liberation would consist not of a different valuation of reproductive labor, but of 
women’s ability to perform other, more socially valued forms of labor. Engel’s solution to the 
gender-based exploitation of women was also dependent upon the realization of socialist society. 
He believed modern industry would facilitate a simultaneous “channeling” of “private labor” into 
“public industry,” suggesting that reproductive labor might become socialized, and thereby 
minimized in the home. But this was imagined with less clarity than women’s participation in 
productive labor. Perhaps abstract systemic change is easier to imagine than what it would be 
like for men—or even one specific man—to take up the burden of women’s work.14  
 
13 Engels, The Origin of the Family, p. 221-2.  
14 For a sense of the private domestic arrangements that may have characterized Engels’s life, see Mike Dash, “How 
Friedrich Engels’ Radical Lover Helped Him Father Socialism” Smithsonian Magazine, Aug. 1, 2013, 
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Thus, the paradox of Engel’s approach to women’s liberation becomes clear: women will 
be freed by performing productive labor, which they will be able to do when they no longer need 
to perform domestic labor. But, as many have noted, in a capitalist society, which does not 
provide adequate mechanisms through which the burden of domestic labor can be reduced, the 
Engelsian solution creates the expectation that women perform productive labor as well as 
reproductive labor, effectively doubling women’s labor load,15 creating a clear valuation of 
productive labor as more socially meaningful than domestic labor, privileging the sites of 
productive labor (i.e. the factory, the field) over the site of reproductive labor (the home), as well 
as creating productive public domains in opposition to the private domestic one.  
But before women could participate in the productive realm, their position in the private 
realm needed to be transformed. In 1907, the anarcho-feminist He-Yin Zhen wrote that the 
emergence of private property “[marked] the beginning of the system of women as private 
property as well as the beginning of the system of slavery.”16 The history of the “bodily slavery” 
of women in China was long and familiar, she argued: “Today, they are the slaves of capitalists, 
whereas of old they only were being ordered around as servants.”17 Following the collapse of the 
“communal system,” systems for “pillaging women for marriage and slavery” emerged, co-eval 
processes that condemned women at birth to a lifetime of exploitation at the hands of men and 
the systems of capital that they upheld. To He-Yin Zhen, the link between domestic labor and 
 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-friedrich-engels-radical-lover-helped-him-father-socialism-
21415560/, accessed Feb. 9, 2020. 
15 For scholarship on the double burden of labor of women, see Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second 
Shift: Working Families and the Revolution at Home (New York: Penguin Books, 2003); Alice Kessler-Harris, 
Women Have Always Worked: An Historical Overview (New York: Feminist Press, 1993); and Jacqueline A. Jones, 
Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1985). 
16 He-Yin Zhen, “Economic Revolution and Women’s Revolution,” in The Birth of Chinese Feminism, eds. Lydia 
Liu, Rebecca Karl, and Dorothy Ko (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 92. 
17 He-Yin Zhen, “On the Question of Women’s Labor,” in The Birth of Chinese Feminism, eds. Lydia Liu, Rebecca 
Karl, and Dorothy Ko (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 81.  
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servitude was clear, and rooted in social systems that treated women as private possessions. 
“Today’s marriage, hence, is exactly marriage based on money. It would be no exaggeration to 
call it a form of property-marriage,” wrote He-Yin Zhen.18 To break down the structures that 
made property of women, He-Yin Zhen it was necessary to abolish the state itself, which could 
only ever buttress the reproduction of the hierarchies that subjugated women. 
 Indeed, domestic labor and forced labor have long been intertwined categories of work, 
and many Chinese feminists recognized that marriage was the mechanism that ensured women 
were reduced to sources of reproductive labor in their husband’s households. In the pages of 
Jiating yanjiu [Family research], a popular journal devoted to family-reform published in 
Shanghai during the 1920s, a contributor named Liao Shuan summarized the New Culture 
movement’s marriage reform platform in an article titled “Hunyin wenti zhi yizhong zhuzhang 
[An opinion on the marriage problem]:” first, men and women should be completely free to enter 
into marriage agreements of their own accord, and their relationship should be based on the 
“spiritual union” of the couple. The new couple should form their own new family unit (xiao 
jiating) separate from their existing families, and each should pursuing their own “economic 
independence” without reliance on the other. Dissatisfaction with the relationship, the taking of 
concubines, the collection of slaves, and “other vile improprieties” all constituted legitimate 
grounds upon which a marriage could be dissolved.19 Although Liao recognized that marriage 
was at once an economic and an interpersonal arrangement, marriages in which “a man and a 
woman who do not know each other are forced to live together is simply barbaric marriage, 
 
18 He-Yin Zhen, “On the Question of Women’s Labor,” p. 93.  
19 For more on Liao’s essay and May Fourth view of marriage and family reform, see Susan L. Glosser, Chinese 
Visions of Family and State, 1915-1953 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), especially Chapter 1, 
“Saving Self and Nation: The New Culture Movement’s Family-Reform Discourse,” pp. 27-80.  
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marriage as commerce, slave marriage.”20 May Fourth intellectuals believed that making 
marriage a free choice between spiritually bonded individuals would not only free men and 
women from being forced to marry against their will, it would prevent women from becoming 
slaves in their own homes.  
As the Republican period endured, support for marriage reform grew, and in 1924 and 
1926 the ruling Kuomintang party passed resolutions abolishing the legal slavery of women and 
girls through the purchase-marriage system, giving women freedom in marriage and divorce 
among other guarantees.21 Five years later, not long after its establishment the Jiangxi Soviet 
issued the “Jiangxi Chinese Soviet Republic Marriage Regulations,” which aimed to “completely 
execute the emancipation of women, acknowledge marriage freedom, practice various methods 
to protect women, enable women to practically gain the material foundations to gradually 
disengage with household constraints, and participate in the economic, political, and cultural life 
of society.”22 Both marriage initiatives sought a broad transformation of women’s rights, 
including the emancipation of women and girls from marriage as servitude by giving women 
freedom of choice in marriage, while the Jiangxi Soviet Marriage Regulations further tended to 
the material circumstances of women. However, guaranteeing the protections of both resolutions 
was a different matter. He Xiangning, head of the K.M.T.’s Central Women’s Department, told 
the leftist American journalist Anna Louise Strong that “Women do not even know that the new 
laws exist,” while the provisional wartime nature of the Jiangxi Soviet meant resources for 
guaranteeing regulations were scarce.23 Rather, it is the 1950 New Marriage Law of the C.C.P, 
 
20 Liao Shuan cited in Glosser, Chinese Visisons of Family and State, p. 46.  
21 See Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family, and Peasant Revolution in China, pp. 55-6.  
22 For more on the Jiangxi Soviet Marriage Regulations, see Xiaofei Kang, Women, Family, and the Chinese 
Socialist State, 1950-2010 (Leiden: Brill, 2019), pp 96-8. 
23 See Johnson, Women, Family and the Peasant Revolution in China, pp. 43-5; and Kang, Women, Family, and the 
Chinese Socialist State, p. 97.  
 218 
that is primarily remembered for transforming the institution of marriage in modern China. 
Drawing on the precedent set in the Jiangxi Soviet, the P.R.C.’s New Marriage Law prohibited 
concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the remarriage of widows, and emphasized the 
free choice of partners, monogamy, equal rights for both genders, and the care of the young and 
old.24 
Indeed, the depiction of marriage prior to 1949 suggests that the boundary between free 
and servile (or serf, or even slave) women was enacted by the state in the years immediately 
following Liberation. In Li Zhun’s “Two Generations,” Gao Xiuzhen, mother to Zhuzhu and a 
member of the fictitious Chaohua People’s Commune, reflects on how the social initiatives of 
the new state have transformed her life, not least of all her marriage. Xiuzhen was married before 
1949, and although Li Zhun is short on details about this time, Xiuzhen recalls that she was sold 
as a child-bride to her husband’s family, where she “worked like a mute for thirteen years 
without daring to speak to [her husband.]”25 With no voice, Xiuzhen began her married life as a 
subaltern, and Li suggests that her relationship with her husband was previously best 
characterized as that between chattel and owner. The line is a typical illustration of a rural 
woman’s backstory for the time, establishing that prior to the arrival of the C.C.P., her marriage 
had amounted to little more than the sale of a unit of domestic and reproductive labor, that it had 
occurred without her consent, and that the terms had left her without a voice.  
 
24 For further scholarship on marriage reform in the P.R.C., see Phyllis Andors, The Unfinished Revolution of 
Chinese Women (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 1983); Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family, and 
Peasant Revolution in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Margery Wolf, Revolution Post-Poned: 
Women in Contemporary China (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1985); Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and 
Social Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); C.K. Yang, The Family in the 
Communist Revolution (Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press, 1972); and Ellen Judd, Gender and Power in Rural 
North China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
25 Li Zhun, “Liang dai ren [Two Generations],” Renmin wenxue  p. 112.  
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Similarly, in another Li Zhun’s novella “Li Shuangshuang,” the peasant Li 
Shuangshuang’s marriage to Sun Xiwang is transformed from an abusive purchase-marriage to a 
romantic, companionate marriage in the P.R.C.’s “new society.” The narrator recalls that 
“Shuangshuang’s family had been destitute peasants before Liberation, and she had been given 
in marriage to Xiwang the year she turned seventeen.”26 Not only had Shuangshuang been sold 
to her husband, before Liberation, Xiwang beat her too. But the co-eval processes of land reform 
and the new marriage law change that: “After [that], Xiwang didn’t dare hit her all the time. For 
one thing, life was getting a bit better, and he was afraid she would divorce him.” Even more so, 
after Liberation Xiwang is able to admit to himself that he “actually did like Shuangshuang,” and 
the story, in part, depicts Xiwang’s process of learning to accommodate his wife’s vibrant 
personality and growing leadership role in the commune. Although both Shuangshuang and 
Xiwang’s marriages began by their sale, without their consent, and on abusive terms in 
Shuangshuang’s case, they are grandfathered in after the establishment of the P.R.C., and 
transformed into warm, supportive, companionate relationships, suggesting that the 
establishment of the P.R.C. itself served as a boundary between marriage-as-slavery and 
marriage as companionate relationship predicated upon individual choice.  
Reforming Labor Through Land 
Marxist views on the sources of women’s subordination, and especially Engels’s The 
Origins of the Family, Private Property, and State, were an important starting point for both 
Chinese Marxists as well as Western socialist feminist analyses of gender and labor.27 In her 
 
26 Li Zhun, “A Brief Biography of Li Shuangshuang,” trans. Johanna Hood, Robert Mackie, and Richard King, in 
Heroes of the Great Leap Forward: Two Stories, ed. Richard King (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2010), 
p. 21. See also Li Zhun, Li Shuangshuang xiaozhuan (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1977).  
27 See Tamara Jacka, Women’s Work in Rural China: Change and Continuity in an Era of Reform, especially 
Chapter 1, “Theorising Gender,” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 10.  
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study on patriarchy in the first decades of the P.R.C., Judith Stacey argues that “family 
revolution” in the countryside was “at the center of the social revolution that brought the CCP to 
state power,” and that much of the theoretical and political framework for the Party’s approach to 
the organization of labor, ownership, and the family in the countryside, especially as it related to 
women, was established from the late 1920s to the mid-1940s, when the CCP forged alliances 
with rural Chinese after being largely expelled from the country’s urban centers by the 
Kuomintang.28 From Jinggangshan to Yan’an, experiences of wartime retreat and mobilization 
provided opportunities to experiment with rural reconstruction policies that dramatically changed 
the texture of rural life. After 1949, experiences from the Yan’an period in particular seemed to 
directly inform many of the signature new policies and initiatives of the new government, 
resulting in a cultural and political model that Mark Selden and others have famously called the 
“Yan’an Way.”29 
But as Kay Ann Johnson points out, approaches toward reorganizing labor and social 
relations implemented at Yan’an often also entailed comparatively conservative social policies 
toward women and family structure. “The wartime setting and the particularly restrictive cultural 
traditions of the remote, mountainous areas of the North and the Northwest strengthened the 
most conservative and cautious tendencies in the Party on family reform issues,” Johnson writes, 
avoiding challenging the ways in which the existing structure of the family unit disadvantaged 
 
28 Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 
108-15.  
29 See Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
China in Revolution: Yenan Way Revisited (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Feng Chongyi and David S.G. 
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Quarterly 140 (1994): 1000-6; Tian Youru, Zhongguo kangri genjudi fazhanshi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995); 
and Lyman P. Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945” in The 
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 221 
women.30 Judith Stacey notes that in comparison to Engels’s praise of unrestrained “sex love” or 
the early Bolshevik advocacy for free love and the weakening of family ties,31 Chinese leftists 
saw no need to do away with the family as the underlying social unit structuring the 
countryside.32 The resulting Yan’an wartime production model was labor intensive, and relied on 
pulling women from the home in order to meet those labor needs, thus centering women’s 
liberation around their participation in public spheres of labor and minimizing the necessity of 
addressing their role in domestic labor.33 Basing rural women’s liberation on their ability to 
participate in labor outside the home, then, was a comparatively conservative stance.  
The success of the Yan’an experience seemed to validate the Engelsian approach to 
women’s liberation, and after 1949, the new state drew from this experience as the basis of their 
approach to both rural development and rural women’s liberation. After the “victory of the 
socialist revolution” (i.e. 1949), women’s liberation through full production participation was a 
key objective for the new state. Mao stressed that building a “great socialist society” would 
necessarily entail “[arousing] the broad masses of women to join in productive activity.” Beyond 
that, it was imperative not only to produce more by working differently, but also to construct a 
new socialist society out of the capitalist one the P.R.C. had inherited, for “Genuine equality 
 
30 Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family, and Peasant Revolution in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1983), pp. 87-9.  
31 For more on Bolshevik feminism, see: Richard Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, 
Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); Gail Lapidus, Women in 
Soviet Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, and Gail 
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32 Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 2. 
33 Although at Yan’an, CCP leaders encouraged women to spin and weave in order to strengthn the economy of 
Communist-controlled regions as well as draw women into social and public life. See Jacob Eyferth, “Liberation 
from the Loom? Rural Women, Textile Work, and the Revolution in North China,” from Maoism at the Grassroots: 
Everyday life in China’s High Era of Socialism, Jeremy Brown, Matthew D. Johnson, eds. (Cambridge, MA: 
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between the sexes can only be realized in the process of socialist transformation of society as a 
whole,” making the socialist mission an inherently feminist one.34  
After the founding of the P.R.C., change in the countryside unfolded in stages. The 
cumulative effect was the transformation of private farming into a system of collectivized 
agricultural production, a total reorganization of the means of production that entailed 
widespread and pervasive social and cultural change.35 If change in rural women’s lives was to 
be centered around their relationship to production, then in rural areas, the land itself constituted 
the means of production, making land reform an immediate priority. Land reform made women 
and certain forms of their labor visible through women’s involvement in its implementation, as 
well as its toppling of male monopoly over land ownership.  
Although land reform is most commonly remembered as a signature policy and first order 
of business implemented in 1950, the CCP had begun organizing land reform much earlier in the 
Jiangxi Soviet.36 As Delia Davin notes, change in the countryside did not arrive across the nation 
in one fell swoop. Conditions the northern “liberated” areas often differed significantly from 
those that were not under CCP control until 1949 or later (the “old” jiu areas), which meant that 
mutual aid teams and agricultural co-operatives were already implemented in some northern 
areas before 1949, well before the process of land reform had begun in other regions of the 
country.37 
 
34 Mao Zedong, Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978). 
35 Here, my account of agricultural collectivization over the course of more than a decade will necessarily be 
abbreviated, as I will focus on narrating systemic change in the countryside with an eye for material changes in the 
arrangement of women’s labor. 
36 See Brian DeMare, Land Wars: The Story of China’s Agarian Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2019).  
37 Delia Davin, Woman-Work: Women and the Party in Revolutionary China (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1978), 
p. 115. 
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The first land laws were drafted in December 1928, and they entailed the confiscation of 
all land to the Soviet government. The land would be redistributed back to poor rural residents, 
but they would not receive land ownership rights.38 Experiences with rural revolution, in 
particular sabotage from middle peasants who had their land confiscated, quickly moderated 
expectations of land reform, and where the “Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic” of 
December 1931 again entailed the confiscation of all major land and other assets of landlords, 
warlords, temples, and other wealthy landowners, it did not abolish private ownership of land. 
Instead, the law aimed to make private land ownership more accessible to poor and middle 
peasants, redistributing land back to them along with land deeds.  
Parcels of land were allotted to rural residents according to family size, either by the 
number of family members or according to the amount of labor power in a family.39 
Significantly, work teams counted women as full household members when they made 
allocations. But by distributing land according to family size, the land reform implemented by 
the Jiangxi Soviet thus solidified the rural family as the production unit of the countryside, 
creating small independent family-run farms where previously the agricultural economy had 
been dominated by wealthy landlord control. When the Jiangxi Soviet met its violent end in 
1934, efforts to redistribute land were resumed again only after the CCP had established a secure 
base area in northern China, but again military conflict with Japan delayed land reform, and 
entering into partnership with the Kuomintang moderated policies again. “Ten Great Policies” 
were announced in August 1937; where land was concerned, they suspended the seizure and 
redistribution of land in favor of protections for rural poor against usurious rent collections and 
exploitative labor practices, such as instituting a ceiling on land rents collected in CCP-areas that 
 
38 Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China, p. 117.  
39 Chao Kuo-chün, Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959, p. 22.  
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had not conducted land revolution, and protecting tenant farmers against advance rental 
collections, rent deposits, and compulsory labor.40 
When war with Japan and against the Kuomintang ended, land policy again returned 
toward redistribution. The land law of September 1947, produced at a land reform conference 
held the same year, laid out land revolution policy, a process through which poor rural residents 
were mobilized to confiscate a landowner’s assets through force and then redistribute those 
assets back to the community. Women played a key role in the process of land reform, and were 
present in the land law document itself, in no small part due to efforts by Deng Yingchao, then a 
prominent member of the preparatory committee for the Women’s Federation.41 The 
mobilization of laboring women (i.e. women involved in productive labor) had been an essential 
component of successful land reform, leading “speaking bitterness (suku)” sessions and 
confiscating landlord property. In areas where all a village’s men had been recruited to the army, 
land reform was carried out by women alone,42 and Deng argued at the conference that land 
reform could not be effectively carried out without due attention to organizing women. Critical 
of the scarce attention that was paid to the issue at the National Land Reform Conference, Deng 
wrote that land reform needed to mobilize women alongside men, and that “There must be no 
 
40 Judith Stacey notes that land laws implemented in the Ten Great Policies bore more than a striking resemblance to 
the Kuomintang land law of 1930, which had never been implemented. See Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist 
Revolution in China, p. 119.  
41 See Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People’s Republic of China, 
1949-1964 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), pp. 46-7 for more on the role Deng Yingchao played in 
drafting the land laws of 1947.   
42 Qi Wang, “State-society Relations and Women’s Political Participation” in Women of China: Economic and 
Social Transformation, Jackie West, Zhang Minghua, Chang Xiangqun, and Cheng Yuan, eds. (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999), p. 22.  
 225 
division with ‘men first, then women.’43 By March 1949, implementation of land reform in 
existing liberated areas and the newly-secured northeast were largely complete.44 
By 1949, the C.C.P. had already become quite experienced in implementing land reform, 
and in 1950, it went about completing land reform nationwide. Like the land law of 1947, the 
Common Program of 1949, the interim constitution of the P.R.C., and the Agrarian Land Reform 
Law of June 1950 revoked all land ownership rights of landlords and redistributed their property 
to rural farmers. The landlord, as a class, was abolished, and landlords as well as rich peasants 
were branded class enemies before being displaced, abused, and killed. 45 Prior to reform, 
landlords had owned about half the land, which they leased to households, but beyond access to 
the land itself, they had not contributed much to the processes of agricultural production (such as 
tools or draft animals for working the land.)  
Although the New Marriage Law of 1950 often takes pride of place when discussing 
signature early P.R.C. policies that promoted gender equality, the process of land reform 
constituted a significant material transformation in the lives of rural women and the valuation of 
their labor. On the one hand, land reform struck at the core of women’s rights through its 
simultaneous toppling of male monopoly over land ownership along with the landlord system. 
Previously, inheritance of land rights passed from father to son, or to other male relatives. 
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Although widows may have held land on behalf of their male children, it was more commonly 
entrusted to a male relative of the deceased father. Since 1931, Republican law had technically 
granted men and women equal rights of inheritance, along with elevating a widow as her 
husband’s legal heir, but as Delia Davin and Mark Van Der Falk have written, these legal 
guarantees were rarely enforced in the countryside.46 After land reform, agrarian law required 
that men and women receive equal shares of land, requiring separate property deeds to be issued 
where necessary, in what was ostensibly an incentive that encouraged women to work the land. 
Issuing land deeds in women’s names had a powerful effect, as many rural women were given 
formal names for the first time when they registered land deeds in their own names, as opposed 
to those of their husbands or fathers.47  
But on the other hand, another consequence of land reform was the assignment of class 
status, which carried with it access to certain political rights and material rewards as well as 
one’s susceptibility to the punishments of revolutionary justice. Crucially, class status was 
assigned not to individuals, but to entire families. This meant that a woman’s political identity 
was therefore embedded within the family, recognizing the family both as a political unit as well 
as a production unit. Although class status often took into account the length of time a woman 
had been married as a complicating factor in determining her status, class status overwhelmingly 
consigned a woman’s political identity to the family unit. Judith Stacey argues that “by 
submerging a woman’s political identity in that of her patriarchal family, the party structurally 
denied that a history of sex oppression constituted legitimate grounds for material 
 
46 See Delia Davin, Woman-Work, pp. 115-6, and Marius Hendrikus van den Valk, An Outline of Modern Chinese 
Family Law (Beijing: H. Vetch, 1939), pp. 123-41. For contemporary gender inequality in the accumulation of 
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Zed Books, 2014).  
47 See Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State, footnote 19, p. 273.   
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compensation,” resulting in policies and practices that Stacey says transformed “land-to-the-
tiller” programs into “land-to-the-families-of-tillers.”48  
Because class distinction was carried by the family, women’s political identities were 
consigned to the patriarchal family unit. The classification system was an administrative 
strengthening of the family as the dominant organizing structure for rural life as well as an 
equalization of the “distribution of patriarchal authority” in rural China. Land reform was mostly 
completed by the spring of 1953. For many rural Chinese, the campaign secured independent 
family farming as a viable means of living after decades of precariousness. But where land 
reform transformed the practices of land ownership through a democratization of land wealth, it 
also enshrined the patriarchal family as the unit of production and of political class. With the 
independent family unit as the dominant organizational structure for rural life, an economy of 
small, private farmers emerged.49  
Mutual Aid Teams 
Where land reform took land out of the hands of a few wealthy landowners, thus making 
small family farming a viable livelihood, land reform itself did not collectivize agricultural 
production. The collectivization of agricultural production began instead with the establishment 
of mutual aid teams, or a handful of households in the same area that organized into a unit 
sharing its resources with one another, from farming tools and draft animals to field labor. The 
formation of mutual aid teams tended to track closely with the process of land reform, as land 
was typically distributed on a per capita basis. Families with small children often received more 
 
48 Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China, pp. 127-8. Stacey also describes the sexual violence 
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land than they could reasonably manage, while families with older children might have a surplus 
of labor. Thus, the mutual aid team allowed small groups of families to pool their resources, and 
share them as they saw fit. During busy parts of the growing season, this might mean directing 
everyone to participate in agricultural labor, or to share farming tools and draft animals. While 
tools and animals were sometimes distributed following land reform, they were not provided in 
quantities sufficient to allow every household their own set of tools, for example, or their own 
draught animal. Previously, a rural household might acquire “one leg of an ox,” as a quarter 
share of an animal was known.”50  
As with land reform, some northern areas under Communist control had already been 
organized into mutual aid teams prior to 1949. Nationwide, mutual aid teams were established 
predominantly between 1954 and 1955, although specific experiences different greatly 
depending on region. In Guangdong, for example, mutual aid teams were formed in 1953, 
consisting of about seven to eight households,51 while elsewhere they typically consisted of 
around ten families.52 
The formation of mutual aid teams raised questions of how labor would be counted, 
valued, and rewarded, and debates over who should receive how much reward for which types of 
labor directly addressed issues of women’s capacity for labor (of all types), as well as the 
gendered distribution of labor in rural households. Instead of wages, mutual aid teams introduced 
the work point as a measurement of labor performed. The number of points awarded to an 
individual varied based on the type of task and the presumed intensity of the (manual) labor. 
Immediately, work point standards that valued the labor of men over that of women emerged. 
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The work of the mutual aid team was organized around the traditional family division of labor, 
and mutual aid teams systematically discriminated against women by awarding them fewer 
points than men. Work point standards varied from village to village, but women were usually 
awarded half the work points of a man for productive labor owing to the assumption that a 
woman was only capable of half a man’s output, known as the “lao wu fen.”  
Often, this distribution of work points was not borne out by women’s record of 
performance, and anecdotes abound of women who performed their tasks as quickly as or faster 
than their male counterparts. In 1948, Luo Qiong, then the leader of the Women’s Federation, 
reported that women in mutual aid teams demanded not only that they receive the same number 
of work points as men, but that they also receive them directly, and have them recorded 
separately from the family tally in a measure of economic independence from the family unit.53 
The problem was persistent, and a September 1956 editorial in the People’s Daily titled “How to 
Deal Correctly with Equal Pay for Men and Women” exhorted groups to pay men and women 
according to the labor performed. Many still continued to classify productive labor according to 
age and gender.  
While mutual aid teams reinforced traditional gendered divisions of labor by recognizing 
the individual family as the basic unit of production, they also laid the foundations for the 
collectivization of agriculture that would eventually replace the small family mode of 
agricultural production. Significantly, mutual aid teams created new labor roles for women 
chipped away at traditional divisions of labor. For example, cooperative labor made the 
participation of women possible in areas where the traditional division of labor barred women 
from agricultural work. In villages where labor was short, women played a leading role in the 
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processes of land reform and agricultural production, and mutual aid teams appeared first and 
were more prevalent in areas that were “forced” to rely on women for agricultural production. 
Mutual aid teams also organized villagers into new groups, forming social networks that rivaled 
the kinship networks that were already in place. As collectivization began to replace the private 
family economy, the transformative implications of reform were expanded, as mutual aid teams 
weakened traditional bases of patrilineal authority. 
Agricultural Co-operatives 
If mutual teams were a beginning step toward the collectivization of agricultural 
production, the agricultural cooperative was the second step. Agricultural cooperatives further 
entrenched new hierarchies of labor, rewarding productive labor above all else. Introduced 
between 1956 and 1957, agricultural producer cooperatives operated at the village or subvillage 
level and allowed many households to collectively manage their land and to share the costs of 
farming the land. In principal, a larger cooperative would allow the group to work more 
efficiently, meeting the pronounced demand for agricultural labor during the busy season and 
directing workers during the down season for capital infrastructure projects. Income was 
distributed to families based on the proportion of agricultural labor, land, and other resources that 
family had contributed to the cooperative.  
Already in 1955, 17 million households had joined six-hundred and thirty cooperatives 
across the country, and Mao called for a further expansion of the cooperative, resulting in the 
Higher-Level Producer Cooperatives of 1956, in which the cooperative oversaw use of all 
agricultural resources from the land to draught animals. Higher-Level Producer Cooperatives 
also ended the award of work points based on the contribution of resources, awarding work 
points based solely on contributions to productive labor. Productive labor was thus recognized 
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above other forms of labor as legitimate work. The number of work points awarded to each 
household was calculated after a harvest was sold, dividing the collective income by the total 
number of member work points earned. By February of 1956, more than half the villages in the 
P.R.C. had opened a Higher-Level Producer Cooperatives, and by the end of the year, more than 
ninety percent of the country’s farmers belonged to a Higher-Level Producer Collective. In some 
areas, mutual aid teams were converted directly into Higher-Level Producer Collectives, 
skipping over the agricultural producer cooperatives.54 
The Higher-Level Producer Cooperatives were often the same size as the village itself. 
Previously, as an institution the village exceeded the mutual aid team or agricultural producer 
cooperative, but with larger cooperatives the village as a political unit and the cooperative as an 
economic unit were now responsible for the same people and geographic area. Quickly, the 
economic mandate of the Higher-Level Producer Cooperatives began to overwhelm its 
counterpart political institutions. Where the cooperatives were responsible for organizing 
agricultural production, collecting taxes, and distributing work points and food, townships 
(xiang) were responsible for implementing and enforcing party policies, army recruitment, and 
maintaining the police. Because administration of the township was now being overwhelmed by 
the cooperative, in 1955 and 1956 townships were re-organized into big townships (da xiang) in 
order to better extend political control over the cooperative. By 1957, there was one big township 
for approximately every seven and a half cooperatives.  
Within less than a decade, the countryside had been significantly reorganized, going from 
a model of agricultural production based around landlord and private ownership of farms to 
collective ownership and administration of farms, and the collectivization of the countryside 
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necessarily exceeded well beyond the limits of productive labor and into the realm of 
reproductive labor. Indeed, reorganizing the site of productive labor would necessarily involve 
reorganizing multiple other sites of labor, as proletarian ownership of the means of production 
also entailed a vast change in the character of social relations. The commune itself would be the 
institution that could deliver both of these shifts, simultaneously revolutionizing social relations 
as they ushered in greater and more equitable economic prosperity.  
People’s Communes 
Although the processes of land reform and the formation of mutual aid teams and 
agricultural cooperatives had significantly transformed the material circumstances of women’s 
labor in the countryside, the commune was the first program that fully attempted to address 
women’s obligation to domestic and reproductive labor. The formation of people’s communes 
was announced in national press beginning in late summer 1958, and from the start, the 
implementation of the commune was undertaken with consideration to the onerous burden of 
housework that rural women bore. A September 1958 editorial in Hongqi magazine explained 
that in order “to make full use of labor power” (the opposite of which was less than full 
efficiency and a failure to contribute adequately to the nation’s growth), women needed to “play 
their full part in field work,” thereby ensuring that “there is no waste of labor time of men and 
women.” In order to ensure the full participation of both men and women, “the farm co-
operatives must be not only organizers of production, but also organizers of the way of life.”55 It 
was not enough, then, to simply collectivize agricultural labor, as the mutual aid teams and 
cooperatives had done. Communes required “organization with higher efficiency,” and if 
 
55 “Greet the Upsurge in Forming People’s Communes,” Hongqi, 7 (Sept. 1958): p. 13. Also included in People’s 
Communes in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 10. 
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domestic labor prevented women from working in the fields then it was hardly efficient to 
exclude half the population from productive labor.56  
Properly collectivizing agricultural production entailed making a host of other social 
services available, thus ensuring that commune members were equally able to fulfill their 
productive duties. Time that was spent cooking, cleaning, sewing, or looking after children was 
time that detracted from one's ability to work in the fields, and so it became necessary for the 
commune to address the burden of domestic labor in order to free up (wo)manpower for the 
fields. Thus, in order to free commune members for productive labor, the commune would step 
in to provide the social services necessary to keep women in the fields. Wu Zhipu, party 
secretary of Henan county, where the nation’s first commune was established, promised that 
people’s communes would fulfill the “seven basic requirements: eating, clothing, housing, 
childbirth, education, medical treatment, and marriage and funeral expenses.”57 A few of the 
seven basic requirements were understood as exclusive domain of women, namely raising 
children, and feeding and clothing families. To relieve women of their childcare, cooking, 
sewing, and weaving responsibilities, the commune would organize sewing circles (fengren zu), 
public canteens (gonggong shitang) to eliminate the need to cook daily, and nurseries (tuo’er 
suo) and kindergartens to substitute for at home childcare.  
 
56 “Hold High the Red Flag of People’s Communes and March On,” Renmin ribao, Sept. 3, 1958. Reprinted in 
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Women’s Work 
What was “women-work” in the P.R.C.? I speak here not in the abstract sense of any 
work done by women, but in terms of a specific utterance, funü gongzuo.58 Delia Davin translates 
the term as “woman-work,” which she uses to refer to “all sorts of activities among women, 
including mobilizing them for revolutionary struggle, production, literacy and hygiene 
campaigns, social reform, and so on.”59 “Woman-work” was a state project, occurring under the 
auspices of party-organized groups and associations for women, including “unions, schools, and 
newspapers for women,”60 and it should be understood in this context and not abstractly as any 
work performed by women. Wang Zheng, who translates funü gongzuo as “women-work,” 
emphasizes in her discussion that “women-work” was a term that re-packaged and camouflaged 
the feminist projects of the May Fourth period for contemporary parlance. As opposed to nüquan 
zhuyi, which fell out of favor as intellectual feminist projects collided, “women-work” allowed 
the socialist state feminists of Wang’s study to legitimize and promote women’s liberation 
through state organs, as well as mobilize women through chapters of the All-China Women’s 
Federation (Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui), established in late March of 1949.61 To 
Elisabeth Croll, “woman work” is another name for “the women’s movement,” and a formal and 
integral aspect of the revolutionary front.62 
 
58 I adopt the hyphenated “women-work” enclosed in quotations; the typographical distinctions set it apart and serve 
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 Yet “women-work” remains a slippery term, as Tamara Jacka notes.63 If, in the abstract, 
women’s work refers to any and all work done by women, then in the specific, “women-work” 
funü gongzuo is also vague; again referring to any and all work done by women falling under the 
umbrella of institutions such as the Women’s Federation. Like a chengyu, it is even unclear what 
particle of speech “women-work” is, an ouroboros-like portmanteau of noun and verb, subject 
and object, indicating work performed for women, by women, to further their own interests in 
concert with the interests of the state project.  
 In Li Zhun’s 1959 short story “Two Generations (Liang dai ren),” a mother and her 
daughter discuss just exactly what “women-work” is as the mother readies her daughter to 
succeed her as the head of the local Women’s Federation chapter.64 “‘This ‘women-work,’ what 
does it consist of?,’ she [Xiuzhen] quizzed her daughter. Zhuzhu counted on her fingers: 
‘Announcing meetings, cleaning the offices, wiping out illiteracy, helping families resolve their 
problems, organizing vaccinations, and also intervening in fights and mediating disputes, 
because we can’t let men bully women!’” Xiuzhen laughs heartily as her daughter recites the 
components of “women-work,” teasing that if she tries to rattle everything that qualifies as 
“women-work” off on her fingers, she’ll be there until midnight. Zhuzhu has missed the forest 
for the trees, and Xiuzhen tries to get her daughter to see the bigger picture: “Women-work, it’s 
about caring about people’s work (ren de gongzuo), taking an interest in every woman in every 
home (guanxin ge jia xiaohu mei yige funü), and helping them to elevate their consciousness, to 
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organize their participation in production (zuzhi canjia shengchan). In every center’s work, you 
must listen to the party and help the party execute every task.”65 As Xiuzhen explains, “women-
work” goes beyond the Women’s Federation, and even beyond the party itself: “It’s a question of 
what road we rural folk will take,” she concludes, turning “women-work” into a set of values 
more than any specific set of tasks.  
 Yet even as Xiuzhen and Zhuzhu discuss what exactly “women-work” is, as the narrative 
progresses it becomes clear that the short story encapsulates not just “women-work,” but all the 
work that engenders the new subjectivity of women in the countryside. Over the course of the 
short story, Zhuzhu learns not only how to take over her mother’s responsibilities in the women’s 
association but also in the home and in the commune maternity ward. As her mother passes from 
one site of labor to the next, her daughter learns how to compensate for her mother by 
performing the same work as her, taking over for her not once but three times, with the short 
story broken up into three numbered sections, each corresponding to an instance of Zhuzhu 
“taking over” for her mother. In my reading of Li Zhun’s text, reproductive labor is the essential 
component of women’s work, gendered to the point of being exclusive to women. 
At the start of “Two Generations,” the commune leader has just asked Gao Xiuzhen to 
accept a position as factory manager of the commune’s new distillery, a position that Xiuzhen at 
first refuses because she assumes it is a man’s job. “‘How can you give this work to me? You 
need skills (jishu) and an education (wenhua) for a job like that, how could a woman (funü jia) 
possibly pull it off?’”66 The commune secretary disabuses Xiuzhen of her mistaken notion that 
women cannot lead factories, telling her she’s already proven she can get the job done, and 
Xiuzhen accepts the decision, indicating that her daughter will step up into her position as 
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chairwoman (zhuxi) of the women’s association so that she can begin working in the factory. 
(Zhuxi is rendered as “chairman” in the Foreign Language Press’s unattributed English 
translation.)67 
 In fact, Xiuzhen’s capable daughter has already “taken over” for her mother several 
times, and the story jumps back through time to recall the first occasion upon which daughter 
replaced mother. On the first occasion, in the years immediately following 1949 Xiuzhen 
becomes increasingly involved in village political work when a work team arrives. This 
development is of great concern to her husband, Yang Zhengxiang, a conservative rural man who 
has heard that the women who attend political meetings always end up asking for a divorce, no 
doubt due to rumors that have spread related to the New Marriage Law of 1950. When Xiuzhen 
is called to attend three days of rallies and meetings in town, her husband is beside himself with 
distress, convinced that his wife intends to leave him. Her sister-in-law takes her brother’s side in 
the fracas: “Going to a meeting? More like mucking around with men, I say (Genzhe nanrenmen 
chuan, laomei)! Who’s going to cook for you while you’re gone, huh? I’m not going to!”  
Instead, twelve-year old Zhuzhu rushes to her mother’s defense, offering to cook for the 
three days she is gone. Xiuzhen teaches Zhuzhu how to make noodles before she leaves, 
initiating her daughter in the domestic work of the house. While away, Xiuzhen finds it difficult 
to concentrate with her family on her mind, and she worries constantly that they will not be able 
to take care of themselves in her absence. When she returns on the fourth day, she beams with 
pride at the sight of Zhuzhu in an apron boiling noodles for dinner, a marker of Zhuzhu’s 
initiation in the reproduction of her mother’s domestic labor.  
 
67 Li Zhun, “Mother and Daughter,” Not That Road and Other Stories, pp. 105-6.  
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Xiuzhen’s return also transforms her relationship with her husband, who had become 
convinced Xiuzhen would use the meeting as a pretext to run away, abandon her family, seek a 
divorce, and leave him without anyone to perform the essential domestic labor upon which he 
depends. Although Li Zhun depicts Xiuzhen’s husband as irrational and a borderline hysteric, he 
may have cause for concern, for their relationship began when Xiuzhen was sold to her 
husband’s family as a child bride, where she “worked [in the Yang home] like a mute for thirteen 
years without daring to speak to [her husband.]”68 With no voice, Xiuzhen began her married life 
as a subaltern, and Li suggests that her relationship with her husband was previously best 
characterized as that between chattel and owner.  
But participation in village political work gives Xiuzhen a voice, and that voice, in turn, 
endows her with a subjectivity; she is no longer an object owned by the Yang family, but a 
subject who expresses her will and agency as she organizes her community. When Xiuzhen 
returns home, Zhengxiang is overjoyed not to have lost his wife; “he couldn’t wipe the grin off 
his face.” Just as Xiuzhen has transformed under the new social conditions of the countryside, so 
too has their marriage, and Zhengxiang “never lost his temper with her again. On the contrary, he 
seemed fonder of her than before.”69 By proving to her husband that she will not abandon her 
domestic responsibilities in spite of gaining a newfound confidence and political subjectivity, 
Zhengxiang and Xiuzhen’s relationship transforms into an affectionate companionate marriage. 
But whether their marriage is based upon the principles of love or property rights, Zhengxiang 
continues to enjoy the same benefits, with the expectation that other immediate kin—either his 
wife or his daughter—will perform domestic labor on his behalf.  
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As time goes on, Zhuzhu learns to perform an increasing amount of her mother’s work in 
the home, allowing Xiuzhen greater participation in her newfound political identity. The two 
women pass responsibility for the reproductive work of tending to the family from one 
generation to another, with men exempted from the cycle. By “taking over” for her mother, a 
hierarchy of labor and subjectivities becomes apparent: Xiuzhen’s initiation as a political subject 
is valued over her performance of household labor, and she is “liberated” from her chores only 
by displacing that labor onto another young woman, her daughter.  
The chapter’s hierarchical division of labor is further elaborated when Zhuzhu replaces 
her mother a second time. This time, when Xiuzhen is sent to the district to run the maternity 
ward, Zhuzhu is elected to her mother’s place as head of the women’s association. As this is 
Zhuzhu’s second instance of replacing her mother, and as her responsibilities are greater than the 
needs of their one small household, Li Zhun elevates “women-work” over the domestic labor of 
an individual household, and taking care of the collective women is valued over taking care of 
the private family. After their conversation about the nature of “women work,” Xiuzhen tells 
Zhuzhu that above all, she must rely on the Party’s guidance. “The Party will help you, and you 
must do the work it gives you,” explaining to Zhuzhu that it isn’t enough simply to run the 
women’s organization, but through that role, to support the productive goals of the mutual aid 
team. This, then, is the heart and soul of “women-work:” helping women resolve any of the 
distinctly feminine problems that might prevent them from participating in the productive and 
social life of the community (like spousal abuse, or a limited feudal consciousness), and 
organizing them so that the mutual aid team can achieve greater productivity. Although the 
specifics of “women-work” varies from day to day, whether it’s mediating in domestic disputes 
or tidying up the women’s association facilities, ultimately all acts, large or small, help facilitate 
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women’s support of the larger community’s productivity. When Zhuzhu begins working as 
leader of the women’s association, she begins to “imitate her mother’s methods and 
mannerisms,” furthering her transformation into from child to ideal adult female member of the 
community.70  
By beginning work in the women’s association, Zhuzhu is also initiated in labor that goes 
beyond the needs of their individual family. Because Zhuzhu now serves the larger community, 
her relationship with her mother is cathected through the public, and Zhuzhu sometimes calls 
Xiuzhen “Comrade Mother” (Mama tongzhi). The unusual and comical moniker combines the 
private intimacy of their parent-child bond with their public relationship as colleagues working 
in the same organizations within the community. Soon, Zhuzhu begins training to work as one of 
many new-style midwives in the maternity ward, receiving formal training in maternal and 
public health in the county seat, including instruction in the use of new, sterile midwifery 
techniques. 
Zhuzhu’s final occasion of taking over for her mother occurs when Zhuzhu takes over for 
her mother as head of the district maternity ward. This time, Xiuzhen feels no anxiety over 
passing the baton on to her daughter, as her daughter’s knowledge of new-style midwifery has 
surpassed her own. But being promoted to head of the maternity ward still signifies a large 
increase in responsibility, and Zhuzhu is eager for the challenge. She tells her mother how 
jealous she was when Xiuzhen participated in the construction of Great Leap infrastructure 
projects, telling her “Look at my hands—how soft they’ve grown” in the maternity ward. “I’ve 
been dying to get back to the land,” Zhuzhu tells her mother. She longs to recover her calluses as 
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well as the purpose and dignity they conferred, a clear idealization of manual labor over the 
reproductive responsibilities of the maternity ward.  
But even if Zhuzhu is ready for the promotion and Xiuzhen is assured of her daughter’s 
competence, the passing of the crown is still perhaps Zhuzhu’s most momentous transfer of 
responsibility yet, and Xiuzhen speaks with great affect, “as if preparing her daughter for a 
wedding.”71 Responsibility for the reproductive labor of the community thus carries a deep 
emotional charge, and Xiuzhen treats it as a sacred social rite of passage for her daughter. 
Xiuzhen is transformed into both metaphorical bride and mother to the extended community. By 
serving as midwife to the pregnant women of the community, Xiuzhen completes the final stage 
in her transformation from girl to woman, with her arrival at symbolic sexual maturity signified 
by her ability to direct the delivery of the community’s babies.  
As Xiuzhen and Zhuzhu move between roles, each transfer of responsibility from mother 
to daughter occurs within an explicitly gendered site of labor until Xiuzhen arrives at the 
threshold of the factory floor. Housework, organizing the women’s association, and obstetrics 
are all presented as inherently gendered forms of labor, and no men are involved in performing 
them throughout the course of the novel. They are also all forms of reproductive labor; childbirth 
explicitly so, while house chores and organizing the women’s association fall under Engels’s 
mantle of “the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing, shelter, and the tools 
necessary for [the] production of life.” As Xiuzhen and Zhuzhu pass from one site of labor to 
another, their labor rises in prestige, becoming increasingly socially valued in their community, 
until finally Xiuzhen is able to free herself from the limits of feminine labor and enjoy the 
“liberation” of performing men’s productive labor.  
 
71 Li Zhun, “Mother and Daughter,” p. 109.  
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Ironically, after years of passing on skills, knowledge, and responsibility to her daughter, 
it is Zhuzhu who finally molds her mother into a factory manager. Looking at the “old-fashioned, 
cumbersome coil in which Xiuzhen wore her hair,” Zhuzhu insists that Xiuzhen cut her hair into 
a more fashionable and factory-appropriate bob. “You’re in industry now, remember. You’re a 
factory manager,” she reminds her mother. But Xiuzhen refuses. “Why should I cut my hair to 
run a factory?,” she asks, telling her daughter that “You can’t expect a woman nearing fifty to go 
round with a bobtail like yours.”72 But during her afternoon nap, she awakens to the sound of 
shears at her ears: Zhuzhu has gone ahead and snipped her hair into a bob without her 
permission. At first, Xiuzhen is enraged at her daughter’s violation of her bodily autonomy, 
presented by Li Zhun as the work of an impudent, mischievous, but ultimately strong-willed and 
well-meaning daughter. But when her husband looks at Xiuzhen with her new hairstyle, her 
feelings soften when she sees the smile that dawns on his face. Looking into a mirror, the entire 
family agrees: Xiuzhen looks a decade younger. 
Thus, Xiuzhen’s entry into Marxism’s most privileged site of labor, the factory floor, 
transforms her traditional rural femininity into a distinctly new one, necessary for women’s 
participation in productive labor. Xiuzhen’s braid is symbolically cumbersome, and while she 
has been fit to perform reproductive labor thus far in her life, ultimately it and the traditional 
rural female subjecthood that it represents, have held her back. In order to participate in the 
productive public sphere, a new subjectivity is required. By forcefully cutting off Xiuzhen’s 
braid, her daughter physically remakes her mother, revitalizing her and taking years off her 
appearance in order to prepare her for her entry, in her fifties, into the male realm of productive 
labor. But the incident also suggests that even in the new society, Xiuzhen was not fit for 
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productive work in either age or appearance. Her lack of consent to the haircut is further 
evidence of her fettered thinking, and not a violation of her bodily autonomy, and the hairstyles 
link feudal ways of thinking with age itself. New China will be best served by new women.  
Li Zhun’s story celebrates Xiuzhen’s transformation from mute child bride to productive 
community leader, but Xiuzhen has paid a high price to get there: after four decades of often 
thankless reproductive labor, Xiuzhen has earned her entry into the factory by reproducing 
herself not just once, but three or four times, depending on how one counts. Where historians 
write of the double-burden of labor (productive and reproductive) weighed upon rural Chinese 
women during the collective era, Xiuzhen has not reproduced herself not only by giving birth to 
her daughter, but by training her to reproduce her mother’s labor in the home, in the women’s 
association, and in the maternity ward. Through “Two Generations”’s depiction of the 
accomplishments of two exceptional country women, the narrative creates an impossible 
standard for women’s entry into productive labor: in order to do a man’s work, a woman must 
learn to endlessly reproduce herself throughout the countryside’s defining new social institutions.  
Ru Zhijuan’s “Maternity Ward,” originally published in 1960 as “Jingjing de chanyuan 
li,” similarly explores the reproductive labor of women, this time centered exclusively in the 
maternity ward.73 The Great Leap Forward entailed supporting women not only in caring for 
children, but in giving birth to them. Childbirth was one of the “seven basic requirements” that 
the commune was responsible for providing to its members, and the Sputnik People's Commune 
(Weixing renmin gongshe) in Henan Province, whose constitution was consulted as a draft for 
others, stipulated in Article 14 that every woman was guaranteed a month's maternity leave at 
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half wages.74 By establishing “birth stations” (chan yuan) and rural hospitals, the countryside 
would achieve a “Great Leap Forward” in health work, and the establishment of people's 
communes was accompanied by an explosion in the number of the country’s maternity wards. 
The journalist Anna Louise Strong wrote in 1959 of “the rapid growth of a system of maternity 
care such as no country in history has set up in such a short period,” with over “[one-hundred 
thousand maternity homes, an average of four to a commune,” already in place within a year of 
the establishment of people's communes.75 Maternity wards were to be made available to all 
expectant mothers in communes free of charge. 
In reality, the establishment of “birth stations” for childbirth was “brief and more 
decentralized than the term ‘stations’ would suggest,” as Hershatter observes. Like most other 
Great Leap Forward social programs, the birth stations were another unfunded mandate, and 
rural governments were already cash-strapped. Hershatter notes that individual commune 
members were often asked to donate money in order to fund maternity wards.76 By 1959, many 
maternity wards reported difficult working conditions, and most were disabled when collective 
dining halls were disbanded.  
The short story follows the midwife Aunt Tan’s encounter with a younger midwife, 
Hemei, who arrives to Aunt Tan’s ward fresh from completing an obstetrician course in town. 
Although Aunt Tan is singularly devoted to delivering children and her work in the maternity 
ward, the story does not mention whether or not Tan herself is a mother, focusing instead on the 
socialized reproductive labor that she performs. Aunt Tan’s identity as a midwife, and the arrival 
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of the maternity ward itself, arrive coeval to the community, and the opening pages of the short 
story linger over the materiality of the ward’s facilities: “As [Aunt Tan] snapped on the electric 
light, this combined office and delivery room appeared spacious. Every object in it seemed to 
glow: the smooth white sheet on the bed and the white screen round it, the white desk, white 
walls and ceiling.”77 “It was wonderful the electric light made everything so much whiter and 
smater,” thinks Aunt Tan to herself, and the illuminated room reinforces the enlightened science 
and social practices that the maternity ward symbolizes. The room is clean, simple, and well-
appointed, its presence signifying not only the material improvement of the community, but the 
arrival of new technologies for managing childbirth that will contribute to the social and material 
wealth of the community.  
 The short story centers on conflict provoked by Hemei’s arrival to the maternity ward. 
Aunt Tan is challenged by the new midwifery techniques and aspirations of the younger 
midwife, who arrives with ambitions and midwifery techniques that Aunt Tan has never heard 
of. Although Hemei has not come to replace Aunt Tan, she does represent the future of the 
profession, and in that sense Aunt Tan is reproduced in the younger figure, making the maternity 
ward a site of reproduction twice over. Ultimately, in order to serve the community’s pregnant 
women and ensure the safe delivery of their children, Aunt Tan comes to see that she must 
remake herself as a midwife, both in mind and in practice. At the story’s conclusion, Hemei 
upgrades the facilities so that they are now able to use running water, a more hygienic practice, 
and the material conditions of the maternity ward itself represent Aunt Tan herself, who 
upgrades both her thinking as well as her skill as a midwife.  
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Like Xiuzhen in Li Zhun’s “Two Generations,” Aunt Tan in Ru Zhijuan’s “The 
Maternity Home” similarly must reproduce herself in order to meet the needs of the community. 
Only Aunt Tan’s remaking of herself does not allow her to serve the productive needs of the 
community, but rather its reproductive ones. Aunt Tan reproduces herself in the image of her 
young successor, Hemei. Like Hemei, in her youth Aunt Tan had been an innovator, introducing 
new techniques to the community through her rural midwifery practice, such as the use of a 
dedicated maternity ward for deliveries, the sterilization of equipment, and the use of electric 
lighting during birth. The challenges of ushering in new midwifery techniques are engrained 
deep in Aunt Tan’s memory, and before Hemei is set to arrive, she recalls how difficult it had 
been to get the villagers to come to her side. “When the country was first liberated, who had 
heard of a maternity home, sterilizer, or electric lights in a village? In those days, childbirth was 
a trip through the valley of death.”78 Her attempts to help the villagers were often met with fierce 
resistance, and Aunt Tan is filled with gratitude that the obstetric methods she introduced are 
now commonplace.  
 Yet Aunt Tan’s experiences with resistant villagers do not prepare her for the new 
maternal healthcare techniques that Hemei introduces when she arrives at the maternity ward. 
The morning after her arrival, Hemei begins teaching women who have just given birth that 
perform post-natal stretching exercises, an activity that Aunt Tan finds distasteful and 
unbecoming for new mothers. Hemei also insists that that ward install running water; Aunt Tan 
cannot understand why the need running water when they’ve been getting by with a water basin 
just fine. Neither is Hemei terribly impressed with the materiality of the ward facilities 
themselves. When she first arrives, Aunt Tan is proud of the ward and its accomplishments, 
 
78 Ju Chih-chuan, “The Maternity Home,” p. 7.  
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eager to show it off to her. “In our two years of history, we haven’t let a single accident occur. 
No harm has come to any mother or child. A woman comes in alone but leaves with a baby in 
her arms,” she tells Aunt Tan, but almost immediately she is overwhelmed with emotion, and 
unable to speak when she considers how much the maternity ward has meant to the community. 
“Since words were not enough to express what she felt, Aunt Tan stood up to show Hemei the 
whole [ward],” from the beds to the contents of her desk. “But Hemei did not understand her 
pride in them,” and instead she looks around the room, ignoring the gleaming medical 
instruments that Aunt Tan wishes her to look at.  
 When Aunt Tan becomes insulted when Hemei agrees with her that their humble 
maternity ward can’t match the county hospital, and their interactions become vexed. Aunt Tan 
takes Hemei’s failure to appreciate the splendor of the maternity ward personally, as if the 
material surroundings and medical implements represented Aunt Tan and Hemei had turned her 
nose down at Aunt Tan herself. Immediately, generational resentment boils to the surface, and 
Aunt Tan begins to resent the privilege that she perceives Hemei as having been born into. 
“These youngsters! …They’ve had white rice in their bowls ever since they can remember. To 
have land to till and food to eat, to go to school or attend training courses are all things they take 
for granted. So are this maternity home, the electric light, tractors, and everything.” Aunt Tan’s 
exasperation serves as much as insight into the character’s internal monologue as it does to 
remind the reader of the commune’s advancements.  
 But over the course of the story, Aunt Tan slowly begins to realize that she has misjudged 
Hemei. When a pregnant woman begins to fatigue during a long labor, Aunt Tan realizes that the 
situation has become dire. But the maternity ward is unable to handle any complications in 
childbirth, so Aunt Tan rushes to the telephone to call for help. But time is short, and Hemei tells 
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Aunt Tan they cannot wait to send the patient to a bigger hospital or for another doctor to arrive. 
The childbirth requires the use of forceps, which Aunt Tan has not been trained to use. But 
Hemei has, and as she guides Aunt Tan through the procedure, Aunt Tan realizes that Hemei’s 
new techniques benefit the women and children of the community. After the birth, feeling newly 
accepting of Hemei with her sense of purpose renewed, Aunt Tan sits in happy silence in the 
ward. “This quiet maternity home, together with all the villages and towns of China, moved 
forward into a new day.”79 
 Throughout the story, Aunt Tan is reproduced through both the younger nurse as well as 
the material ward itself. Indeed, Hemei and Aunt Tan’s read less as two separate personalities 
than they do as two incarnations of the same midwife, each trained during a different time period 
and with their defining concerns extending out of that specific historical context. Hemei is a 
younger version of Aunt Tan, an enthusiastic rural midwife eager to serve her community who, 
like Aunt Tan before her, improves upon the existing reproductive practices. Teaching Aunt Tan 
new delivery techniques, such as the use of forceps during delivery, Hemei upgrades Aunt Tan’s 
knowledge base, teaching her new skills that allow her to handle deliveries of increasing 
complexity. Just as the contributions of Aunt Tan’s new, hygienic childbirth practices are 
symbolized in the physical space of the maternity ward itself, Hemei’s improvements are 
symbolized through the facilities upgrade she delivers in the form of running water. Hemei’s 
material improvements and knowledge transfer to the maternity ward have the net effect of 
allowing the rural ward to be less reliant on outsiders, with less need to call for an outside doctor 
or to rush a patient to a bigger hospital. The material innovations of the maternity ward are met 
with scientific innovations in maternal care, made possible through the mental transformations of 
 
79 Ju Chih-chuan, “The Maternity Home,” p. 21. 
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the nurses who work inside. In order to serve the commune’s reproductive needs, Aunt Tan then 
remakes herself, not once, but twice: first by creating herself in Hemei, and then by allowing 
Hemei to remake her as a midwife. “Maternity Ward” and “Two Generations” present narratives 
of reproductive labor in which the essential reproduction is not that of others, but of the self.  
Both Ru Zhijuan’s “Maternity Ward” and Li Zhun’s “Two Generations” depict the 
complex processes of social reproduction that occur on the rural commune. Each story is 
centered in sites that are explicitly gendered as a woman’s space, from the home to the women’s 
association to the maternity ward, and they depict transformations rural women must undergo in 
order to serve the literal and figurative reproductive needs of their communities. In Li Zhun’s 
“Two Generations,” on the final occasion in which Zhuzhu takes over for her mother, she learns 
to handle her mother’s responsibilities as head of the maternity ward so that her mother is free to 
work as a floor manager in the commune’s new liquor factory venture, a position of leadership 
and considerable status. Only after Xiuzhen has reproduced herself in the home, in the body, and 
in the gendered community is she fit for a public role in a privileged site of productive labor, the 
factory. Aunt Tan, on the other hand, must be continually made and remade, like the maternity 
ward itself: when the novelty of electricity wears off, running water is installed, and when the 
novelty of socialized midwifery becomes widespread, Aunt Tan must learn a new and improved 
set of medical skills. “Maternity Home” and “Two Generations” serve as parables, then, of how 
women’s new subjectivity is produced under the new social conditions of the Chinese 
countryside.  
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Chapter 6 | Conclusion 
 
I began working on this dissertation project in earnest in the summer of 2016, and so it 
bears the dubious distinction of having been written largely under the rise of the Trumpian 
political era. Donald Trump’s election in November 2016 was a watershed in many ways. In the 
days, then months, and now years that have followed, there have been many moments when my 
dissertation did not feel like the most urgent task in front of me, and when I was not sure that this 
was the most meaningful work I could contribute to society. But as the era has endured, I have 
noticed an ever-increasing number of palimpsests of the revolutionary past. At “Trump on 
Show,” a ribald Cantonese opera that premiered in Hong Kong in May 2019, for instance, 
playwright Li Kui-ming portrayed Trump as the inheritor to the chaos and excess of the Cultural 
Revolution, drawing explicit parallels between the cult of personality, even the “dragon energy,” 
that he believes the two men share. 
 Other themes from the past reappear in new form: in the throes of the 2020 Democratic 
presidential primary election, Elizabeth Warren, for example, emerged as the “plan-maker” to 
Bernie Sanders’s “earth-shaker”1—the engineer to his spontaneous storm, the Liu Shaoqi to his 
Mao Zedong. Warren’s “I’ve got a plan for that” belies a faith that the system can be fixed, while 
Sanders’s vision promises systematic political re-alignment powered through spontaneous mass 
mobilization. On the left, the characterization distinguishing Sanders’s supporters from Warren’s 
 
1 I borrow here language used by labor historian Gabriel Winant to describe the two in a widely-circulated essay 
exploring the re-appearance of Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich’s term “professional-managerial class.” See 
“Professional-Managerial Chasm,” n + 1, Mar. 12, 2020, https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-
only/professional-managerial-chasm/. 
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has often been characterized as that between the “working class” and the “professional-
managerial class.” The term professional-managerial class, in particular, has emerged as a 
“sociological designation turned into an epithet and hurled like a missile.”2 Meanwhile, “white” 
has returned as a pejorative in mainland China, this time in the guise of the “white left (baizuo),” 
a sneering insult used to describe believers in Western liberalism whose political commitments 
are limited to identity politics and incremental adjustments to the capitalist order.3  
 By making this comparison, I do not mean to suggest that today’s presidential primary 
candidates draw directly from revolutionary Chinese thought in formulating their campaign 
platforms, and neither do I find most attempts to condemn Trumpian excess through comparisons 
to the Cultural Revolution particularly informed or persuasive. Nativist neo-fascism can easily be 
condemned on its own grounds. But I do want to point to how in each time, and in each society, 
conflicts around parallel ideas persist, and their unsettled legacies carry into the future. The 
professional-managerial class has emerged today as the contested boundary between the working 
class and the elites—or what might have been called in other times the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie. But how exactly is the professional positioned in society? Is the professional a 
member of the petty bourgeoisie, a “transitional class” where the interests of capitalists and 
proletarians combine into a politically capricious whole? Or, because they rely on the sale of the 
labor-power to make a living, are they already members of the proletariat, and primed for 
sympathy to their struggles? Whither the professional?  
 When I took up the question of the conceptual and cultural transformation of labor during 
the socialist period in the P.R.C., it was immediately apparent that the nature of the professional 
 
2 Winant, “Professional-Managerial Chasm.”  
3 Dylan Levi King, “‘White Left’: The Internet Insult the West has Gotten Wrong,” Sixth Tone, Jul. 10, 2017, 
https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1000477/white-left-the-internet-insult-the-west-has-gotten-wrong. 
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in a socialist society was a central, yet deeply vexed issue. It was also one that the country’s 
brightest leaders approached with signature élan, imagining with bold iconoclasm how the 
professional class could systematically be remade through the embrace of labor. Where some 
saw the “white” class as existing in an inherently antagonistic relationship to the “red,” others 
believed that white experts could be remade as “red and expert.” If the problem with the 
professional class was their ambivalent position between labor and capital, belonging fully to 
neither, then remaking the professional through a relationship to labor would resolve their class 
contradictions in the service of a technocratic socialist future: a “regiment of sci-tech (kexue 
jishu) cadres, … professors, educators, scientists, journalists, artists, lawyers, and Marxist-
Leninist theoreticians” belonging to the proletariat, as Liu Shaoqi proclaimed.4  
 In many ways, each of my chapters describes variations on this vision of a utopic, 
technocratic socialist future in China: once the bourgeoisie is replaced by a new class of red 
experts, fields as diverse as the fine arts, medicine, education, and even gender itself would be 
transformed in a just and egalitarian centering of proletarian interests. In order to do so, the 
revolutionary project needed to articulate how the ideals embodied by a professional ideology 
necessarily betrayed the social world in which those professions were located: hence white-
coated doctor from Chunmiao who is so distracted by the needs of ego and the conventions of his 
profession that he refuses to heal the sick, or the veterinary teacher from Juelie so blinded by the 
abstractions of theory that he misses the veterinary praxis right in front of his eyes. As cultural 
texts, these works of film, literature, journalism, and art imagine the alignment of professional 
and working class interests through the embrace of the labor associated with the proletariat: the 
 
4 Liu Shaoqi, “Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai Beijing gejie qingzhu Shiyue shehuizhuyi geming sishi zhounian dahui shang 
de jianghua [Remarks by Liu Shaoqi at the all-inclusive fortieth anniversary celebration of the socialist October 
rebolution in Beijing],” reprinted as the introduction to Lun youhong youzhuan [On being red and expert] (Beijing: 
Beijing qingnian chubanshe, 1958), p. 3. 
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doctor who walks rice paddies without shoes; the artist who understands the daily lives of the 
lower-middle peasants because they are a lower-middle peasant; the college student who studies 
not to better themselves, but to better society; the housewife dignified by her new position of 
leadership on the factory floor. 
 During the socialist period, the revolutionary episteme made a conscious effort to 
recognize and resolve major social conflicts that were understood as the vectors of injustice in 
the old society: the conflict between urban and rural, between mental and manual labor, and 
between industry and agriculture. The forms of labor associated with the underhand (rural, 
manual, and agricultural labor) were used to transform the upper hand (urban, mental, and 
industrial labor). I have borrowed gratefully from the historian Michael Denning to describe this 
as a “laboring” of modern Chinese culture occurring during the socialist period, infusing its 
rhetoric, narrative, and thinking with an increased visibility of rural, lower-class Chinese and the 
forms of labor they were most closely associated with. The laboring of culture challenged the 
reification of professional work, and because any division of labor is also gendered, it also 
challenged the exclusion of women from the most privileged forms of labor.  
 When I write of the socialist period in China, I am referring broadly to the period from 
the late 1940s to the early 1980s. I stretch my boundaries before 1949 and after 1976 because, as 
a cultural historian, I am interested not in top-down political histories motivated by a few elites, 
but in the broad cultural shifts brought in like the tide on waves of entrenched expectations 
around the constellations of ideas that produce our societies. In this dissertation project, I have 
found that while the broad cultural shifts in concepts of labor that I examine have roots prior to 
the establishment of the P.R.C., during the Great Leap Forward they took center stage. In today’s 
scholarship, the Great Leap Forward is typically understood backwards—that is to say, as if it 
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was birthed from Mao’s mind like Athena, a mature policy reflecting the culmination of 
considered debate and research that sprang forth fully grown. But in fact, as Maurice Meisner 
emphasizes, when the Great Leap Forward slogan was announced in January 1958, “there were 
no detailed blueprints. It was the product of a utopian social vision, not an economic plan on the 
order of a five year plan.”5 The Great Leap Forward reflected a Maoist vision for the 
reorganization of society through permanent revolution, but the specific policy initiatives for 
which the Great Leap Forward is remembered—the people’s communes, the backyard furnaces, 
the large-scale irrigation projects—were improvised, and produced as the revolutionary Maoist 
episteme took hold.  
Instead, I have endeavored to understand the Great Leap Forward first and foremost as a 
way of thinking, that eventually produced the signature policies with which it has now been 
conflated. Although this emphasis may seem like a minor matter of historiography, the 
conventional approach to the Great Leap Forward—through its failures first—can only ever 
result in a pre-determined analysis of the period that can only explain culture as propaganda and 
broad popular support as the brain-washing of a captive people. Instead, in each chapter I trace a 
culture of new medical, artistic, educational, and domestic labor stretching from the Great Leap 
Forward to its fullest expression during the mid-1970s, at the tail end of the period that is now 
known as the Cultural Revolution.  
The question of the professional was paramount during the Cultural Revolution, 
functioning as an index for the complications of class and of class analysis within a socialist 
society. And if the Cultural Revolution was a revolution against the bureaucracy, what is the 
bureaucracy if not a professional class? Scholars such as Richard Kraus argue that the Cultural 
 
5 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1999), p. 192.  
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Revolution constituted an antibureaucratic analysis of socialism in which the root of the problem 
could be traced back to the socialist state. “In this view, socialist classes were based ultimately 
upon power relationships in a highly bureaucratized society,” writes Kraus, making the Maoist 
critique of the party and its institutions a class analysis of a socialist society.6 Maurice Meisner 
believed that this made Mao unique amongst his socialist contemporaries in articulating that “a 
socialist society, if left to its own devices, would generate a new exploiting class.”7  
Although Maoist critique carries Mao’s name, it would have been powerless had it not 
reflected sweeping and pervasive views within socialist society, culminating in widespread 
programs to remake the professional, expert, and bureaucratic through their relation to labor. 
This process was simultaneously top-down and bottom-up: the professional would be socialized, 
and the proletariat would be intellectualized. By re-defining the doctor, the artist, and educator, 
and the woman through their relationship to labor, the cultural texts of the socialist period were a 
conscious attempt to recognize and resolve the conflict between educated and poor, the 
professional and amateur the urban and the rural, the revolutionary woman and the bureaucratic 
man.  
Gender was perhaps the central site through which the laboring of the socialist period 
occurred precisely because women’s labor had for so long been invisible, largely excluded from 
forms of labor privileged by the immediate recognition of “productivity.” To be clear, women 
have always worked—but they have not always been recognized as named workers. Indeed, as 
Gail Hershatter argues, “China’s modern history is not comprehensible without close attention to 
 
6 Richard Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 143.  
7 Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978-1994 (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1996), p. 50.  
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women’s labor, and Woman as a flexible symbol of social problems, national humiliation, and 
political transformation.”8  
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how revolutionary narratives themselves were 
gendered during the socialist period, whether through the bare feet of Chunmiao or the contested 
blank exam of Li Jinfeng. As characters, women characters offered their narratives the most 
dramatic opportunities for transformation, sublimating their subaltern status into an active and 
noble revolutionary subjecthood. As the amateur artists or lay medical experts  of their 
communities, women were a powerful symbolic reminder of the labor transformations that were 
possible: look no further than Li Jinfeng, the peasant mother of four who transformed into a 
celebrated and accomplished painter. Because they both embodied and executed the cycles of 
social reproduction essential keeping the countryside afloat, women made the idea agents 
through which the engines of society could be retooled, from Li Jinfeng, the humble wheat 
grower who becomes an exemplary college student, or Gao Xiuzhen, the housewife who learns 
to lead her commune.  
These cultures reached their fullest expression during the Cultural Revolution, which 
rendered their collapse in the years following Mao’s death all the more spectacular. The failure 
of the Cultural Revolution was also the failure of an anti-bureaucratic vision of society, and the 
reform era that followed not only repudiated, but effectively reversed the signatures of the 
revolutionary era. Barefoot doctors, peasant artists, labor universities, and people’s communes 
were “orphaned” by the failure of the Cultural Revolution. Linking the late 1950s to the late 
1970s in a trajectory of revolutionary cultural thought demonstrates how the repudiation of the 
Cultural Revolution by the C.C.P. in 1981 in fact entailed the denial of a much more extensive 
 
8 See Gail Hershatter, Women and China’s Revolutions (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), p. 2. 
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intellectual project and history. The Maoist cultural imaginary ceased to hold its persuasive 
power, gradually replaced with the embrace of an elite, urban, technocratic, and episteme of 
reform. The great irony, perhaps, is that the productivist bent of the socialist period turned out to 
be completely compatible with the productivist imperative of the capitalist system.  
Given its failures, what vestiges, then, remain of China’s revolutionary society in the 
present? Increasingly, linkages between the revolutionary period and the present are being 
explored by scholars such as Cai Xiang, Paul Clark, Laurence Coderre, Jie Li, and Pang 
Laikwan, who emphasize long and connective cultural histories over the short and precise 
narratives of political intrigue that have hitherto dominated the study of the P.R.C. Other 
scholars are beginning to tease out ideological frameworks established during the Cultural 
Revolution that remain operative today, such as Xiaohong Xu, who argues that the Cultural 
Revolution initiated a process of separation between the “political” and the “economic” that 
enabled neoliberal logics of development and global integration to take root in the P.R.C.9 
Thus, we arrive at a moment in the present in which work is understood as nearly 
exclusive to waged labor, with gendered, classed, and racialized divisions of labor once again 
consolidated around the reification of productive and professional forms of work. The failure of 
the ambitious projects of the socialist period—to labor the work of the professional, and to make 
visible and elevate the multiple forms of labor that rural women perform—have ultimately 
contributed to the collapsing of the concept of “work” around waged labor, a productivist conceit 
shared by capitalist and socialist epistemes alike. Medicine ultimately had could not 
accommodate the presence of a lay laborer, and the socialist amateur finds herself equally 
 
9 See Xiaohong Xu, “The Great Separation: How the Cultural Revolution Shaped China and Its Relationship with 
Global Capitalism,” presented to the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies Interdisciplinary Workshop, 
University of Michigan, Feb. 20, 2020.  
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abandoned by the fine arts. In this dissertation, I have sought to make legible the ambitious 
transformations of multiple contexts of labor during the socialist period of the P.R.C. So long as 
they remain illegible, they remain inert. But illuminated within the context of their own times, 
perhaps there is something still that can be gleaned.  
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